The Meaning Behind the Four U.S. Soldiers Missing in Lithuania

The world learned Wednesday that four American soldiers have gone missing in Lithuania during a NATO exercise. Information so far is scarce and confusing: The NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte initially announced that the soldiers had been “killed,” only to have his statement walked back hours later by a spokesperson who said that their fate was “unknown.” Meanwhile, Lithuanian media declared the soldiers dead, while the country’s ministry of defense said rescue efforts were underway.

What we do know is that the soldiers were participating in a scheduled training exercise, that they had been manning an armored vehicle that apparently became trapped in swampy terrain, and that this occurred near the border of Belarus, an ally of Russia. The soldiers were part of a 16,000-strong U.S. deployment to Eastern Europe as part of a NATO mission to deter Russia. Most of those U.S. forces—around 14,000—are deployed in Poland, with 1,000 in Lithuania and 700 in Estonia. 

Although the proximity of the drills to the border of Belarus sparked conspiracy theories about a false flag operation aimed at drawing the United States into a direct war with Russia, a simple accident seems more likely. The swampy terrain in eastern Lithuania can’t be too kind to heavy military vehicles.

At this point, we can only wait for further updates and pray for the soldiers to be found alive, but the terrible news already highlights important issues in the often-overlooked Baltic theater.

First, the ever-present possibility of this sort of accident underscores the necessity for the U.S. and Russia to maintain direct channels of communications. As war fervor continues to engulf much of Europe, the potential for misunderstanding is unacceptably high and could lead to catastrophe where two nuclear powers clash directly. 

The Trump administration deserves much credit for reestablishing communication channels with Moscow, though it has gotten more condemnation than praise from the media. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff was savaged for his podcast conversation with Tucker Carlson, during which he recounted his meeting with the Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom he called a “very smart guy.” 

When speaking of the Russia–Ukraine War, Witkoff may have gotten some specifics wrong, particularly in giving too much credibility to the referendums in Moscow-controlled Ukrainian regions. But Witkoff understands the big picture: The world’s two leading nuclear superpowers simply cannot allow tensions to get out of hand. If American soldiers had gone missing or been found dead in Russia’s vicinity with Joe Biden in the Oval Office and paranoia gripping the West, how might Washington have responded?

The deadly accident raises another question: Why are U.S. troops deployed in Eastern Europe in the first place? In the wake of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states have legitimate security concerns about Russia’s intentions. For them, a reinforced NATO presence and U.S. tripwire is a reasonable insurance policy against any possibility of Russia attacking a NATO member. Baltic states like Lithuania have had hostile relations with Russia since re-emerging as independent states after the Soviet collapse in 1991.

But for America, the presence of U.S. troops in Eastern Europe carries a risk: Poland and the Baltics can become overly emboldened, even as Moscow doubts that Washington would fight for them in a war with Russia. The U.S. needs assurances that its Eastern European partners are cautious actors who understand these risks for American national security. 

Baltic politicians are not helping their cause with inflammatory rhetoric against both Russia, the potential aggressor, and America, the principal protector. The current EU high representative for foreign policy Kaja Kallas, formerly the prime minister of Estonia, has said she would welcome Russia’s collapse and disintegration into smaller states. Though she now represents the entire European Union, Kallas keeps talking like an Estonian hawk, to the dismay of nations, like Spain and Italy, that do not see Russia as an existential threat. She has also rattled officials in the Trump administration with accusations that they are appeasing Putin and her suggestion, after the Trump-Zelensky White House clash, that the “free world needs a new leader”. 

In reaction to Witkoff’s diplomacy, the chair of the foreign affairs committee of the Estonian parliament Marko Mihkelson called U.S. leaders “ignorant people” who “know nothing about history and diplomacy.” The always-outspoken former foreign minister of Lithuania, Gabrielius Landsbergis, boldly insists that the question of Ukraine joining the NATO “is not about if, but when.” Responding to Rutte’s admission that relations with Russia will have to be restored, Landsbergis said that any talk of reconciliation with Russia is “hugely inappropriate.” 

Some Baltic voices are more moderate. Andris Berzins, the former president of Latvia, recently criticized the climate of warmongering in his country and reminded his audience that NATO is a defensive alliance, not a “war structure.” Raising concerns about the EU’s rearmament campaign, he noted that “defense is primarily not about weapons, but about being smart.” Such views may be more widespread in the Baltics than many analysts realize, but institutional power rests firmly in the hawks’ hands. 

Washington should make clear to the Baltic capitals that it doesn’t plan to jettison them, but also that NATO is a defensive organization, not a license to pursue reckless policies that provoke a hostile great power on NATO’s borders. Otherwise, U.S. leaders will increasingly find it hard to explain to the American public why American soldiers need to drown in Lithuanian swamps.