Seoul’s pivot after Yoon’s removal could prove a win for China

The Constituional Court’s finalization of the impeachment of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol on April 4 has sent shockwaves through the Korean Peninsula and beyond. With opposition leader Lee Jae-myung now favored to win the presidency in a likely snap election, South Korea stands at a geopolitical crossroads – precariously perched between its democratic allies and an increasingly assertive China.

This is not merely a domestic crisis. It’s a moment of strategic vulnerability. Beijing, for one, is watching with quiet satisfaction. China sees an opportunity to reclaim influence long denied; the US, disillusioned with an ally it increasingly sees as ungrateful, questions the very value of its commitments on the peninsula.

Lee Jae-myung – known for his conciliatory stance toward Beijing and Pyongyang – may tilt South Korea toward a new kind of alignment, one far more palatable to Xi Jinping than to Washington.

China’s long game: a tributary state reimagined

Beijing has never shed its historical vision of Korea as a subordinate – an obedient tributary nestled under the Middle Kingdom’s shadow. From the diplomatic rituals of the Joseon Dynasty to Mao Zedong’s Cold War framing of Korean deference, the narrative has remained strikingly consistent: keep Korea close, compliant and within China’s sphere.

Xi Jinping’s modern strategy echoes that traditional ambition. Today, with South Korea politically shaken and economically anxious, Beijing sees a rare opening. Yoon’s ouster undermines the pro-US camp, while China’s economic leverage grows ever more potent – over 25% of Korean exports still flow to China.

Through trade dependency, technological entanglement, and cultural diplomacy, Beijing is well-positioned to reassert dominance.

For China, the goal is clear: a South Korea that no longer functions as a forward base for American power but, instead,becomes a neutralized buffer – or, better yet, a pliant partner to counterbalance US influence in Northeast Asia. The vassal-state vision never died. It simply evolved.

Lee Jae-myung may be Beijing’s best bet

Enter Lee Jae-myung: a populist firebrand known for bucking convention and challenging Washington’s strategic expectations. As governor of Gyeonggi Province, Lee championed engagement with China through initiatives such as the “Korea-China Friendship City,” while minimizing US contributions to Korean security.

Lee’s calls for a “balanced diplomacy” are widely interpreted as code for downgrading the US alliance in favor of warmer ties with Beijing. If he takes power, Lee may revive inter-Korean projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, welcome Chinese investment in sensitive sectors or edge Seoul away from the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy.

In Lee, China sees a leader unlikely to resist its ambitions and more than willing to lead Korea out from under Washington’s shadow.

US view: strategic ally or security freeloader?

Washington, meanwhile, is growing increasingly impatient. For years, US policymakers –especially on the right – have accused Seoul of free-riding on American security guarantees.

That frustration flared again on April 3, when the Trump administration abruptly slapped a 25% tariff on South Korean export materials – just one day before the court ruling removing Yoon.

Justified as a matter of economic self-defense, the tariff decision undermines the strategic trust that anchors the alliance. And in light of Cold War precedent, it looks dangerously shortsighted.

In the 1960s, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw Japan’s economic rise as vital to regional stability. In a now-declassified 1964 memo, the State Department urged “firm Executive Branch resistance of American industry demands for curtailment of Japanese imports” and supported Japan’s growth – even at the cost of short-term US trade interests.

This tacit bargain – security in exchange for economic leniency – enabled Japan’s postwar ascent and kept the country from falling into Soviet hands.

Today, the inverse seems to be happening. Rather than shielding South Korea from external pressure, Washington’s punitive posture threatens to drive a strategically vital ally toward Beijing just as China’s influence expands.

Resentment on both sides

Anti-American sentiment, long simmering within Korea’s leftist circles, may now return with renewed vigor. Lee’s political base – animated by economic frustration and nationalist pride – has long bristled at US military exercises and the continued presence of American forces.

Ironically, Washington’s complaints about “unfairness” may only hasten the strategic drift that Beijing hopes to exploit. Impatience in Washington and indignation in Seoul now reinforce each other.

A precarious balancing act

For South Korean conservatives – those of us who’ve worked to keep Korea aligned with the liberal democratic order – this is a nightmare scenario unfolding in real time.

The coming months will determine whether Seoul remains a steadfast partner of the West, or drifts toward a new geopolitical reality, one shaped not in Seoul or Washington but in Beijing.

Hanjin Lew is a former international spokesman for South Korean conservative parties.