By The Diplomat | Created at 2026-09-15 16:41:57 | Updated at 2026-09-19 07:57:45
4 days ago
The Malaysian states Johor and Negeri Sembilan recently held state elections that produced disappointing results for Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s coalition.
During the July 11 polls in Johor, an economically important state at the tip of peninsular Malaysia, Barisan Nasional (BN), secured a commanding victory, winning 48 of 56 state assembly seats, up from 40 at the last election in 2022. Anwar’s Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won the remaining eight seats, down from 12 previously.
This result was largely replicated in Negeri Sembilan on August 1. Here BN won 18 of the 36 seats in the state’s legislative assembly and was set to form government with the pan-Malay Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, which won seven seats. PH, which had ruled the state in coalition with BN prior to the election, saw its share of seats drop from 17 to 11.
In both contests, the losses were particularly marked for the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a key member of the PH coalition that is traditionally associated with Malaysia’s ethnic Chinese community. In Negeri Sembilan, the election was also marked by close cooperation between the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Islamist party PAS, the primary components of the BN and PN coalitions, respectively. This has raised suggestions that a new “Malay wave” could be set to wash away Anwar’s coalition at the next general election.
The twist is that BN and PH remain in coalition at the federal level, following the close-run general election of 2022. The growing competition between the two nominal partners has even raised the possibility that Anwar may choose to call a snap election.
Dr. Oh Ei Sun, a senior fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, spoke to The Diplomat’s Southeast Asia Editor Sebastian Strangio recently about what the results might mean for Anwar’s leadership and federal politics as Malaysia moves toward its next general election.
Let’s start with the most obvious question: How do you interpret the collapse of PH’s position in Johor and Negeri Sembilan?
I think there are similarities and differences in some of the major factors that led to PH’s collapse in these two states. The similarities lie primarily in the voters’ seeming conflation of PH’s perceived performance (or non-performance) at the federal level with their political solicitation at the state level.
To be more specific, we may look closer into PKR [the People’s Justice Party] and DAP – PH’s two largest component parties – respectively but also relatedly. PKR’s core supporters are those seeking social and political reforms, ranging from those advocating revamp of parliamentary and electoral systems to those who are fervently against corruption and power abuses. Many of them have become increasingly impatient with what they perceived as PKR’s feet-dragging since coming to federal power at fulfilling its reform promises that were loudly proclaimed during its opposition years. Worse still, some of them saw regressive measures that were unashamedly touted, such as those controlling freedom of expression online, that were reminiscent of pre-2018 BN days.
At the same time, PKR at the government’s driver seat was also perceived to be at best lackluster in its microeconomic performance, with many members of lower- and even middle-income groups finding it hard to carry on with livelihood, a scenario that was perceived to be worse than the BN days. So these core PKR supporters carried this rather disgruntled attitude toward PKR from the federal to the state level, and did not come out in droves to support PKR. Yet PKR, with its same, reformist image, remained inept in competing with UMNO and PAS in attracting an increasingly conservative Malay voters cohort to make up or surpass the difference.
DAP shared many of these misgivings and thus non-votes by its core supporters as PKR, plus disillusion from its non-Malay core supporters who had even higher expectations of DAP championing their long-held dream of attaining political and social equality. When they perceived DAP as having been non-enthusiastic in advancing this dear cause of theirs since coming to federal power, and furthermore remained silent when their rights were perceived to have been trampled upon, they wanted to “punish” DAP by not voting for it.
But these conflated or “transferred” disfavors against PH aside, there were also respective distinct factors that favor BN in these two states. The Johor chief minister, Onn Hafiz, turned out to be both charismatic and pragmatic, having brought in large amounts of foreign investment into the state that were transforming the state’s economic outlook. So the voters were comfortable with his helmsmanship and would like to see him continue in his leading role. In Negeri Sembilan, UMNO and PAS non-contest arrangements prevented vote splitting and handed easy wins to UMNO and participation by PAS for the first time in the state administration. This was a win-win situation for both parties. How long the state ruling coalition could hold is quite another question, if past disastrous collaboration history between UMNO and PAS provides any lesson.
Do you anticipate a similar result in Melaka, the next state to hold an election?
The conflated or “transferred” disfavors against PH by its core supporters would most likely remain quite intact in Melaka, as nothing much is likely to take place within a space of at most a few months to dissuade them otherwise. On the other hand, the Onn Hafiz favorite-son factor is certainly missing in Melaka, which saw at best average socioeconomic performance over the last half decade. And it would appear that BN and the PAS-led PN could still not reach a no-contest agreement in Melaka. As such, PH could aspire to holding on to its present state seats in Melaka. Anything more would be a distinct bonus.
The Negeri Sembilan election in particular was marked by close cooperation between BN and PN (particularly between UMNO and PAS), which have recently been at loggerheads. This has prompted some to suggest that a “Malay wave” could wash away Anwar and PH at the next general election. Do you think this is likely, and if so, why?
I think a Malay-Muslim wave that would be swept to power remains a very viable political scenario, as it almost did in the last general election. This is due not so much to PAS’ or UMNO’s revitalized political or electoral prowess. Rather, it is an electoral manifestation of an increasingly vibrant Malay-Muslim desire to attain a much more conservative and religiously oriented social and political outlook for the country. This is in line with yet another wave of religious revivalism that is sweeping across many Muslim-majority countries, ranging from Turkey to Indonesia. So the majority of Malay voters see PAS as a most conducive political vehicle for the soonest realization of this earnest desire, with UMNO as perhaps second best in realizing so. Therefore, a PAS-UMNO electoral alliance is likely to trump PH hands down.
But ironically, Anwar may remain prime minister after the next general election. This is due to the power struggles that are taking place within UMNO and PAS, which are usually more intense than their confrontations with PH. UMNO’s internecine fights are mainly factional in nature, with different warlords and their power bases rallying against one another. So Zahid the party president may ultimately not be touted as a viable prime ministerial candidate, with his many unresolved legal cases as the pretext. The fights in PAS, on the other hand, are usually ideological in nature, pitching the conservative ulamas against the more moderate professionals. The ulamas would loath to see a moderate such as the much-mentioned Terengganu chief minister Shamsuri to become prime minister. So Anwar, with his sizable religious and communal credentials in the past, may actually emerge as a compromise figurehead prime minister with PAS and to a lesser extent UMNO pulling the string behind the scene.
PH and BN insist their federal partnership can co-exist with rivalries at the state level, but how sustainable is the current situation? Do you anticipate Anwar calling a GE any time soon?
Malaysia has entered a very fragmented political landscape, with perhaps no single party being able to command an outright parliamentary majority, thus necessitating the forming of ruling coalitions. So the main calculation for alliance or split is not so much an ideological one as a politically convenient one. Therefore, the answer to the sustainability of any political coalitions really depends on the electoral viability and the thirst for power of its potential component parties.
It really does not matter when Anwar would call for a general election. The Malay-Muslim wave will sweep aside a large portion of its PH, but he may remain politically useful as prime minister.
How do you interpret the collapse of the DAP vote in the two recent elections, and also the state election in Sabah in November? What does this say about the dynamics of ethnic Chinese politics in peninsular Malaysia? If the party decides to leave the PH coalition, what impact could that have on Anwar’s political chances at the next GE?
See particularly the answer to the first question above. But there is a bit of a nuance to DAP in Sabah. DAP was trounced in Sabah mainly because it aligned itself too closely to the state ruling coalition there that was evidently disfavored by DAP’s core Sabah supporters, who decided to pitch their tent with Warisan instead, which they thought would come back to power. Nationally, the non-Malays continue to aspire to a fairer and more equal Malaysia. DAP’s decision to remain in cabinet is likely to come back to haunt it in the general election, as it would have to continue to collectively shoulder the kind of decisions which non-Malays may perceive to be unfair and unequal.
