Has al-Sharaa 'Freed' Iran from Spending on the Region?

Pictured: Ahmed al-Sharaa, alias Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of Syria's jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, is greeted at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus on December 8, 2024. (Photo by Abdulaziz Ketaz/AFP via Getty Images)

In most government offices in Tehran, the first thing a visitor encounters is a cardboard effigy of the late General Qassem Soleimani, presented as "the greatest military commander in Islamic history." Also labeled as "the martyr Haj Qassem," his bust adorns public squares and sport stadiums in more than 100 Iranian towns and cities.

Eulogized as the leader who defeated the United States, humbled Israel and conquered Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and parts of Yemen, Haj Qassem is one of the trio that dominate Khomeinist mythology, the other two being the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the current "Supreme Leader" Ali Khamenei.

But what if the tide is turning against Haj Qassem? Plans to install his bust in more of Iran's 1,000 towns and cities have been quietly "postponed" in recent days, and the narrative about his derring-do adventures toned down in the official media and Friday sermons.

Instead, the ghost of a new master of derring-do, this time regarded as an enemy of Iran, is creeping into national discourse and official propaganda: the "liberator of Damascus" Ahmed al-Sharaa, alias Abu-Mohammed al-Jolani.

Let us make a provocative suggestion: Al-Jolani may merit the title of a hero of Iran, if not necessarily of Islam, more than Haj Qassem.

Why?

First because Haj Qassem was a kind of ATM that dispensed between $30 and $50 billion of Iran's money, creating a pipe-dream empire in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and parts of Yemen, which is vanishing like smoke in thin air. In an editorial Monday, Kayhan, the daily that echoes the Supreme Leader's sentiments, noted that the "deep feeling of hurt" at the loss of Haj Qassem's empire resembled what the Islamic World felt after the loss of Andalusia (Spain).

By showing that one cannot build an empire with an ATM, al-Jolani may have punctured the illusion that Iran, in the words of former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, has become the "regional superpower." And that may persuade the ruling mullahs to pull down their vanity, something that would benefit everyone, including the mullahs.

Al-Jolani may have served Iran's interests in other ways.

By forcing Iranians to flee Syria, he helps Iran avoid further human losses, estimated at between 5,000 and 6,000 dead, and more than 30,000 wounded since 2011.

Next, al-Jolani gives Tehran an opportunity to get rid of the estimated 80,000 Afghan, Pakistani, Lebanese and Syrian mercenaries who fought for Haj Qassem in Syria. (How this could be done may be difficult, but that is another question.)

Al-Jolani also cuts Tehran's direct access by land to Beirut, making it more difficult to ship money and weapons to what is left of the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah, which costs Iran an estimated $800 million each year.

At the same time, the closing of Syria to half a million Iranian pilgrims, going to visit the tomb of Zeinab, a sister of Imam Hussein, would save Iran a further $1 billion in cool dollars. That in turn could help partly quench the thirst for dollars which has plagued the Iranian economy since Haj Qassem embarked on empire-building.

Because in Iran, the government, thanks to oil exports, is the main source of dollars, a reduction in currency expenditure in Syria and Lebanon could bring down the value of US dollars by increasing its supply in the domestic market.

That, in turn, would reduce inflation or at least slow down the current rush towards hyperinflation. The average Iranian urban family is currently converting a good part of its savings into foreign currency, the value of which keeps rising because of inadequate supply.

Al-Jolani may have helped Iran in a number of other ways.

Four years ago, General Muhammad Baqeri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, demanded $1 billion a year to deploy 4,000 additional border guards to end attacks by some 80 terror groups operating from bases in Pakistan. His demand was quietly turned down because "defending the shrine" in Damascus was a bigger priority.

Thanks to al-Jolani, Baqeri may now get his 4,000 border guards.

Over 15,000 families, known in Persian as mal-bakhtegan, whose life savings were wiped out with the collapse of state-endorsed Ponzi schemes, could also be thankful to al-Jolani. A plan to partially compensate them in 2018 was shelved because the government couldn't spare the $500 million required.

Thanks to al-Jolani, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's administration may also be able to tackle other problems ignored for lack of money.

For example, why not rebuild the jetties destroyed in the Iran-Iraq war decades ago that once made Khorramshahr Iran's largest seaport?

Al-Jolani may have done Iran two more favors.

First, he has shown that spending money and blood on killing other peoples to keep a hated tyrant in power isn't good politics or economics. Even the dumbest or most hoodwinked policymakers in Tehran may have gotten that message.

Secondly, if Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wishes to replace Iran's Khomeinist cabal as pretender to leadership of the Islamic world, let it taste some of the witches brew dished out to Iran by Haj Qassem and his puppet-master.

Amir Taheri was the executive editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at or written for innumerable publications, published eleven books, and has been a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat since 1987. He is the Chairman of Gatestone Europe.

This article originally appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat and is reprinted with some changes by kind permission of the author.