By The Diplomat | Created at 2026-07-30 09:45:26 | Updated at 2026-08-03 11:53:53
4 days ago
China’s military pressure on Taiwan remained generally stable in the first half of 2026, with no major escalation in military aircraft or naval vessel activity. Tensions ran lower than at the end of 2025. This owes largely to the multiple opportunities for direct meetings that the U.S. and Chinese leaders arranged in 2026. For example, during the mid-May 2026 summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, from May 13 to 17, daily sorties by Chinese military aircraft detected around Taiwan fell to an average of three, with zero sorties on both May 14 and May 15. By comparison, the daily average for the first half of 2026 was 7.5 sorties.
After the summit concluded, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a joint combat readiness patrol on May 19; Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense detected 24 military aircraft that day.
At least two more opportunities for the U.S. and Chinese leaders to meet remain in 2026: in September, when Xi is expected to visit the United States, and in November, when China hosts the APEC summit. (Some suggest the two leaders will also come together at the G20 summit in December, although Xi has not attended every G20 summit in person in recent years.) But this does not mean China’s military pressure on Taiwan will stand still in 2026. Quite the opposite: China needs to seize every opportunity to create a de facto advantage on the Taiwan topic ahead of these meetings.
Beijing views Trump as a negotiator who respects an adversary’s leverage and is willing to pay a high price when the other side’s bargaining position is strong. And China’s primary instrument for attaining that leverage is gray zone operations.
Since 2018, when the China Coast Guard (CCG) was transferred to the People’s Armed Police system and placed under the direct command of the Central Military Commission, it has acquired highly militarized capabilities while retaining its “law enforcement” character. China has grown accustomed to using coast guard law enforcement as a gray zone tool, enabling it to apply sustained pressure in disputed waters without crossing the threshold of war.
In late May 2026, the Philippines and Japan announced the launch of formal negotiations to delimit the maritime boundary of the two countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. Tokyo and Manila’s EEZ claims in these waters overlap, and they also overlap substantially with the waters east of Taiwan. Citing this, China deployed the CCG beginning June 1 to openly conduct law enforcement patrols in these waters for the first time under the banner of independent law enforcement patrols.
The operation does not appear to be temporary. In early July, the CCG rotated its formations and continued regularized law enforcement patrols, including inspecting vessels and protecting fisheries.
The waters east of Taiwan had traditionally been regarded as the “rear area” of Taiwan’s defense, or a relatively low-pressure zone. In this operation, China appears to be seizing the opportunity to expand the scope of its near-seas governance, forming a more complete maritime encirclement posture around Taiwan.
Coast guard patrols in the waters east of Taiwan amount to asserting a jurisdictional claim over those waters. From January to May, an average of roughly one Chinese official ship (primarily CCG vessels) per day was detected operating around Taiwan. In early June, the daily average rose to 5.2, reaching 10 on June 9, yet military aircraft activity did not increase in tandem. Operating under the name of law enforcement, the coast guard presents a lower external profile than military aircraft circling Taiwan.
After then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, the PLA used this pretext to break the long-standing tacit understanding of the Taiwan Strait median line and conduct large-scale encirclement exercises around Taiwan. Since then, operations by China’s military aircraft, warships, and drones circling Taiwan and entering Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have shifted from occasional to routine. Gray zone tactics allow China to maintain its “peaceful reunification first” narrative while advancing control in practice.
For Taiwan, the CCG’s frequent activity in the waters east of Taiwan forces its military and Coast Guard Administration to remain on high alert, yet they cannot enter into conflict with these highly militarized police forces. Ultimately, the Chinese military’s presence and patrols in the waters east of Taiwan will become routine and an established fact. In theory, this will become the foundation of Beijing’s strategy to “blockade Taiwan” ahead of any conflict.
For the Philippines and Japan, their respective clashes with the CCG in the South China Sea and the East China Sea remain fresh in memory. The CCG routinely deploys larger-tonnage, advanced vessels armed with autocannons. They have been known to fire high-pressure water cannons at opponents. While the CCG’s escalated activity provides the Philippines and Japan an opportunity to deepen maritime security cooperation, how to move from mechanism-level discussions to actual cooperation remains a question. Both sides need to ensure that they do not proactively escalate a conflict in the vicinity of Taiwan.
For the United States, this is a test of the First Island Chain strategy. Against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict with Iran, the U.S. toolkit and resolve remain constrained. The more likely approach, therefore, is to work behind the scenes to push Tokyo and Manila to strengthen security cooperation and to increase investment in and deployment of security and military infrastructure.
But with the September summit approaching, we do not know whether Washington is prepared to withstand Beijing’s diplomatic pressure. After all, Xi demanded during the two leaders’ February phone call that the United States handle arms sales to Taiwan prudently, and ahead of the May summit Beijing again warned that announcing arms sales would jeopardize the summit. The White House made concessions both times.
At present, U.S. deliveries of arms sold to Taiwan are still underway, and F-16s and HIMARS may both arrive in Taiwan in stages in the second half of 2026. The unannounced $14 billion arms sale package, meanwhile, has become a bargaining chip for Trump in maintaining relations with China. As long as Trump has not announced it, Beijing must remain at the negotiating table and diplomatically accord Trump sufficient respect – even if actual progress in those negotiations is slow.
But Beijing does not expect Trump to cease arms sales to Taiwan forever. From the period after Xi’s September visit to the United States through the conclusion of the U.S. midterm elections in November, the second half of the year still offers many junctures at which Trump could announce this $14 billion arms sale package. Before that happens, Beijing is impatient to cement its presence in the waters east of Taiwan – because subsequent events may give China the pretext to intercept vessels bound for Taiwan under the guise of “quarantine” and “law enforcement inspection.”
