Why Was Xi Jinping in North Korea?

From June 8 to 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife made a state visit to Pyongyang. The high-level delegation accompanying them included Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau; Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of the Central Committee; and Dong Jun, Minister of National Defense. 

The seven-year gap since Xi’s previous visit to North Korea suggests a cooling in bilateral relations, perhaps connected with North Korea’s recent involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Prior to the visit, several significant diplomatic developments took place. Xi met U.S. President Donald Trump in Beijing from May 13 to 15, and the U.S. fact sheet about the summit reiterated the need for North Korean denuclearization. Chinese readouts were less specific. Prior to Xi’s arrival in Pyongyang, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un engaged in various displays to demonstrate that he has no intention of abandoning nuclear weapons. 

Then from May 19 to 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his 25th visit to China, and signed more than 20 bilateral agreements. Given the ongoing war in Ukraine, these agreements likely focused on military and defense logistics cooperation.

Some had expected a verbal clash between the U.S. and China at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore from May 30 to June 1, but U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth delivered a restrained speech, while China sent a delegation composed of military experts and scholars instead of the defense minister.

What was the Purpose of Xi’s Visit?

Very little has been revealed about any substantive issues addressed during the visit, implying that its purpose was primarily ceremonial. The propaganda value of the trip was certainly exploited by Chinese state-run media such as the People’s Daily, which published highly exaggerated reports of its importance. The visit served as a pragmatic diplomatic move for China to gain leverage against the U.S. without actually conceding anything substantial to North Korea.

Nevertheless, Xi had sound strategic reasons to meet with Kim Jong Un. While China welcomes Russia and North Korea’s joint opposition to U.S. alliances in the region, it is wary of Russia emerging as North Korea’s dominant strategic patron. To this end, Xi will have reminded Kim that his “20×10” economic development project relies upon economic assistance from China. Also, Xi and Kim will surely have discussed South Korean plans to build nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) with U.S. cooperation.

For its part, North Korea used the visit to project an image of strategic autonomy, signaling that it can navigate between great powers, much as South Korea does. While some analysts view North Korea’s aggressive rhetoric during recent domestic events and foreign summits as mere posturing, it is actually intended to bypass South Korea. Although the recent constitutional changes declaring a relationship of “two hostile states” are primarily designed to legitimize North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and secure recognition as an official nuclear state, they are also an indirect strategy to improve relations with the U.S., sidelining South Korean involvement. North Korea was also hoping for stronger language from China condemning the joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea, which it labels “hostile war rehearsals.”

According to some analysts, Kim believes that China interfered with the outcomes of the Singapore and Hanoi summits held during Trump’s first term, and Kim is still holding that grudge. If true, this could account for the seven-year hiatus: perhaps Kim declined an earlier visit from Xi.

Relations between China and Russia are predicated upon a mutual desire to escape the constraints of a U.S.-led international order, though Russia is now very much the junior partner. Despite this alignment, however, they are not natural allies, and Xi’s recent visit to North Korea was part of the competition between China and Russia to expand their respective influence over North Korea.

In that vein, China has recently resumed cross-border rail services, and also weekly flights via Chinese airlines. This is a clear sign of deeper economic cooperation, which has languished in the years since the pandemic. Russia is likewise improving economic links with North Korea by opening the Tumen River road bridge this summer, having already launched direct flights between Moscow and Pyongyang last year, as well as reestablishing direct rail links. The anti-Western trilateral alliance of China, Russia, and North Korea is essentially a symbolic concept, and North Korea’s primary goal is to extract maximum material aid from both its neighbors.

Future Outlook

Moving forward, there are several likely geopolitical ramifications of Xi’s visit to North Korea. During his forthcoming visit to the U.S. in September, Xi will leverage his Pyongyang trip to further limit U.S. involvement with North Korean issues, including on denuclearization. Having established his position as a “North Korea whisperer,” Xi will argue that South Korea does not need SSNs, for which U.S. assistance is essential. Xi will also strongly oppose the possibility of South Korea signing a military Logistics Support Agreement with Japan, extending the existing General Security of Military Information Agreement. Finally, with South Korea still preoccupied by the North Korean threat, Xi will expect less interest in China’s activities in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.