For the Arakan Army, Recognition Must Be Earned

Recently, Human Rights Watch published a distressing investigative report, tellingly titled “Skeletons and Skulls Scattered Everywhere.” The report confirmed that the Arakan Army had massacred at least 170 Rohingya civilians, including 90 children, and likely killed or wounded hundreds more in the village of Hoyyar Siri (Htan Shauk Khan in Burmese) in the Buthidaung Township of Myanmar’s Rakhine State on May 2, 2024. 

This constitutes only a small fraction of the Arakan Army’s record of human rights violations against the Rohingyas. Since the ethnic armed organization (EAO) has wrested control of much of the Rakhine State in 2023-2024, it has expelled more than 150,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh, committed war crimes — massacres, rape, and arson — against Rohingya civilians; subjected them to severe restrictions, extortion, and forced conscription; and even banned the use of the word “Rohingya” upon the threat of harsh penalty. In fact, Major General Twan Mrat Naing, the commander-in-chief of the Arakan Army and the Chairman of the United League of Arakan (ULA), had publicly denied the distinct identity of the Rohingyas, terming them as “Bengalis.”

Thus, while the Arakan Army is deliberately refusing to recognize the distinct identity of the Rohingyas, who constituted between 25 and 30 percent of the population of Rakhine State before the 2017 “cleansing operations,” it is seeking international recognition for its de facto control over Rakhine State. 

Using the geostrategic importance of Rakhine State as a leverage, the Arakan Army is trying to legitimize its territorial and administrative control over state by seeking recognition from external actors with political, economic, security, and strategic interests in the region, particularly China, India, Bangladesh, and the United States. Rakhine State holds substantial reserves of oil and natural gas, has strategic access to the Indian Ocean, hosts important Chinese and Indian geo-strategic projects, and often serves as a conduit or transit route for regional non-state armed actors. Using these factors as bargaining chips, the Arakan Army is trying to attain international recognition.

In international law, the issue of the recognition of a new state or a new government is highly complex. Since the Arakan Army has not yet made a formal declaration of independence, the question of the recognition of an independent Rakhine State is moot from the viewpoint of international law. Hence, the question is about the recognition of its government. So far, while the Arakan Army has not yet declared independence, it has formed its own government for Rakhine State, termed the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government (APRG), which is essentially controlled by the ULA. Meanwhile, the Rakhine State Government, located in the capital Sittwe, is formally under the Tatmadaw-backed Myanmar Union Government. Thus, Rakhine State currently has two rival governments.

The situation on the ground is as follows: the Arakan Army controls approximately 90 percent of the territory of Rakhine State, along with the Paletwa Township of Chin State. In these territories, the APRG acts as the de facto government. The military-backed Rakhine State Government remains the de jure government of the state, but its de facto authority is currently restricted to the state capital Sittwe, the strategic port of Kyaukphyu, and parts of the Ann Township which the military controls. 

As long as the Rakhine State Government retains control of Sittwe, it is unlikely that any foreign state would grant de jure recognition to the APRG. However, a number of states, including China, India, and Bangladesh, have engaged with the Arakan Army in order to safeguard their interests in Rakhine State, and international institutions, particularly humanitarian actors, need to engage with the Arakan Army to avert a humanitarian crisis in the region. This creates the possibility that the Arakan Army may attempt to secure de facto recognition of its government from these states and institutions.

Whether Beijing, New Delhi, Dhaka, or any other capital would extend de facto recognition to the APRG is contingent upon the dynamics of their relations with the Tatmadaw-controlled Myanmar Union Government, the trajectory of the Myanmar civil war, and the perceptions of the urgency of their interests in Rakhine State. However, before granting any sort of recognition to the APRG, states and international institutions must take into account the following factors.

First, Rakhine State is still engulfed by war, and the APRG’s control over the region is not undisputed. The Myanmar Union Government is still engaged in an intense war against the Arakan Army, and Chin EAOs are opposed to continued Arakan Army control of Paletwa Township. Granting recognition to such an entity, even if only de facto, would be premature.

Second, the Arakan Army has displayed latent expansionist and confrontational tendencies in its actions toward other actors in the region. Its occupation of Paletwa Township has created fictions with Chin EAOs, while its actions toward Bangladesh, including repeated abductions of Bangladeshi citizens, extraction of ransom from the hostages, seizure of Bangladesh-bound vessels, imposition of illicit taxation on Bangladeshi traders, and killing of Bangladeshi citizens, have generated unease in the country. Unless the Arakan Army adopts a more moderate and conciliatory attitude, granting even de facto recognition to the ARPG would only embolden its reckless behavior and ultimately be counterproductive.

Finally, the Arakan Army has so far demonstrated no inclination to build a democratic, inclusive, and law-governed polity by ensuring the rights of all ethnic, racial, and religious communities in Myanmar. It has not only violated the rights of the long-suffering Rohingyas with impunity, it has blatantly denied the existence of a distinct Rohingya identity and effective dehumanized them by propagating the narrative that the Rohingya are “Bengali immigrants” to Rakhine State. Also, the Arakan Army has subjected other minorities, including the Chakmas and the Chin, to human rights violations. Under these circumstances, granting even de facto recognition to the APRG would be a mistake from both moral and pragmatic perspectives.

The international community and particularly the regional states should make any sort of recognition of the APRG contingent upon the Arakan Army’s recognition of the Rohingyas’ distinct identity, its commitment to safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable repatriation of all Rohingya refugees, its dedication to the creation of a democratic, inclusive, and law-governed polity, and its pledge to moderate its behaviour towards regional actors. This would go a long way in ensuring the stability of the region and a sustained peace in Rakhine State.