By The Diplomat | Created at 2026-09-18 16:41:45 | Updated at 2026-09-19 03:39:30
19 hours ago
On September 16, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act with a 262 to 159 vote. The U.S. Senate had passed the legislation on August 7 with an overwhelming majority, which means that the bill now awaits only presidential approval.
Named after the late Senator Lindsey Graham, a staunch supporter of Ukraine, who spearheaded negotiations on the bill with the White House, the bill effectively allows President Donald Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on exports to the U.S. from the top five purchasers of Russian oil or natural gas, making exceptions for countries that import less than 15 percent of their natural gas from Russia and are taking “significant” steps to reduce the imports. Additionally, the bill provides for a range of sanctions against Russian officials and Moscow’s shadow fleet of vessels.
Following the bill’s passage, Senator Richard Blumenthal publicly remarked that China and India “better clean up” their “act” and buy oil and gas “somewhere else.”
As of August 2026, India was the second largest buyer of Russian oil, behind only China, leaving the two Asian giants most exposed to potential U.S. tariffs. Between December 2022 and August 2026, China accounted for 50 percent of Russia’s total crude exports, while India accounted for 37 percent.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was quick to issue a statement on the passage of the bill, stating that it had raised the issue with the U.S., highlighting its impact on “not just the bilateral relationship but also the international energy market.” It reiterated that New Delhi remains “committed to ensuring energy security for its 1.4 billion people…..through diversified sourcing and on the basis of evolving market dynamics.” It also reaffirmed India’s determination to take “all necessary measures to protect its trade and economic interests.”
The language and tone of India’s statement are notably different from its response last year, when Trump first announced “punitive” tariffs on Indian goods over Russian oil purchases on August 6, 2025. New Delhi had then explicitly called out Washington’s actions as “unjustified and unreasonable,” highlighting Western hypocrisy by pointing out that both the European Union and the U.S. continued trade with Russia. It also said that India would take all necessary measures to safeguard its “national interests and economic security,” linking the dispute with state sovereignty.
This time, the MEA dropped the word “national interest” entirely, focusing instead on “trade and economic interests.”
Rhetoric aside, the impact of Western scrutiny on New Delhi’s oil purchases is evident from the actions of major Indian refineries. By November 2025, India’s largest conglomerate, Reliance Industries, which owns the world’s largest and most complex oil refining hub in the world, announced that it would stop importing Russian crude oil for its exports. However, this proved to be short-lived as Reliance resumed buying Russian crude from December 2025.
State-controlled refineries such as Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals, Ltd., and HPCL-Mittal Energy Ltd also reportedly suspended Russian oil imports in the aftermath of the U.S. sanctions.
Meanwhile, in October 2025, India’s oil imports from the U.S. increased to 10.7 percent from around 3 percent earlier in 2025, while Russian oil imports decreased by 38 percent. By January 2026, India’s crude oil imports dropped to about 1.1 million barrels per day, down by 23.5 percent from December 2025 and by about a third compared to numbers from January 2025.
Correspondingly, the share of West Asian oil in India’s crude imports rose to 55 percent, its highest since late 2022, when India started buying Russian oil aggressively.
Such curbs proved to be short-lived as disruptions in West Asia, stemming from the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, created instability in energy supply chains in the region. Following a temporary U.S. waiver issued on March 5 this year — to allow the sale and delivery of sanctioned Russian oil which has already been loaded on vessels to India — India purchased around 30 million barrels of Russian crude. By July 2026, India’s imports of Russian crude reached a record high for the second consecutive month, rising by 2.1 percent month on month, 53 percent of which was transported by “shadow sanctions.” Global Trade Research Initiative data reveals that India bought $40.8 billion worth of Russian crude in FY 2026, accounting for 30.3 percent of its total crude imports.
In September 2026, amid the looming threat of U.S. tariffs, preliminary data suggests that Indian imports of Russian crude have already declined to about 30 percent lower than the August average of around 2.1 mbpd, according to data from trade intelligence firm, Kpler.
Historically, even when sanctions increased the logistical costs of shipping Russian oil, discounts offered by the Kremlin still made Russian crude commercially viable. Now, together with the looming threat of U.S. sanctions and narrowing discounts on Russian crude amid increasing Ukrainian attacks targeting refineries, New Delhi finds itself in a particularly difficult position.
Experts warn that replacing Russian crude with other suppliers will result in an increase in import bills, which would adversely impact the gross refining margins of the refining and marketing industry. This explains why many Indian refiners chose to return to purchasing Russian crude despite sanctions.
For New Delhi, caving in to the U.S. pressure will also have an adverse impact domestically and risk damaging ties with its “all-weather friend” Russia. As things currently stand, the only hope for New Delhi is pushing for the waiver option listed in the legislation, per which the President can waive the sanctions if it is “in the national interest of the United States.”
As talks with Washington over a free trade deal continue, New Delhi could potentially demand the waiver as part of the ongoing negotiations. Even if New Delhi is able to secure this waiver, it would only serve as a temporary fix. The real challenge lies in identifying India’s sources of external dependencies vis-à-vis energy security and addressing them by building state capacity.
