Breaking Down the State of Play in Sino-North Korean Ties

From June 8-9, 2026, Chinese leader Xi Jinping made his first state visit to North Korea in seven years. Both governments highlighted the enduring strength of bilateral ties, yet the rhetoric from the engagement masked years of political stagnation and strategic drift in the relationship since Xi’s last trip to Pyongyang in 2019. The Kim Jong Un regime’s self-imposed COVID isolation gave way to deliberate steps toward deepening ties with the Kremlin rather than Beijing. The summit, then, was a key indicator of the current state of play in ties between China and North Korea.

While many outside observers watched intently for notable signs of strategic realignment, the visit was devoid of the substance seen in other summit-level events that North Korea has hosted in recent years. 

Ultimately, Xi’s state visit was largely a pro forma exercise intended to re-establish a baseline for engagement rather than to break new ground in Sino-North Korean relations. Observers can expect the two governments to proceed with working level meetings in various sectors (e.g., trade, tourism, science, sports, etc.), while the biggest question remains whether the two governments will actually take steps to increase military cooperation. 

The Bilateral Relationship Before Xi’s visit

There was a stark contrast in bilateral relations between Beijing and Pyongyang prior to and after Xi’s last state visit to North Korea in 2019. Ahead of that trip, Xi was a fixture in Kim’s foreign policy designs, warranting a summit-level meeting prior to each of Kim’s follow-on engagements with then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump. In total, Kim made four visits to Beijing from 2018 to 2019 before Xi finally reciprocated in traveling to Pyongyang. After that trip, however, there were no bilateral meetings between the two for years, and it was Russian President Vladimir Putin, not Xi, who emerged as the foreign leader most frequently engaged with Kim during that time.

North Korea’s COVID lockdown was a key transition period for the Kim regime’s policy designs. The self-imposed isolation allowed for a reset in multiple areas of governance while few officials were permitted to enter or leave the country, including foreign diplomats. It was during this time that the North Korean government focused on a triple track approach of internal stability, military modernization, and restructuring external relationships. Under the first track, the Kim regime took measures to re-indoctrinate the population and reorganize the economy under the central government. This included rooting out black market activity that had been fueled largely by goods smuggled in from China, including foreign media and cell phones.

The second track was wholesale modernization of the Korean People’s Army, but the most notable evolution came in the adoption of new nuclear forces. Rather than relying upon a Chinese nuclear umbrella, the Kim regime took concrete steps to develop wide-ranging delivery vehicles for its stable of nuclear warheads including rail-launched ballistic missiles, strategic cruise missiles, and nuclear-capable rocket launcher systems. 

At the same time, the Kim regime’s third track focused on restructuring its external relationships under new policy paradigms. This notably included the abandonment of unification with South Korea as it demonstrated a willingness to accept two sovereign states on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the decision to back Russia in its war against Ukraine given Pyongyang’s newfound leverage in its engagements with the Kremlin. Less advertised has been the stagnation of Sino-North Korean ties as Beijing had to figure out how to adapt to a more self-assured North Korea.

In 2025, the two governments began rekindling their bilateral engagement, most notably with Kim’s return to Beijing. Traveling to the Chinese capital to observe Victory Day celebrations alongside other world leaders, Xi held a one-on-one meeting with Kim and signaled a willingness to return to North Korea. Nine months later, Xi followed through.

Xi Jinping’s State Visit

The state visit largely adhered to established diplomatic choreography and featured no noteworthy departures from precedent. On the first day, Xi participated in a large welcome ceremony at Kim Il Sung Square, held summit talks with Kim, attended a banquet, and observed an arts performance. On the second day, Xi laid flowers at the Sino-North Korea Friendship Tower, visited the Central Cadres School of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and departed following a small group luncheon with Kim Jong Un and their spouses. The symbolism was familiar and carefully choreographed, emphasizing continuity rather than innovation.

That same message was reinforced in the Chinese and North Korean op-eds published via the Rodong Sinmun national newspaper on the morning of Xi’s arrival – one from the North Korean side, and one attributed to Xi. Neither article announced concrete initiatives; rather, both emphasized the historical bonds between the two countries and called for a new era of cooperation built upon their shared revolutionary heritage.

Overall, the visit reflected a distinctly party-centric approach. It may seem natural for North Korea to emphasize Workers’ Party of Korea representation as counterparts to the Chinese Communist Party; however, it meant that there was a different cast of officials present for Xi’s visit than those involved in North Korea’s other recent summits. It is difficult to tell how this will affect future interactions, but it was a notable deviation from prior events.

Key Takeaways

Any summit-level engagement for North Korea is noteworthy given the rarity of leader-level meetings. For analysts, the itinerary, the reporting, and the pre- and post-activities are important indicators for the Kim regime’s baseline foreign policy behaviors. However, each summit of course carries its own significance, and there were five important takeaways from Xi Jinping’s state visit.

First, the most remarkable aspect of the visit was how unremarkable it was. There were no new treaties signed and no major initiatives declared, and the activities were pro forma. While there was much ceremony, the visit did not yield any publicly announced policy initiatives. This is notable considering the examples set in Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit in March in which the two sides signed a new Treaty of Friendship and numerous sectoral agreements. It stood in even starker contrast to Vladimir Putin’s last visit in which Russia and North Korea signed a new alliance treaty.

Second, Xi’s Pyongyang visit was more “reset” than “breakthrough.” A common theme throughout the visit was the leaders’ call for renewed engagement and capitalizing on a new era of bilateral relations. In this way, the two governments were highlighting the need for restarting cooperation rather than accelerating or innovating existing efforts. This means that there will likely be a “feeling out” period as the two sides initiate working level meetings and decide on the most appropriate methods of fulfilling the top-down direction for bilateral collaboration.

Third, Russia-Ukraine War has created different impetus of Sino-North Korean engagement. Beijing has been on the sidelines watching the DPRK and Russia deepen ties during the Russia-Ukraine War, and this engagement signaled that the Xi administration no longer wants to be in “reaction mode.” The push to rekindle ties with Pyongyang indicates an effort to gain a better handle on what China’s regional partners are doing. Meanwhile, the end of the Russia-Ukraine War is going to alter the power dynamics between the Kremlin and Pyongyang significantly as Russian dependency upon North Korean military assistance wanes. For the Kim regime, it is important to re-establish a baseline with Beijing before those power shifts happen.

Fourth, its important to note that the countries’ denuclearization and “One China” positions are lagging indicators. There are two types of indicators in analysis: lagging indicators are results from outcomes that have already occurred; while leading indicators are factors that show trends before outcomes have manifested. Many analysts are treating the issues of denuclearization and One China policy as leading indicators in the Sino-DPRK relationship, but they are actually lagging indicators that reflect the evolution of the relationship since the 2019 summit.

The stagnation of ties for the past seven years illustrated to Beijing that it does not have the economic leverage to compel Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons that are as much about autonomy as deterrence. The Russian example also indicates that tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear program is a prerequisite to advancing bilateral ties in this new policy paradigm.

As for North Korean support to the One China policy, the summit only reiterated long-standing talking points. North Korea has been clear on its position vis-à-vis Taiwan since at least 1999. More recently, in August 2023, the North Korean government published an op-ed attributed to its ambassador in Beijing entitled, “There is only one China in its land.” In other words, the mention of support for the One China policy at this recent summit is only a reiteration of talking points that have been in circulation for years.

Finally, the 65th anniversary commemoration is the next big event to watch. The Sino-DPRK alliance treaty was signed on July 6, 1961, and during the state visit, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un noted that the two sides would hold major commemoration events next month. This will be important to observe to see if they actually generate some momentum in military-to-military cooperation. Two questions merit close attention: what level of representation will they have present; and will they sign new implementation agreements related to military-to-military engagement? The answers to those questions will offer signals of the pace and action that this summit actually generated for military cooperation.

In his banquet speech while in Pyongyang, Xi reportedly stated that China and North Korea are at a “new historic starting point,” which is entirely appropriate in this moment. The strategic environment has evolved since 2019, as has the policy paradigm surrounding North Korean security and foreign policy. The Xi administration has been slow to adapt to its ally’s developments, and this summit represented an attempt to reset relations and provide a foundation going forward. It is impossible to determine where exactly the shared path for the Xi and Kim governments will lead, but it is important to recognize that the recent state visit was a means to restart their journey together rather than to produce a definitive roadmap for the way ahead.