By The Diplomat | Created at 2026-06-05 10:58:04 | Updated at 2026-06-07 05:13:33
2 days ago
Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to choose India as the destination of his first official foreign visit since becoming Myanmar’s president in April came as a surprise to many, who were expecting him to head to Beijing first. After all, China was one of the strongest supporters of the military junta, since it grabbed power via a coup in February 2021.
For New Delhi, however, the visit of the former junta chief, who only two months ago transitioned to becoming Myanmar’s president, signaled the success of its “pragmatic approach,” which has long dictated ties with Myanmar.
Indeed, New Delhi, which had strong ties with Myanmar under the National League for Democracy government, carefully continued engagement after the coup with the junta leadership through various channels.
Yet Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Delhi marks an important milestone in India’s relations with Myanmar, as it accorded de facto recognition to the military-backed government.
The election, which was widely criticized as deeply flawed as it aimed to perpetuate the military’s grip on power in Myanmar, brought to power the military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party. The new government remains largely diplomatically isolated, especially by Western countries.
The significance of Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India should therefore not be understated.
The timing of the visit provides some clues as to why New Delhi is making this very public outreach to a much-reviled leader. It took place amid growing disarray in India’s relations with its neighbors, and China’s aggressive strategic expansion into New Delhi’s traditional sphere of influence. Bangladesh offers the most striking example of this interlinked dynamic. Despite New Delhi’s long-standing opposition to Chinese involvement in the Teesta River restoration project – a vital transboundary river flowing from the Himalayas through Indian territories of Sikkim and West Bengal before crossing into Bangladesh – Dhaka’s recent attempts at formally seeking support from China on the project signal a definitive strategic shift in the India-China geopolitical tug of war.
Even with Nepal, tensions have been simmering since the new government came to power after general elections in March. Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s recent controversial remarks calling for mediation from China to resolve India-Nepal border tensions have reignited questions about whether New Delhi has lost strategic space to Beijing in Kathmandu.
These developments are playing out against the backdrop of a rise in anti-India sentiments throughout the region.
Myanmar is a key country in India’s “Neighborhood First” policy. New Delhi is visibly keen to retain influence in Naypyidaw, even if it means formally engaging with the military junta or its successor military-backed government.
India is keen to access Myanmar’s critical minerals and rare earths, and Myanmar is reportedly anxious to reduce its dependence on China.
According to some estimates, rare earth exports from Myanmar to China have increased fivefold in the four years since the coup. Myanmar reportedly supplies approximately two-thirds of China’s annual rare earth elements imports, mostly heavy rare earth elements.
Critical minerals trade with India will help Myanmar reduce some of its dependence on China. Critical minerals were an important part of the discussions between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Min Aung Hlaing.
Both sides also reportedly discussed a rupee-kyat settlement mechanism, which is expected to further deepen economic ties.
Another notable outcome of the meeting was discussions on the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Thailand-Myanmar highway, which have been stalled owing to the security situation in Myanmar. If successfully restarted, these projects would significantly improve physical connectivity between India and Myanmar.
While it may be tempting to frame this visit as a win for New Delhi’s neighborhood policy, there is reason to temper optimism.
Even as Min Aung Hlaing and Modi were discussing security issues and border concerns, the security forces of India and Myanmar exchanged artillery fire along the border, highlighting how volatile security dynamics continue to mar broader diplomatic initiatives.
New Delhi will also have to deal with the challenges emerging from the domestic political blowback and awkward optics on the global stage. The world’s largest democracy, which has previously vocally supported the restoration of democracy in Naypyidaw, rolling out the red carpet for the former junta chief has adverse reputational costs. Myanmar refugees and their supporters in India have been vocal about their opposition to Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Delhi. A planned protest ahead of the visit was foiled by the Delhi police.
For India to retain regional influence, it is important for New Delhi to build enduring linkages with its neighbors. But by providing institutional legitimacy to a military-backed government, New Delhi risks severing connections with anti-coup forces, such as the National Unity Government (NUG), Myanmar’s government-in-exile, formed by former members of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. Zin Mar Aung, the foreign minister of the NUG, wrote to Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, expressing deep concern about Min Aung Hlaing’s visit.
If it isolates other stakeholders in Myanmar’s peace process, which include the democratic parties and the ethnic rebel groups, New Delhi is risking defeating its own objectives of building sustainable bonds in its neighborhood. It could also fuel anti-India sentiment among the people in neighboring countries.
