Can Europe use Trump’s return to reform its defence capabilities?

Since the end of World War II, Europe has thrived under the protective umbrella of the United States. Pax Americana, established through Nato and an enduring transatlantic partnership, allowed European nations to flourish, focusing on rebuilding their economies and societies while American military might deterred threats.

This security arrangement is the cornerstone of Europe’s post-war stability and prosperity. Yet with Donald Trump back in the White House, the era of unquestioned American commitment to European defence is over. It gives the European Union a binary choice.

Trump’s presidency is poised to underscore, yet again, the fragility of Europe’s dependence on the US. During his first term, he repeatedly – and rightfully – criticised Nato allies for not spending enough on their defence, questioned the security alliance’s value and threatened to withdraw the US.

In response, German chancellor Angela Merkel warned in 2017 that the EU could no longer “fully count on others” and must “take our destiny into our own hands”. In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron called for “a true European army”. Both leaders recognised a shift was necessary – yet the EU has since taken incremental steps at best.

Initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation and European Defence Fund have been bogged down by bureaucracy, limited budgets and a lack of political will. Joint military projects remain the exception rather than the rule, and the bloc’s €326 billion (US$342 billion) defence spending, despite increased efforts due to the Ukraine war, lags far behind America’s US$852 billion.

Little has been done to prepare Brussels for a geopolitical reality in which Washington prioritises an “America first” doctrine and retrenches its global commitments. Meanwhile, Brussels is increasingly consumed by internal struggles.