How China Is Normalizing Its Presence in the Waters East of Taiwan

Following the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting on May 28, 2026, Japan and the Philippines are to hold negotiations to determine the boundaries of their overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves in the waters east of Taiwan. The main goals include clarifying the scope of resource development, strengthening defense and maritime security cooperation, and preventing unforeseen clashes. Japan regards this as a model of peaceful resolution under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and consistent with international law; China strongly protests the initiative. Since China considers Taiwan part of its own territory, it claims rights over the waters east of the island and objects that Japan and the Philippines should not negotiate boundaries without Chinese involvement.

China has long argued for the legitimacy of the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, asserting that the islands and waters of the South China Sea are Chinese territory. Less noted is that the northeastern end of the nine-dash line runs along southeastern Taiwan, and the “2023 edition of China’s standard map,” published by the Ministry of Natural Resources on August 28, 2023, adds a tenth dash line east of Taiwan. This confirms China’s strong interest in those waters. China has also deployed carrier groups there and repeatedly conducted exercises suggesting preparation for an invasion of Taiwan from the east.

As China’s interest in the waters east of Taiwan grew, the People’s Liberation Army commenced activities there. Then, in June 2026, China criticized Japan and the Philippines at the same moment the China Coast Guard (CCG) began conducting law enforcement patrols off Taiwan’s eastern coast. It has kept those patrols going in an effort to normalize them. Military, legal, and administrative functions are now acting in concert.

These recent actions are reminiscent of the Kinmen Islands episode in February 2024. On February 14, after two Chinese fishermen died during a crackdown by the Taiwanese Coast Guard near Kinmen, the CCG abruptly announced it would conduct law enforcement patrols in the Xiamen-Kinmen waters and declared such activities would be normalized, effectively breaking boundaries Taiwan had set and forcing a very real change in the status quo. The Kinmen episode was not the first such instance. The same applies to the Senkaku Islands: in September 2012, when the Japanese government purchased and nationalized private land there, Beijing responded by routinely allowing coast guard vessels to intrude into Senkaku territorial waters as a form of law enforcement. China has thus made it a routine approach to exploit incidents and accidents, voice protests, normalize previously non-existent law enforcement activities, and change the status quo.

This time, the opening of boundary negotiations between Japan and the Philippines is being treated as an “incident or accident,” prompting the CCG to commence and normalize hitherto unseen law enforcement activities off Taiwan’s eastern coast. Based on the Senkaku and Kinmen precedents, those activities can be expected to become normalized and conducted on a daily basis.

Since Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s remarks about the “situation threatening national survival” at the House of Representatives Budget Committee on November 7, 2025, China has ramped up its criticism of Japan, framing all of Tokyo’s foreign policy as “neo-militarism.” Under the guise of protesting this, China continues to litigate Japanese responsibility while simultaneously changing the status quo. The narrative propagated domestically and internationally, of course, is that Japan and others moved first, thereby justifying Chinese actions. This is a pattern likely to keep recurring in the Western Pacific.