Strategic Affairs Expert Aleksei Zakharov on the Russia-Taliban Defense Deal

On May 27, Russia and Afghanistan signed a defense pact. This has come less than a year after Moscow formally recognized the Taliban regime as the government of Afghanistan. Details of what the agreement entails have not been disclosed. However, the pact marks an important shift in Moscow’s previously troubled relations with Afghanistan and could pave the way for deeper cooperation. The agreement has triggered speculation about its motivations and implications. Analysts have pointed to the timing; it comes amid the ongoing Pakistani military strikes on Afghanistan. Is Kabul seeking to boost its military capabilities to signal to Islamabad that it has strong friends? Others have argued that the agreement is about deploying Afghan fighters in the Russia-Ukraine war.

In an interview with The Diplomat’s South Asia editor, Sudha Ramachandran, Aleksei Zakharov, a fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, shared his insights into the growing Russia-Afghanistan relationship, reasons for the growing cooperation, the defense pact and its implications for Afghanistan and the region. While it is “natural” that Taliban leaders are projecting “the deal with Russia as a leverage or a deterrent against Pakistan,” the deal is not a mutual defense pact, he said. It is “unlikely to include any security assurances or mutual commitments to support each other in military conflicts.”

The Russian government and Afghanistan’s Taliban regime signed a military-technical cooperation agreement on May 27. What does this agreement provide for?

The details of the agreement have not been publicly disclosed, but judging by comments made by Zamir Kabulov, the Russian special envoy for Afghanistan, the deal includes the repair and restoration of various Russian-made military equipment. The Taliban’s interest is clear: possessing a large arsenal of legacy defense equipment left from the Soviet times, a Taliban-led Afghanistan would need to refurbish these platforms to bolster its defense capabilities. This includes the T-62M tanks, Mi-17 transport helicopters, Mi-25/35 attack helicopters, An-26 and An-32 transport aircraft, and artillery systems such as 122 mm D-30 howitzers, BM-21 Grad 122 mm multiple rocket launchers, and 82 mm 2B14 Podnos mortars. In the early 2000s, Russia also supplied Afghanistan with BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles.

There have been reports, primarily in the Pakistani media, of the Taliban’s interest in acquiring Russian air defense systems. These systems were sorely missed by Kabul during the recent “open war” with Pakistan. The Taliban may also be keen to receive Russian assistance with attack and surveillance drones, which could again be instrumental in the event of escalating tensions with Pakistan. Even though Kabulov suggested that the agreement could eventually lead to defense contracts being signed by the two sides, it is unlikely that Russia will provide the Taliban with any advanced equipment.

How does Russia gain from the defense cooperation with the Taliban? What do you think is the quid pro quo?

One of the most important factors for Russia – and this could probably be part of the deal – is that the Taliban would not permit any third-country military infrastructure or the deployment of new military facilities on Afghan soil. Russian officials have referred to this on multiple occasions. Russia also seeks to gain more leverage over the security situation in Afghanistan and, it is expected that, through this agreement and overall bilateral engagement, Moscow expects the Taliban to share information about the situation on the ground. Therefore, Russia is looking at the security aspects of the deal and anticipates greater intelligence sharing and counter-terrorist cooperation with the Taliban. Regarding the latter, an important driver for Russia’s willingness to go ahead with the agreement is the prospect of a joint fight against international and regional terrorist groups. Russia continues to view the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) as the main threat emanating from Afghanistan. According to Alexander Bortnikov, Director of Russia’s Federal Security Service, the ISKP is actively recruiting citizens from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, as well as migrant workers living in Russia. He also highlighted that the ISKP, affiliated jihadist groups and armed anti-Taliban factions were making efforts to weaken the Taliban administration. Following this logic, arming the Taliban and helping them to make the legacy military hardware operational again aims to counter these groups and sustain the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

According to reports, Taliban fighters and other Afghan workers may join Russian fighters in the coming months on the frontlines in Ukraine. Is this in the pipeline?

It is unlikely that the Taliban could send troops to support Russia militarily, given their own precarious position within Afghanistan. They are unable to address the instability in the northern provinces and the security situation along the border with Pakistan remains fragile. These issues will prevent the Taliban from getting involved in other wars. Moreover, the Taliban fighters would not significantly alter the situation on the battlefields in Ukraine. They are more accustomed to the Afghan terrain, having excelled at guerrilla warfare in the highlands and mountains as well as in rural landscapes. Fighting on Ukrainian soil would be a completely different environment for them, where the saturation of drones creates “kill zones,” preventing infantry from making any significant advances.

As Russia is experiencing an acute labor shortage, Moscow and Kabul have been discussing the possibility of bringing Afghan workers into the Russian labor market. However, there are several challenges to this, including language barriers and security concerns. Therefore, Russia will not employ Afghan nationals in large numbers. The 2025 quota for Afghan workers was just around 80 people.

Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, the Taliban regime’s defense minister, said Pakistan would “soon no longer dare” to attack Afghan territory due to the agreement. What did he mean? Is this also a mutual defense pact, or likely to pave the way for such an agreement?

It is only natural for Mullah Yaqoob to portray the deal with Russia as a leverage or a deterrent against Pakistan. The Taliban leaders seek to demonstrate that Afghanistan is now better protected against Pakistani attacks thanks to the deal with Moscow. However, the framework agreement signed seems to focus more on the military-technical aspect and is unlikely to include any security assurances or mutual commitments to support each other in military conflicts. Stepping in to defend Afghanistan would scarcely be in line with Moscow’s regional vision and its current geopolitical position. Russia will strive to maintain a delicate balance in the region and avoid alienating Pakistan. Given the positive trajectory of Russia-Pakistan ties, Moscow’s support for the Taliban is likely to be limited and, at some point, may even be coordinated with Islamabad. Russia is in no way interested in exacerbating the regional situation. In fact, Russian officials have offered to mediate between Pakistan and the Taliban to help resolve their disputes. This approach will clearly continue to shape Moscow’s decisions.

What are the implications of this defense agreement for Afghanistan’s neighbors?

Although the military deal provoked a lot of fuss in the Pakistani media, Islamabad was not overly concerned about its potential implications, concluding that the agreement was more about the maintenance and technical support than the provision of new arms. Even if Russia were to restore all of the existing military equipment, it would not alter the security balance between Kabul and Islamabad.

Tajikistan is a neighbor that may be alarmed by the deal, given its long-standing rejection of the Taliban regime and its support for the Afghan opposition forces. Moscow is torn between its CSTO ally, Dushanbe, which occasionally requests assistance in securing the porous Afghan-Tajik border, and the Taliban, its newly found regional partners.

Only time will tell if the agreement brings any improvement to the security situation in Afghanistan by helping the Taliban to combat the ISKP and other terrorist groups. If it does, it could stabilize the region and serve the interests of neighboring states well.

While Moscow might expect other regional players to follow suit and strike similar security agreements with the Taliban, evidence shows that other countries have been more cautious about deepening their engagements with Kabul. The Taliban will first have to demonstrate the deal’s positive impact on stability in Afghanistan before regional players consider any form of defense or security cooperation with their government.

Last year, Russia became the first country to recognize the Taliban regime. What are Russia’s motivations in stepping up cooperation with the regime?

For a long time, the Russian government was somewhat divided in its view of the Taliban. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was more enthusiastic about strengthening relations with the Taliban regime, the Security Council was more apprehensive about the engagement due to concerns about the Taliban’s links with different terrorist groups. However, a unified approach has begun to take shape since 2024, when the representatives of the latter bloc acknowledged that the Taliban’s measures were contributing to the “restoration of order and stability” in Afghanistan, and that establishing pragmatic cooperation between security services would be mutually beneficial.

Russia’s official recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan government last year reflected Moscow’s conviction that the Taliban is an “objective reality” and the only political force capable of controlling power in Afghanistan. This has led to a rethink of their role in Russian regional priorities, paving the way for their newfound perception as Russia’s “allies in countering terrorism.”

Are the Russians interested in an economic role with Afghanistan?

Bilateral engagement is reflected in the increasing economic interactions between Moscow and Kabul. The Taliban representatives now regularly attend various economic forums held in Russia, including the Russia-Islamic World: KazanForum, the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum and the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. A Russian business center has been operational in Afghanistan since 2023, promoting trade, investment and economic cooperation with the Taliban government. Trade turnover is gradually growing, reaching US$326 million by Russian estimates (around $500 million, according to the Afghan data) by 2025. Agricultural products and Russian raw materials dominate the trade portfolio. Afghanistan is the largest regional destination for Russian LPG supplies. A Russian company is conducting geological exploration and drilling in several Afghan provinces and plans to build an oil refinery in the country.

Russia is also pushing for the development of transport corridors through Afghanistan. Moscow supports two routes: the Torghundi – Herat – Kandahar – Spin Boldak railway, which could be an extension of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the multimodal corridor from Belarus to Pakistan. These projects could provide Russia with access to the Indian Ocean through the Pakistani port of Karachi and reduce its reliance on Iranian transport infrastructure. However, owing to the unstable political and security situation in Afghanistan, many economic projects are progressing very slowly.