By The Diplomat | Created at 2026-06-11 15:35:20 | Updated at 2026-06-12 09:19:13
21 hours ago
On February 7, nine-year-old Huzaifa Sultana died in a Dhaka hospital, 27 days after a stray bullet fired from across the Myanmar border struck her in the head. Huzaifa had gone with her grandfather to buy snacks from a nearby shop and it was while she was returning home that she was hit.
On March 28, 13 Bangladeshi fishermen from Teknaf were reportedly detained by the Arakan Army (AA) while fishing in the Naf River, which forms the international border between southwestern Bangladesh and Myanmar. Then, on May 24, three Bangladeshis were killed in a landmine explosion near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border at Naikhongchhari.
These are among dozens of incidents reported along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in recent years. Several Bangladeshi fishermen have also been abducted by the AA, disrupting the livelihood of many people living along the Naf River. The AA is an armed group that operates in Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
These incidents have underscored that the armed conflict in Myanmar is no longer a distant crisis taking place across the border. Its consequences are increasingly being felt inside Bangladesh.
For years, Bangladesh’s approach to Myanmar has been defined by one issue — the massive flow of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh. More than 700,000 Rohingya fled a crackdown by the Myanmar military in Rakhine State in 2017 and crossed into Cox’s Bazar, joining earlier waves of refugee populations. Their numbers have swelled to more than a million at present.
Their repatriation back to Myanmar has dominated Dhaka’s Myanmar policy. But the political and security dynamics across the border have shifted profoundly.
Since Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, the country has descended into civil war. In Rakhine State, the AA has emerged as the dominant force, capturing much of the territory bordering Bangladesh. In large areas across the Naf River, effective authority now rests not with the Myanmar military but with the AA.
The impact of this new reality is perhaps most visible on the Naf River.
The clearest example is the growing number of Bangladeshi fishermen detained by the AA. Reports citing Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), local officials, and fishermen’s associations show that several hundred fishermen have been detained from the Naf River and adjacent waters since the group consolidated control along the border.
Since December 8, 2024, when the AA seized Maungdaw and took control of the Myanmar side of the border, at least 399 Bangladeshi fishermen have been abducted.
As of May 2026, some 165 of them remain in rebel custody. Some have been held for over a year, with many families still unsure whether their relatives are alive. This has, by all accounts, become a hostage crisis.
For many families, the consequences are severe. Fishing remains one of the primary sources of income in large parts of southeastern Bangladesh. Many fishermen borrow money from boat owners or traders before going to sea. When they are detained, households lose income while debt obligations remain.
The geography of the Naf River further complicates the situation. The river is narrow, tidal, and difficult to navigate. Fishermen often point to strong currents, shifting sandbars, and poorly demarcated boundaries that can push boats toward Myanmar’s side of the border. Bangladeshi authorities have also acknowledged that sometimes fishermen cross the border accidentally.
Former detainees have described poor conditions in AA-controlled camps, while others alleged that relatives were contacted and asked for money through Bangladeshi mobile financial services. Boats, fishing gear, and catches have not always been returned after release.
The significance of these incidents extends beyond the fate of individual fishermen. They illustrate how the AA is increasingly exercising functions traditionally associated with state authority. Along stretches of the Bangladesh-Myanmar frontier, the group is not only controlling territory but also regulating movement, enforcing its own rules, and shaping the livelihoods of communities that depend on cross-border waters.
This presents Bangladesh with a dilemma.
The AA controls territory and influences events along the border, but it is not a recognized government. Dhaka cannot engage it through normal diplomatic channels. Yet practical realities on the ground increasingly require communication with the actor exercising authority across much of the frontier, and that is the AA.
The fishermen’s issue is only one manifestation of a broader transformation. These incidents demonstrate how Bangladesh’s security environment is increasingly being shaped by developments inside Myanmar.
A 2025 study titled “Navigating Challenges of Bangladesh-Myanmar Border Management and Its Strategic Solutions” described the Bangladesh-Myanmar frontier as one of the country’s most difficult borders to manage. Although the two countries share only 271 kilometers of land boundary, the region includes hills, forests, rivers, and coastal routes that complicate surveillance and enforcement.
The researchers identified a combination of challenges, including informal trade, drug trafficking, cross-border crime, poverty, Rohingya displacement, and Myanmar’s political instability. Their analysis highlights the structural weaknesses that make such incidents more likely.
Myanmar’s civil war has accelerated these vulnerabilities. As state authority weakened in Rakhine, armed groups gained influence over territory, trade routes, and local populations. For Bangladesh, the result is a neighboring region where the most influential actor on the ground is no longer necessarily the internationally recognized government. This has implications far beyond border security.
Any future Rohingya repatriation effort will depend heavily on conditions inside Rakhine. For years, Bangladesh’s strategy focused on negotiations with Myanmar’s central authorities. Yet as the AA consolidates control over large parts of Rakhine, its policies and security arrangements may become increasingly important to the feasibility of any return process.
Border management, maritime security, trade, and refugee policy are therefore becoming more closely intertwined than before.
Bangladesh now faces a difficult challenge. How can it protect its citizens and manage its border when the most powerful actor across much of the frontier is not Myanmar’s government, but an armed group? Can Dhaka communicate with the Arakan Army on practical issues without giving it political legitimacy? And how should Bangladesh balance its relations with Myanmar’s government against the realities on the ground in Rakhine?
Bangladesh has not fully caught up with these changes. Public and political attention remains focused largely on India. Yet along the southeastern frontier, a different security landscape is taking shape.
The Rohingya crisis remains unresolved. But it now exists alongside cross-border violence, maritime disputes, landmine threats, and the growing influence of a non-state armed actor controlling territory immediately across the border.
