The Militarization of Outer Space: Chinese Infrastructure in the Global South

Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

Projects developed within bilateral frameworks could form an international infrastructure that provides China with operational advantages in space.

The militarization of space encompasses not only the deployment of weapons in space but also the potential military use of the space domain, including ground-based infrastructure. Most studies on the militarization of space limit themselves to analyzing the actions of major powers in the space sector, primarily focusing on the space race between the United States and China. 

While it’s true that China’s space program has positioned the country as the second global power in space, it’s important to note that Beijing’s main strategies include investments, innovation, and expanding collaboration with countries in the Global South. This strategy generates commercial benefits and seeks to create diplomatic coalitions that strengthen China’s influence in international institutions. It also allows China to establish ground-based and satellite infrastructure in regions such as Latin America and Africa. Given this development, questions arise about whether China’s bilateral satellite cooperation and associated infrastructure with Global South countries are part of a broader Chinese international infrastructure and the strategic implications this could have for the United States.

Since the 1980s, China has maintained partnerships with countries in the Global South in the satellite sector. In 1984, China began collaborating with Brazil in this sector, formally launching the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program in 1988. Later, China expanded collaboration to other Latin American countries, including Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile. Since 2001, China has extended its partnerships to include countries in Africa. It established its first ground station in Swakopmund, Namibia and has since grown its satellite and infrastructure cooperation to include Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, and other countries in the region.

These collaborations include selling and jointly constructing communications and Earth observation satellites; constructing receiving and control stations, assembly and integration centers; offering personnel training programs; providing financing; and establishing mechanisms for scientific and technological cooperation. China frames these collaborations as part of its efforts to promote social and economic development in these regions while simultaneously combining commercial interests with enhancing its strategic capabilities.

We should not assume that the analyzed facilities or satellites are being used for military purposes. But we should pay attention to their potential dual use and the capabilities their combination could provide China. Considered collectively, for example, that the ground infrastructure in Argentina, Namibia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and other countries can provide greater geographic coverage and expand opportunities for telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) functions. It can also reduce latency in data reception and facilitate data distribution. Furthermore, integrating them with other systems could contribute to space situational awareness (SSA) and expand capabilities for tracking space objects.

Recently, U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink confirmed that the United States has “space control weapons” deployed in space. This is an example of the trend toward the militarization of space, an area in which China and Russia have also demonstrated capabilities. In 2007, China tested its anti-satellite (ASAT) system, destroying one of its own satellites. This maneuver surprised Americans due to the technology China developed and the significant amount of debris produced by the collision. Additionally, India conducted an ASAT test in 2019, and Russia did the same in 2021. Other nations, such as Australia, France, Japan, Iran, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, are developing counterspace technologies. With the growing number of actors, increasing development of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons technology, and reliance on the space domain for troop deployment and intelligence gathering, the militarization of outer space seems inevitable. The question here is what strategic advantages China’s growing space infrastructure in the Global South could provide.

Among other examples, two ground stations in Namibia demonstrate varying degrees of control over the space system. The Windhoek ground data receiving station, which opened in February 2026, was designed to receive and process data from remote-sensing satellites. According to the Chinese ambassador to Namibia, Namibian personnel will manage this ground station. However, Chinese personnel will remain on site to provide ongoing technical support to the technicians they have trained. Additionally, the station receives data from CBERS-4, combining data reception and processing with Chinese technical support and data reception from a Sino-Brazilian satellite.

The Swakopmund station, which was also built by China in Namibia in 2001, provides TT&C. It can also be used to track satellites flying over the South Atlantic. It is managed directly by the Xi’an Satellite Control Center, which is linked to China’s military space structures. While the Windhoek station focuses on receiving and processing Earth observation data, the Swakopmund station provides satellite TT&C capabilities.

China has even donated a satellite to Ethiopia. The ETRSS-1 is Ethiopia’s first remote sensing satellite. DFH Satellite Company Ltd., a subsidiary of the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), designed and developed the satellite. CAST is a subsidiary of the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), which is part of China’s space and defense industrial system. Since 2012, the Entoto Observatory & Research Center has operated as a ground station in Ethiopia. The Entoto Observatory is a multisatellite ground receiving station that supports ETRSS-1 operations. It also receives data from other satellites, including CBERS-4, Gaofen-1, Gaofen-3, Gaofen-5, and GaoJing-1. The latter are Chinese satellites. Entoto has had a new antenna since 2025 that is responsible for ingesting high-resolution imagery.

China’s collaboration with Egypt is also noteworthy. China funded and helped build the MisrSat-2 Earth observation satellite, which was launched in late 2023. China also constructed the Satellite Integration, Assembly, and Testing Center (AITC) near Cairo. Thus, their cooperation encompasses earth observation, ground stations, TT&C, data applications, and satellite assembly, integration, and testing capabilities. China has access to shared ground laboratories and data processing centers in Egypt. This enables China to expand its international satellite image analysis infrastructure in a geopolitically sensitive region such as the Suez Canal.

The deep-space tracking station in Neuquén, Argentina, is the most prominent example of a Chinese ground station located outside of China with dual-use potential. Established through agreements between the National Commission for Space Activities (CONAE), the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), and the Neuquén provincial government, it features a 35-meter antenna and operates in the S, X, and Ka bands. It supports the Chinese lunar program and provides TT&C services. Its technical characteristics could enable dual-use applications, including satellite monitoring, intelligence gathering, and the interception of satellite signals, depending on the capabilities employed. Additionally, the station has institutional ties to the CLTC and the Xi’an Satellite Control Center. 

Together, the reception of the Sino-Brazilian CBERS-4 satellite at facilities in Africa such as Windhoek, the multisatellite capacity at Entoto, the TT&C station in Swakopmund, and the deep-space station in Neuquén demonstrate that projects developed within bilateral frameworks can have functional connections that extend beyond bilateral collaborations with China. These facilities could form an international infrastructure that would provide China with operational advantages in terms of geographic coverage, data reception and distribution, TT&C, and tracking space objects in regions such as the South Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and various areas of the African continent. Integrating these capabilities could contribute to broader Space Domain Awareness (SDA). Both the United States and Europe should examine the potential strategic implications of this infrastructure more systematically.