US ICC Sanctions Pose a Test for Japan

When the United States sanctioned International Criminal Court (ICC) President Akane Tomoko on August 18, Tokyo’s response was swift – and carefully calibrated. The next day, Foreign Ministry Press Secretary Kitamura Toshihiro called the move “very unfortunate,” reaffirming Japan’s consistent support for the ICC and the rule of law.

Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae commented publicly on the same day, telling reporters that she considered the sanctions “very unfortunate” and would continue communicating with the United States and other relevant countries. She did not, however, say whether Tokyo would ask Washington to withdraw the sanctions.

It was a statement of principle, but the restraint was noticeable. After all, Akane is a Japanese judge leading an institution that Tokyo has spent nearly two decades championing. Japan became a state party to the Rome Statute in 2007 and has since been one of the ICC’s strongest supporters.

On January 7, Takaichi herself received Akane and International Court of Justice President Iwasawa Yuji separately, describing the two courts as central to the rule of law and pledging Japan’s firm support. Eight months later, Akane has been personally sanctioned by Japan’s only treaty ally.

Washington’s sanctions, which also targeted Senegalese ICC lawyer Abdoulaye Seye, are part of a broader Trump administration campaign against the court. The United States argues that the ICC has overstepped its authority by pursuing nationals of countries, including the United States and Israel, that have not accepted its jurisdiction. In his statement announcing the sanctions, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the court “corrupt and fatally politicized” and denounced what he called “its assault on state sovereignty.” 

The ICC strongly rejected the latest sanctions, calling them “a flagrant attack” on the independence of an impartial judicial institution. The court warned that threats against judicial officials for applying the law put “the international legal order itself” at risk. The ICC said nine of its 18 judges are now under U.S. sanctions, along with both deputy prosecutors, a former prosecutor, and one staff member. 

Akane herself had already expressed a profound sense of crisis over growing pressure on international justice. In an interview with Japanese media, she described the rule of law as “a flickering candle.”

European leaders have rallied behind Akane. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa said they “stand firmly” with the ICC president and officials carrying out its mission, stressing that the court’s judges and officials must be able to act independently and without external pressure. The Netherlands, which hosts the ICC, has likewise rejected the sanctions and reaffirmed its support for the court and Akane. 

Pressure on Tokyo to go further is also building at home. A cross-party parliamentary group condemned the sanctions in the “strongest possible terms” and urged Takaichi and Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu to lodge a clear protest and demand their withdrawal.

Tamaki Yuichiro, leader of the Democratic Party for the People, Japan’s second-largest opposition party, made an important distinction: Japan should defend Akane not simply because she is Japanese, but because of the rule of law she represents.

The controversy exposes a wider tension in Japanese diplomacy. What happens when Tokyo’s commitment to the rule of law collides with the policies of its only treaty ally? This is not the first time the Takaichi government has confronted that question.

After U.S. and Israeli attacks against Iran earlier this year, Japan emphasized that Iran must not develop nuclear weapons and called for an early end to the conflict. Yet Tokyo avoided offering a clear judgment on whether the initial use of force was consistent with international law. At a March 3 press conference, Motegi was directly asked about the “legal legitimacy” of the attacks but did not provide such an assessment.

A pattern is emerging wherein Tokyo strongly emphasizes the rule of law as a principle of international order, but becomes more cautious when applying that principle could put it at odds with Washington.

There are understandable reasons for that caution. The Japan-U.S. alliance remains the foundation of Japan’s security strategy amid growing challenges from China, North Korea, and Russia. Tokyo may also calculate that quiet diplomacy is more likely than public confrontation to influence the Trump administration, particularly when Japan has broader security and economic interests to manage with Washington.

But there’s a trade-off: keeping quiet takes a toll on Japan’s credibility. Tokyo has spent years demanding that Beijing and Moscow respect international law and condemning attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. Such arguments are most persuasive when the same principles are applied not only to competitors and adversaries, but also to allies.

As a middle power rather than a nuclear-armed great power, Japan has a profound interest in an international system in which rules constrain power. If major powers can decide when international institutions deserve respect and when they can be pressured for politically inconvenient decisions, Japan ultimately has much to lose.

Tokyo doesn’t have to choose between the Japan-U.S. alliance and the ICC. A mature alliance should be able to absorb disagreement, and defending judicial independence does not require Japan to endorse every decision made by the ICC.

Tokyo can, however, make clear that judges and court officials must be able to carry out their duties without political coercion. It can ask Washington to withdraw the sanctions, and work with the Netherlands, the EU, and other ICC states parties to ensure that Akane can continue performing her duties.

Such steps would be uncomfortable for Tokyo. But a tepid expression of regret without further action carries its own strategic risk. If Japan allows the rule of law to become a principle applied mainly to rivals, it weakens one of the most important diplomatic tools available to a middle power in an increasingly power-driven international order.

The choice before Tokyo is therefore larger than whether to protect Akane or defer to Trump.

For decades, Japan has said that it stands for a rules-based international order. The sanctions on the ICC president may now force Tokyo to show what that commitment means when the pressure comes not from Beijing or Moscow, but from Washington.