In a recent interview with postgraduate students in investigative journalism at the Universidad del Sur de Buenos Aires (USBA) and Universidad del Salvador (USAL), Rosendo Fraga said he does not expect Pope Francis to visit his native Argentina while President Javier Milei leads the nation.
“The antagonism between Milei and the Pope is inevitable because they maintain ideologically opposing positions,” he held.
The experienced political analyst also talked about Argentina’s new alignment with Israel and the United States against the backdrop of the Middle East conflict.
“There is a risk for Argentina, if the war becomes regionalised and is expanded,” Fraga said in the interview cycle series, coordinated by Rodrigo Lloret, director of Perfil Educación and chancellor of USBA.
What will be the next line of action of the International Monetary Fund with respect to Argentina, if in the next election in the United States Donald Trump or Kamala Harris wins?
Whoever wins, the [US] Treasury will not substantially change its attitude because it has its rules. In my opinion, the markets are the ones which will operate differently depending on who wins: if Trump prevails, the markets could have a more favourable attitude, whereas if Harris is the winner surely they would be less beneficial.
President Javier Milei has very clearly sided with Trump and that will have an influence. Argentina is by far the IMF’s main debtor. The Fund will never ask for a default, but it will be reluctant to lend fresh money. If Argentina managed to lower the country risk [rating] to less than 800 points, that is, the level of such countries as Egypt and Pakistan, they could access credits.
Why would the IMF never ask Argentina to default?
Because it’s its most important debtor. In rough percentage terms, over 40 percent of the total lent by the IMF has been to Argentina. If it asked for a default to its most considerable debtor, that would drag it. This explains why both [former president Mauricio] Macri and [ex-economy minister] Massa were ‘forgiven.’ Milei is also being ‘forgiven.’ Being too large a creditor, on occasion, is advantageous.
Early on in his government, President Milei said he would not maintain relations with “communist governments.” Taking into account that recently there was an approach with China, does it mean a change in position or the government learning on the fly about foreign policy?
I believe it doesn’t have to do with foreign policy but with Argentina’s financial needs. The country has a swap with China, that is, a loan which Beijing could or could not allow, which can be converted into dollars.
The main reason for the government’s twist is financial. Insofar as the market currently does not offer fresh money to Argentina, China’s support becomes necessary to be able to exchange part of the swap into dollars and strengthen its reserves.
Months ago, China could have asked the country for a default because it owed little over US$1 billion, but it didn’t have the money. However, it didn’t and postponed the maturity by a year. There are even those who say that China did not enforce that default at the IMF’s request, in line with the idea that the body does not seek Argentina’s going bankrupt.
How do you read the government’s relationship with the Pope?
The antagonism between Milei and the Pope is inevitable because they maintain ideologically opposing positions. Both are consistent with their stances, since Francis defends his social view of the world, while the President is a libertarian, an ultra-liberal. I think the Pope’s not coming to Milei’s Argentina, because his presence would play a role of division rather than one of union. Nevertheless, if the deterioration of the social situation became deeper, the Supreme Pontiff would talk further.
What is your analysis of Milei’s current diplomacy?
Ever since Milei began his presidential candidacy, he said: “I’m Trump, [Jair] Bolsonaro and [Spanish party] Vox in Argentina.” He’s been very consistent as to this. Being the sitting president, he attended the first campaign rally of the Republican candidate. He did the same in Brazil in the first campaign rally for the midterm election. And with Vox he did likewise at the rally prior to the European Parliament legislative election.
This shows that Milei puts these political solidarities ahead of what should be the interests of national foreign policy. Presidents ought to be wiser, and currently they’re not worldwide. That’s not something that’s happening only in Argentina.
What is [presidential chief-of-staff] Karina Milei’s role in foreign policy?
In the West, disruptive political phenomena are growing. I think Milei is a local manifestation of a global phenomenon. This type of novel expression can be called ultra-right, far right, radical right or populist right. In those political models, these types of characters are those that work better.
A character such as Karina Milei would have been impossible politically 10 years ago. She has no political experience, but she has taken to power, which gives you a crash course in politics. And this has been formalised thus: Javier Milei is number one, Karina number two and Santiago Caputo number three, as stated by the President himself.
Every week or every 15 days there’s a new area falling under the scope of the chief-of-staff, which is why I think Karina has more power than the Cabinet Chief.
She is bringing the concept of radical ultra-right to foreign policy. For example, in the context of the next G20 and the [United Nations] 2030 Agenda and gender policies: all countries support it, even Saudi Arabia. The only country not backing it is Argentina. I think it is the most extremist foreign policy attitude assumed by the country at the moment. Karina Milei has a growing role, and Javier Milei doesn’t mind it, but quite the contrary, he seems comfortable with it.
Could siding with Israel in the Middle East conflict pose a risk to Argentina?
Argentina is a particular case. It is enough to analyse the voting usually made on the State of Israel in the United Nations, where the country votes in a group of 14 countries out of 190. It is the only Latin American country with a very firm position in favour of Israel. Let’s remember that Argentina suffered two terrorist attacks by Hezbollah, in 1992 and 1994, without having had a direct role in Middle East conflicts, which is why there is a risk for Argentina, if the war becomes regionalised and expanded.
How do you assess the decision of leaving BRICS?
I wouldn’t have left BRICS. I believe one can go slower and moderate their role, but I wouldn’t have left being in an incorporation process. Coming out and saying that Argentina will rejoin the group doesn’t make much sense, which is why Foreign Minister [Diana] Mondino was left adrift. It wasn’t a foreign policy play by Milei but an attitude by Mondino she took from India, a very important country for Argentina, even if Milei does not have it on the agenda. I think she got carried away over the climate in India and tried to win them over somehow, but she had to take it back.
I think Pope Francis’ most important triumph lies in his geopolitics: understanding that the future of the Catholic Church depends on Asia and Africa, and not on Europe. This idea also applies to Argentina. What will be the most important international relations for our country over the next few decades? Though it seems strange, they won’t be with Europe, but with Asia. Europe has a population under 10 percent of the world and in 10 years it will be six percent, and 20 [years] it could be five percent. On the other hand, China’s population is 1.4 billion and shortly they may reach two billion.
I believe Argentine foreign policy has to look to the future. Former Italian prime minister Enrico Letta said publicly yesterday: “At this rate, Europe will have to choose between being a colony of the United States or China.” It might sound exaggerated, but it’s still a reality. Yesterday and today there was a gathering of the ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Argentina is not interested in that.
If I were handling foreign policy in our country I would do the same as Saudi Arabia, being there without being the star, but being there. On the other hand, the G20 will take place in November in Brazil and there is a very particular circumstance that goes unnoticed in Argentina: there are three groups there: G7 world powers, BRICS or emerging countries and ‘MITKA,’ consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and Australia. Argentina is in none of these three groups.
MITKA would be an upgrade for our country. With [former president] Cristina Fernández de Kirchner it was said: “MITKA is small for Argentina. It must integrate into BRICS.” Then the same with Macri, but seeking an alignment with the United States. Now it’s the same with Milei. This explains why our country has a cultural problem in terms of foreign policy: we struggle to admit that we’re a medium-sized country.
And what will be the future for Mercosur in the middle of Milei’s government?
Mercosur was born in the early 1990s, but I believe today it has lost gravitation because China showed up. Thirty years ago, Brazil was much more important to Argentina than it is today. Asia’s entry into South America has weakened inter-regional trade. What is Brazil’s most important partner? Also China. Paraguay and Uruguay are going through the same thing. Twenty-five years ago, China had little relevance in that sense. Mercosur needs a readjustment, to move forward in topics such as infrastructure, integration and connectivity, the latter especially because it has no ideology. Mercosur needs a new agenda that goes beyond trading.
Surveys mark a descent in Milei’s image, what’s your reading about that?
As any leader of the radical right, Milei set his axis in the culture of polarisation. He can be wrong for our taste, but in his logic he’s not wrong. He needs to polarise, and the more difficulties he has, the more he’ll do it. He said it very clearly [at an event] in Parque Lezama: “I have to govern with 10 percent in the Senate and 15 percent in the Chamber of Deputies.” Milei will govern on the limit of institutionality.
In 1853, when our Constitution was enacted [which was later reformed, but its structure was kept practically intact], assembly members said: “We have to create a hyper-presidentialism, the President must rule.” This came after 30 years of civil war and that had to end. Then they did a very simple formula: the President, with only a third of the Senate, is safe from any destitution attitude, he cannot be impeached and no veto can be overturned. This formula has never failed since 1853 during democratic governments. It has also never happened that the President would veto two laws in such a short time.
To govern, Milei will have to veto more and more. Now, what will happen if the budget is not approved? He will postpone it and reallocate items. Yesterday Cabinet Chief Guillermo Francos said it: “It’s not so important whether the budget is approved or not.” On the other hand, for instance, in relation to the Supreme Court, by the end of the year three judges will be left. What will Milei do? There’ll be co-judges, a mechanism contemplated in the Constitution.
That is why I say he will govern to the fullest. Then comes the emergency decree, a battle which starts this very week. It’s a mechanism he will use to. That allows the President to rule by decree instead of by law. The first time Congress vetoed an emergency decree was now with Milei, when they overturned the SIDE [intelligence services] funds decree. I see Milei very determined to move forward and the opposition with problems to articulate. He makes use of the division in the opposition, and that allows him to govern on the margins of institutionality.
We thank you for taking part in this interview cycle with students and we give you the chance to close with one final comment.
The country needs a team that thinks about Argentina in 2050, that considers the long term. It’s not about making a strategic plan, but to see where trends go, for example the growth of Asia and Africa. By 2050, man will have arrived on Mars.
There are a series of long-term issues that Argentina is not looking at, and I believe that is what we must do. Journalism may play an important role in this.
