The US Congressional Elections Will Shape China Policy, Too

Pundits and researchers focused on China-U.S. relations are now homing in on the 2024 U.S. presidential election, making predictions about how the next U.S. president might shape China policy. However, many overlook that congressional elections, taking place concurrently with the presidential election, are just as crucial in influencing China policy. In today’s polarized political climate, the composition of Congress – especially the House – is as significant as the presidency in shaping China-U.S. relations.

This election cycle, 468 seats in the U.S. Congress (33 Senate seats and all 435 House seats) are up for grabs. Currently, Republicans hold a majority in the House, while Democrats and independents who caucus with them control the Senate. Regardless of which presidential candidate wins, the next administration may struggle to advance their China policy without supportive majorities in Congress.

Although there seems to be a common perception of bipartisan consensus on countering China, closer examination reveals partisan divisions in China-related legislation in recent years. Much of the so-called bipartisanship results in performative legislation – bills heavy on rhetorical condemnation but lacking substantive measures. For instance, the Assessing Xi’s Interference and Subversion Act (AXIS Act) (2022) and the PRC Is Not a Developing Country Act (2023) both passed the House with near-unanimous support but stalled in the Senate.

On more economically impactful China-related legislation, partisanship is apparent despite claims of consensus. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act, which the Biden administration hailed as a bipartisan success to counter China, passed the House on a 243-187 vote, with most Republicans opposing it. 

Conversely, the Republican-led Limit, Save, Grow Act of 2023 – emphasizing energy independence and countering China – passed on a strict party-line vote, with most Democrats voting against it. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer criticized the GOP bill, arguing it would “send American jobs and critical battery manufacturing to China,” and contrasted it with Democrat-led initiatives like the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (2021) and Inflation Reduction Act (2022), which the Democrats claim better protect U.S. interests. Both of these bills also passed along partisan lines, with Democrats holding the majority in the House at the time.

These examples demonstrate the underlying partisan split on countering China, often masked by claims of bipartisanship. Generally, Democrats favor a defensive, domestically focused approach to counter China’s global supply chain dominance through government-led industrial policy. Republicans, meanwhile, advocate an offensive approach, targeting China’s technological, ideological, military, and economic challenges. These ideological and economic differences among legislators may significantly influence the new president’s policy approach to China.

Admittedly, the executive power held by the president enables the active use of external balancing strategies, such as forming alliances, to counter China. However, when it comes to internal balancing strategies – like expanding military build-up or protecting U.S. industries from China through legislation – the president’s success largely depends on whether their party controls the House and Senate. Even bills considered directly tied to national security, like the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), often reveal a partisan divide in the House. Amid rising polarization in U.S. politics, the next president will likely have to rely on their party’s congressional majority to advance a China-focused legislative agenda effectively.

A new House speaker may also impact the United States’ China policy. Like his predecessor Kevin McCarthy, Speaker Mike Johnson has consistently shown an anti-China stance and commitment to supporting anti-China initiatives. However, if Republicans still retain only a razor-thin majority in the House, Johnson’s leadership could be challenged, with some Republicans already firmly opposing his speakership.

Should Johnson lose the speaker’s gavel, his most likely replacements could be Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Jordan or Majority Leader Steve Scalise, who are both Trump allies. If either takes the role, particularly Jordan, whose views lean isolationist, the prioritization of China-related issues might wane under the influence of Trump’s isolationist approach.

On the Democratic side, if they win the House majority, the likely speaker would be Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries. As a centrist, Jeffries has rarely used harsh rhetoric on China. He generally aligns with the party line, supporting Democratic-led China-countering bills such as the CHIPS and Science Act, while also advocating for scrutiny of the GOP-led Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for its potential to fuel xenophobic rhetoric and conspiracy theories. If Jeffries secures the speaker’s gavel, he could become a pivotal supporter of Kamala Harris’ China-related legislative agenda but may act as an obstacle for Donald Trump’s.

Lastly, the future of the House Select Committee on the CCP could also depend on a new speaker. While the committee claims bipartisan support for countering China, a third of Democrats initially opposed its creation, and even some supporters raised concerns about potential partisan divergence. Additionally, disagreements have surfaced among legislators and staff from both sides of the aisle regarding the committee’s reauthorization, as its current mandate expires at the end of 2024. Given that the committee is largely a Republican initiative, a new Democratic speaker could bring significant uncertainty regarding its future.

If the next president’s party does not control the House, their China-related legislative agenda may face considerable headwinds. The effectiveness of the new president’s legislative approach to China – whether to maintain or alter the status quo – will likely be subject to heightened scrutiny from a polarized Congress after the election. That is when the currently malfunctioning “China card” may begin to be played more frequently.