By The Straits Times | Created at 2026-09-18 14:21:31 | Updated at 2026-09-19 12:46:16
22 hours ago
SEOUL – As South Korea continues to weigh its options for contributing to security around the Strait of Hormuz, President Lee Jae Myung has ruled out deploying troops or military assets in a way that could draw the country into the US-Iran war.
Speaking at a televised press conference on Sept 18, Lee stressed that South Korea’s longstanding principle of not engaging in or becoming involved in any war “has been observed so far and will continue to be observed in the future”.
The assurance came as Seoul faces domestic opposition to any involvement in the war on the one hand and mounting pressure from its security ally, the United States, on the other, to contribute to its efforts in Iran, with the issue emerging as a growing flash point in increasingly testy relations between the two sides.
For Lee, the question of how South Korea should contribute to securing the Strait of Hormuz has become an urgent issue that requires his administration to balance between managing external pressures and adhering to its “pragmatic diplomacy” that puts national interests at the centre of its foreign policy.
Seoul has strong economic and strategic reasons to help keep the vital energy route open, but risks wading into muddy waters with any military role that will likely provoke Iran and fuel domestic opposition. This is especially when the President is seeking to arrest a rapid decline in his approval rating.
On the other hand, Lee was singled out by US President Donald Trump in a Truth Social post on Aug 16, with the US leader writing that he had asked whether South Korea wanted to join in its efforts to denuclearise Iran, to which Seoul reportedly responded with a “no thanks”.
In the same post, Trump ordered a substantial reduction in joint US-South Korea military exercises, citing their cost and what he described as the “inappropriate and hostile” signal these drills sent to North Korea, the military and political foe of South Korea.
In ruling out South Korea’s military involvement in the conflict, Lee said Seoul would nevertheless take steps to protect the lives and safety of South Korean people and merchant ships, and the crude oil transport routes.
He added that his government was reviewing how to expand the role of the anti-piracy naval Cheonghae Unit, which has been deployed in waters near the Strait of Hormuz since May to help safeguard vital crude oil transport routes and protect commercial vessels.
The strait is effectively shut by Iranian and US blockades as the two sides are locked in a stalemate.
South Korea depends on the Strait of Hormuz for about 70 per cent of its crude oil and over 50 per cent of its naphtha imports to fuel key manufacturing sectors like semiconductors, automobiles and petrochemicals.
Local media had earlier reported that Seoul is also considering deploying non-combat units such as a maritime patrol aircraft, a logistics support vessel, or a mine detection and clearance unit, with a Blue House official saying on a radio programme that “technical support” was among the possible ways South Korea could contribute.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun is in Washington, where he is due to meet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sept 18. Their talks are expected to cover a wide range of issues, including South Korea’s possible contribution to securing the Strait of Hormuz, as well as bilateral economic and security matters and the Korean peninsula.
Several media outlets, citing multiple sources, had reported that Washington was pressing Seoul to decide by November, ahead of the US midterm elections, as Trump seeks to shore up domestic support by demonstrating progress in the Iran war. The South Korean Defence Ministry, however, has since denied such a deadline.
The ministry also clarified that the dispatch of an on-site assessment team to the United Arab Emirates from Sept 5 to Sept 6 was for the purpose of “gauging the situation and stability on the ground and is not premised on a troop deployment”.
Nevertheless, there is perhaps urgency for Lee’s administration to reach a decision soon, as it risks getting caught up in a storm of geopolitical pressures, domestic opposition and falling approval ratings.
Besides pressure from Washington, Tehran has also issued a stern warning directed at Seoul, with Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei posting on X in Korean on Sept 7 that any country joining military operations in the Persian Gulf or Hormuz would face “serious consequences” and be treated as “supporting the aggressor”.
Back home, 55 per cent of South Koreans oppose any military deployment to the Strait of Hormuz, with civic and activist groups having taken to the streets in recent weeks to protest.
Lee’s approval ratings have also taken a beating in the past months, sliding to an all-time low at 37 per cent, based on a Gallup Korea poll of 1,002 respondents released on Sept 18.
His press conference the same day sought not only to address the Hormuz issue, but also to assuage rising public discontent over his administration’s real estate policies, controversial personnel appointments in the recent Cabinet reshuffle, and economic and livelihood concerns.
Against this backdrop, the decision over a possible Hormuz deployment could be one of Lee’s most important foreign policy decisions since taking office, given the state of relations between Seoul and Washington.
The structural friction between the allies over Middle East burden-sharing has reached “a critical inflection point”, says analyst Lee Seong-hyon, with the urgency “driven by a convergence of alliance extortion and the fear of diplomatic marginalisation”.
The senior fellow at the Washington-based George H. W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations pointed out that Washington had weaponised the US-South Korean alliance by cutting the joint military drills when Seoul initially declined to provide military assistance for the Iran campaign.
The analyst added that Seoul risks being sidelined as momentum builds towards a possible summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un later in 2026.
Trump has reportedly discussed with aides the possibility of meeting Kim during his expected November trip to China for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen.
“If Seoul does not pay its transactional ‘alliance premium’ in the Middle East, it risks being entirely sidelined in Washington’s security architecture on the Korean peninsula,” said Lee.
Among plausible options for Seoul, says Bence Nemeth of the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, could be the provision of logistical and technical support by way of either a logistics-support ship, maritime-patrol aircraft, surveillance or possibly mine-clearance-related capabilities.
“This would allow Seoul to argue that it is supporting freedom of navigation and protecting its own economic interests, rather than joining a US war against Iran. This could be a middle ground for South Korea, particularly because it needs to take into consideration its relationship with Iran and the domestic pressure at home,” said the associate professor.
He warned that South Korea should not risk any deployment that could draw it into an open-ended conflict when its main priority must remain deterrence and defence on the Korean peninsula.
“(Seoul) should be very careful not to make commitments that start as limited support but gradually become a much broader military involvement,” said Nemeth.
Another viable option would be for Seoul to join the Britain and France-led maritime defensive mission aimed at restoring and protecting safe commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz once regional fighting ceases.
President Lee had earlier pledged his support for the initiative during a virtual summit co-hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron and then British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in April, and reiterated his support during his summit with Macron in Paris on Sept 8.
Joining the initiative will offer Seoul “a sophisticated diplomatic shield”, said analyst Lee, but he expressed doubts that it would suffice to meet Washington’s demands.
“Trump measures allies’ utility through direct, bilateral compliance. Contributing to this European coalition may check the box of international burden-sharing, but it may not deposit the necessary political capital into Trump’s personalised transactional ledger,” he said.
