The term “regime change”, Susan Doran informs readers, dates from the 1920s, but the concept is as old as politics. It offers a suitable frame within which to consider the years immediately following Elizabeth I’s death, and the accession of James VI of Scotland. The author, a renowned Tudor expert, has transitioned to the Stuarts with ease, writing authoritatively and engagingly, mining an impressive range of primary and secondary sources.
Having recently experienced the death of Elizabeth II, it is easier for us to understand the emotional turmoil that the English people underwent in March 1603. Their bewilderment was enhanced on being informed that the new king was the foreign son of the Catholic Mary, Queen of Scots, executed on Elizabeth I’s orders, and the ruler of a prickly ally with a history of bitter enmity. Doran gives much credit for the smooth transition of power to the English privy council, especially Sir Robert Cecil, although she perhaps exaggerates the uncertainty within elite circles over the succession. The mutterings of a handful of disgruntled courtiers gave birth to the cack-handed Bye and Main Plots, allowing the regime to exploit show trials in which plotters begged for mercy from the new king. The optics of public theatre were understood by James, who played his part expertly, as he did over the first few months of 1604 at the Hampton Court Conference and his official entry to London.
James was the main reason for the success of regime change. Doran underlines his experience as a ruler as he quickly and confidently took charge of England. Fortunately, the Elizabethan shine had been dimmed by long, costly wars, economic setbacks, unresolved religious issues and financial grievances, creating a backlog of discontent. The new king positioned himself as a reformer on whom hopes might be pinned, progressing south amid a well-organized public relations exercise. James I’s accession was so smooth that, Doran observes, it was “something of an anticlimax”.
In contrast to Elizabeth I, James had a spouse and children. Prince Henry, the heir, died in 1612, leaving a more fragile dynasty, but by then the Stuarts were firmly established. Queen Anna was, in Doran’s view, an important, if traditional, royal consort, sharing some of her husband’s burden. The English court was a huge step up in scale and wealth from Scotland, yet James soon ran into difficulties by overspending on lavish display and patronage. Admittedly, he had to support separate courts for the queen and Prince Henry, but his excessive generosity to the Scots who formed an impenetrable ring around him stirred English jealousy. Concern at alien influence was heightened by his preference for taking advice and making policy decisions outside his privy council. He expected his council to manage operational business without him, but he was appropriately informed, diving into detail when necessary. The government of England was unchanged, being overseen by largely hard-working and competent councillors, free from serious faction. James worked them hard; in fact, he worked Cecil to death.
James’s political problems largely arose from relations with the House of Commons. He got off to a bad start in April 1604, when his vision of a unified Great Britain ran into vested interests and xenophobia. Doran sees his Union vision as the most significant innovation he introduced, a contrast to the general emphasis on continuity. James’s well-known views on his sovereign authority, and his readiness to use prerogative power to advance the Union agenda, set alarm bells ringing. Despite some progress on naturalization, commercial activity and border administration, Union was dead in the water by 1606, a humiliating defeat for the king’s flagship policy. Relations with parliament were further strained by James’s deteriorating financial position, in part due to parliament’s refusal to provide adequate supply, which came to a head in 1610 with the failure of the Great Contract.
James’s ambition to position himself as a confessional conciliator clashed with the unrealistic expectations of Puritans and Catholics. Despite the early mood music about reform, he was wedded to the royal supremacy and religious conformity, key features of his sovereign authority. Puritans had to make do with his preference for Calvinist theology and a preaching ministry. Catholic frustrations led extremists to the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 and the inevitable crackdown that followed. The failure of the diabolical plot provided an opportunity to trumpet God’s heavenly support for the dynasty. Despite the domestic impact of Catholic terrorism and the fears of militant Protestants, James was successful in delivering peace with Spain and in promoting European peace more widely.
The author is critical of the overemphasis on the Stuart succession as the cause of a breach with England’s Tudor past, arguing for greater continuity between James I and his immediate predecessor. Neither religion nor the government of England, especially in the localities, altered significantly. James’s biggest change project, Union, was derailed. Arguably, peace with Spain was a bigger switch in direction than Susan Doran allows, and the rocky relationship with parliament is perhaps underplayed. A different book might have shown that the real shifting of the tectonic plates after 1603 was in Scotland and Ireland, but this is a convincing account of how James I led a successful and under-estimated regime change in England.
Keith M. Brown is Professor of Scottish History at the University of Manchester
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