A China Strategy That Lasts

For decades, Beijing has used trade not only as a means to generate economic growth but also as a geopolitical tool to attract investment, strengthen its industrial base, expand its economy, and support its military. It has done so by integrating national security, economic security, energy policy, and environmental policy. In sectors as varied as automobiles, chemicals, and solar panels, the Chinese government’s policies have led to overproduction at home, which pushes companies to export at low prices, flooding international markets and undermining the manufacturing bases of rival economies. The erosion of those countries’ industrial capacity ultimately weakens their ability to compete with and resist China economically, diplomatically, and militarily. And the United States cannot win a long-term competition with China when Beijing controls global manufacturing and supply chains.

In Washington, policymakers of both parties recognize the China challenge. Yet the United States’ approach to addressing this challenge has shifted with each presidential administration and, at times, even within a single presidency. Long-term challenges require long-term solutions, and Congress is the branch best suited to crafting such solutions. Congress can provide the consistency and predictability needed to align U.S. economic, trade, and national security goals into the future. If the United States hopes to compete successfully with China in the coming decades, Congress—not the executive branch alone—must establish a durable framework that can outlast political cycles.

To counter China’s trade policy and protect U.S. national security, Congress should pass legislation to permanently strengthen enforcement of existing trade laws, modernize customs authorities to better track goods coming from China, deepen partnerships in the Western Hemisphere, and address the advantage that China derives from weak enforcement of environmental standards. Many such pieces of legislation have already been introduced. Now, Congress needs to move forward and make them law. This will ensure that the United States can rebuild and protect its industrial base and win the competition with its biggest geopolitical rival.

CLOSING LOOPHOLES

A long-term trade strategy to counter China must first have permanent trade enforcement. One positive step came in July 2025, when Congress closed the de minimis loophole, which allowed goods costing less than or equal to $800 to be imported without a tariff. Because of this loophole, in 2024, approximately four million packages a day—mostly from China—entered the United States duty free and largely unscreened. Counterfeit products, goods containing hazardous chemicals such as fentanyl, and cheap consumer products were pouring into the United States. Meanwhile, American exporters sending goods to China faced tariffs on any products for individual use costing more than $6.90 and on commercial products worth more than $690.00.

Repealing the de minimis threshold will help level the playing field for American manufacturers and create a more stable framework going forward—one that cannot be changed by a future executive order. But other legislation is needed to further bolster enforcement. Currently, U.S. trade strategy relies on a June 2026 executive order that increases the bond on high-risk goods that is required to guarantee duties get paid in full, places restrictions on repeat violators of customs rules, establishes minimum penalty floors, and expands reporting requirements that provide Customs and Border Protection with the ownership and supply chain information necessary to identify bad actors. Together, these changes make it harder for Chinese companies to exploit gaps in U.S. customs enforcement.

Congress should codify the June 2026 executive order to make these changes permanent. Such a bill warrants bipartisan support because protecting U.S. manufacturers and rebuilding the manufacturing job base is a shared priority for policymakers. Furthermore, such a bill would protect American businesses and ensure that trade rules are enforced more consistently.

GET WITH IT

Enforcement alone will be insufficient, however, if customs authorities continue relying on systems designed for an earlier era of global commerce. Although recent executive actions, including the June 2026 customs enforcement order, authorize the destruction of counterfeit goods, expand electronic filing, and move the United States toward a better trade-processing system, Congress should pursue a broader effort to bring customs into the twenty-first century.

The Customs Modernization Act, which I introduced in 2023, aims to replace paper-based customs processes with comprehensive electronic filing. It also requires online marketplaces to provide verified seller and transaction data. The Trump administration has since built on these reforms by requiring importers of record—the entities legally responsible for imported goods—to maintain sufficient domestic assets, bonding, or both to ensure compliance with U.S. customs laws.

Just as important, the CMA enables Customs and Border Protection to employ the same advanced data analytics and artificial intelligence already used by these marketplaces. These tools would help customs officers evaluate millions of shipments efficiently, expedite the processing of legitimate commerce, and identify high-risk imports before they enter the American market. The CMA would give the United States better tools to identify and stop illicit or dangerous goods from China from entering the country, thereby strengthening U.S. economic and national security. Passing the Customs Modernization Act is now even more important to address the many policy challenges coming from China.

UNITED WE TRADE

Trade enforcement, even if codified in legislation, cannot on its own counter Chinese incursions into the Western Hemisphere. The United States must also provide countries with attractive alternatives to economic dependence on Beijing.

The Americas Act, which I introduced in March 2024, offers one model for accomplishing this by encouraging a trading network in the Western Hemisphere built on trusted partnerships rather than Chinese dominance. Near-shoring production in the Americas would diversify supply chains away from China, strengthen regional economies, improve U.S. access to critical minerals, and reduce U.S. and global dependence on Chinese manufacturing.

The Americas Act includes investment incentives designed to deepen commercial ties between the United States and its regional partners with the goal of reducing China’s influence on regional trade. It also provides measures to prevent partnerships with corrupt governments, given that in some countries, corruption, bribery, and informal economies undermine the rule of law and act as barriers to U.S. investment. The legislation would use e-government systems to better track trade among countries and the transactions of state and local governments.

Among the act’s most powerful financing tools is the creation of an Americas Investment Corporation, which would allow the U.S. government to invest alongside private firms in infrastructure and industrial projects important to U.S. national security. Such a corporation would provide a credible alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which extends financing for massive infrastructure projects around the world but can leave recipient countries heavily indebted to and politically dependent on Beijing. In contrast, an Americas Investment Corporation would attract sustainable private-sector investment that promotes long-term economic partnerships across the hemisphere by distributing risk and directing capital toward infrastructure, industry, and supply chains that can compete with Chinese-backed projects. Congress should revive and advance the Americas Act as a bipartisan strategy to strengthen regional trade networks and loosen Beijing’s grip.

REMIT WHAT YOU EMIT

One way that China has reduced its manufacturing costs is by refusing to enforce environmental standards commonly accepted in the advanced industrialized world. Lower production costs encouraged companies to relocate their manufacturing to China, which strengthened the country’s industrial base, expanded its economy, and supported its military modernization and geopolitical ambitions. And it has come at a cost to the global environment.

The consequences of these emissions go beyond China’s borders. According to a 2014 study, on any given day, as much as 24 percent of the sulfates measured in the western United States originated in China. Other research has shown that foreign pollution, much of which comes from China, has contributed to thousands of premature deaths and billions of dollars in added medical expenses for Americans each year. China is also the world’s biggest carbon emitter: according to the International Energy Agency, in 2024, China produced more than 12 billion tons of carbon dioxide, more than 2.5 times that of the United States.

The Foreign Pollution Fee, which I proposed in April 2025, is one legislative solution to this imbalance. It would impose an import charge approximately equal to the cost saved by ignoring emission goals comparable to those required by the United States. Although this policy would apply to any country with weak environmental enforcement, China, as the world’s biggest polluter, would pay the highest price.

The Foreign Pollution Fee builds on an American comparative advantage in emissions. Absolute U.S. emissions have steadily declined since 2005. Presuming this trend continues as American manufacturing becomes cleaner, the gap between the emission output of U.S. and Chinese production will continue to grow, thereby increasing the size of the fee. If, however, China invests in controlling its emissions, then its production costs would rise. Either way, manufacturing costs would no longer be artificially skewed by China flouting environmental regulations. Rather than asking American workers to compete against lax environmental standards, the policy rewards innovation, productivity, and cleaner manufacturing.

BUILT TO LAST

China uses trade as an instrument of geopolitical competition. To respond, the United States should keep its trade policy focused on one goal: curbing China’s ability to undermine the United States’ economy and military infrastructure, along with those of U.S. allies. Achieving that objective requires a strategy that extends beyond a single administration and even beyond the United States by working with like-minded partners including Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

Congress must take the lead. It can do so by permanently strengthening trade enforcement, modernizing customs authorities, building resilient supply chains throughout the Western Hemisphere, and ensuring that manufacturers in China cannot gain a competitive advantage by simply ignoring environmental standards. It can achieve this by codifying the 2026 executive order on strengthening customs enforcement, passing the Customs Modernization Act and the Americas Act, and implementing the Foreign Pollution Fee. These measures would increase the United States’ economic growth relative to China’s, strengthen U.S. industrial capacity and the associated job base, and provide greater resources for both national prosperity and national defense. More important, placing this authority with Congress would give the United States something executive action alone cannot: a durable strategy capable of surviving changes in administrations and sustaining long-term competition with China.

The threat from Beijing’s trade-based foreign policy is not going away any time soon. Washington should respond with a clear policy meant to last. The legislation is already written; what is needed now is the political will to pass it. Congress should work together to establish a lasting trade strategy that protects American industry, strengthens U.S. allies, and ensures that the United States—not China—sets the rules of the twenty-first-century global economy.

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