By The Diplomat | Created at 2026-09-03 17:48:22 | Updated at 2026-09-20 01:29:57
2 weeks ago
With UNCLOS conciliation proceedings between Thailand and Cambodia now formally under way, Thailand is preparing to engage constructively. We would have preferred to resolve the matter directly with Cambodia. Direct diplomacy is usually faster, less cumbersome and, when there is sufficient political will, more effective. But Thailand is a State Party to UNCLOS, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. We accepted the process and will take part in good faith, with the interests of the Thai people and our sovereign rights firmly in view.
That willingness to engage through international law should not be mistaken for a willingness to treat every dispute along the Thailand-Cambodia border as if it existed in a vacuum. They do not.
A boundary is not drawn on a blank sheet of paper. It is surveyed on actual ground, by actual people, in communities that need to be safe enough for technical work to take place.
This is the point that risks being lost in Cambodia’s push to convene the Joint Boundary Commission, because no technical or legal process can be separated from conditions on the ground. Before survey teams can do their work, the border must be sufficiently safe, stable, and properly managed.
That means implementing the commitments already agreed by both sides on ceasefire and de-escalation, joint demining, and cooperation against transnational crime. These measures are what make credible border discussions possible in the first place.
Consider demining. Thai soldiers have repeatedly been injured by landmines along the border, including incidents involving mines that have been identified as newly laid. Just a couple weeks ago, yet another Thai deminer lost a limb. Whatever political narrative one prefers, a mine does not become less dangerous because a meeting has been scheduled. Nor can a Joint Boundary Commission survey team be expected to work in an area potentially littered with mines.
Joint demining is a practical prerequisite to constructive talks. It is also an obligation rooted in the commitments that both Thailand and Cambodia have undertaken bilaterally and internationally, including under the Ottawa Convention. If both sides are genuinely committed to resolving border problems peacefully, making the ground safe for the people expected to do that work should hardly be controversial.
The same logic applies to transnational crime. A border is not secure if criminal syndicates can exploit weak enforcement, traffic people across it, and operate industrial-scale scam networks with impunity.
The scale of the problem is well known. The global online scam industry generates more than $1 trillion a year, while the International Organization for Migration estimates that more than 300,000 people from over 80 countries have been trafficked into illicit call-center networks in Southeast Asia. Reports have identified operational bases in our neighboring countries, but Thailand is not exempt from responsibility. We have a duty to act on our side of the border as well, and we have been doing exactly that.
Thailand has helped tens of thousands of Thai and foreign victims return home. We have expanded intelligence and information sharing with foreign partners, strengthened cooperation on prosecution, and pushed for wider international partnerships. These efforts intensified after last year’s clashes with Cambodia, when Thai authorities uncovered large scam operations along the border, including in areas previously used by Cambodian forces as military positions. The discoveries helped expose the scale of the networks, their methods, and the extraordinary degree of impunity in which they had been operating.
This matters to the border question because lawlessness does not politely stay in its own policy silo. Areas affected by mines, military tensions, or organized criminal activity are also areas where communities cannot return to normal life, while cross-border commerce suffers, and any serious effort to resolve contested claims becomes harder.
The sequence is therefore important. The first step is security: uphold the ceasefire, reduce military risks, clear mines, strengthen law enforcement, and cooperate against criminal networks. Then technical border work can proceed on firmer ground, literally and politically.
These security issues are already reflected in the Joint Statement painstakingly negotiated and signed by both sides on December 27, 2025. What is needed now is implementation.
Thailand will continue to do what it can and what it must. We will engage international mechanisms seriously and uphold our legal obligations. We will continue to advocate for a rules-based international order in which law is not treated as an à la carte menu. States cannot insist on rules they find useful while treating inconvenient obligations as optional.
That principle applies to Thailand as much as to Cambodia. A durable settlement will not come from public posturing, legal theater, or technical talks detached from realities on the ground. It will come from concrete steps that reduce risk, protect communities, and create the conditions in which both countries can address difficult boundary questions peacefully and credibly.
Thailand is ready to turn that page. We hope Cambodia is ready to do the same. But first, we must make sure the proper foundations are in place.
