By The Straits Times | Created at 2026-06-24 11:51:51 | Updated at 2026-06-24 12:56:53
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China and India are taking steps to get relations back on track after deadly clashes along their disputed Himalayan frontier in 2020, with the two sides in May discussing how to settle their territorial disagreements.
During a visit to New Delhi on June 22 and 23, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and articulated Beijing’s longstanding position that the boundary disputes should not hold their wider relationship hostage. India says it wants peace and stability on the border in order to progress bilateral ties.
The stage is now set for more specific border negotiations in coming weeks between Wang and Doval in Beijing.
India and China dispute the ownership of several areas, but the main focus of the rift centres on two stretches of territory along their roughly 3,488km shared frontier. Both are mountainous and sparsely populated.
The disputed area to the west is known as Aksai Chin, a high-altitude plateau of approximately 38,000 sq km. China, which administers the territory, claims it as part of its Xinjiang and Tibet regions. India considers it part of its federally administered northern territory of Ladakh.
Further east, both nations also claim about 84,000 sq km of territory under India’s control. Most of it encompasses what India considers to be its northern state of Arunachal Pradesh. China says the land is part of Tibet and refers to it as Zangnan, or South Tibet.
After India achieved independence from British colonial rule in 1947, there were a number of unsuccessful attempts to agree on the boundary.
In the late 1950s, India discovered that China had built a strategic road linking Xinjiang and Tibet through Aksai Chin. Beginning in 1956, the two sides entered into negotiations to settle the dispute, with China’s then-Premier Zhou Enlai offering at one point to withdraw to the colonial-era border in the east, known as the McMahon Line, if India would accept Chinese control over Aksai Chin in the west.
Zhou made the offer even though China had never formally accepted the legality of the McMahon Line because it was agreed with the government in Tibet, whose boundary-drawing authority Beijing did not recognise. Nonetheless, Jawaharlal Nehru, then India’s prime minister, rejected the proposal, saying the boundary was already established and India was not open to bargaining.
Tensions steadily grew, culminating in the 1962 conflict in which China attacked and overran Indian positions on both disputed frontiers. The war resulted in a de facto border known as the Line of Actual Control that still exists in the absence of a formal settlement. On-and-off clashes have continued to this day.
In 2005, the nations signed a treaty that established a framework for a potential future boundary settlement. Under this agreement, they committed to resolve the dispute through “peaceful and friendly consultations”; to refrain from using or threatening force; and to make meaningful adjustments to their respective positions in order to arrive at a “package settlement”.
In 2019, the Indian government moved to take greater control over Ladakh and Beijing accused it of seeking to undermine China’s sovereignty. The following year, China surprised India by deploying troops in the part of the disputed region that it controls. The stand-off ended four years later, when the two countries pulled its forces back from some areas. But the tensions it created have endured.
Both sides say their claims are justified by historical precedent. India maintains that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of the country and that Aksai Chin was part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, one of the territories overseen by Indian hereditary rulers under the British.
China maintains that its border with India was never truly agreed upon. From China’s point of view, Zangnan has long been part of Tibet. It regards Aksai Chin as historically administered from Tibet and Xinjiang and also claims two other areas along the frontier.
Some of the contested territories have strategic significance. China’s G219 highway linking Xinjiang and Tibet cuts through eastern Aksai Chin. The wider border region also houses critical transboundary rivers that support agriculture in both countries.
The instability on the border is one reason why India for decades sought good ties with Russia and with Western powers led by the US. But New Delhi is now trying to navigate an increasingly volatile relationship with the US, which under President Donald Trump has prioritised power politics and tried to strong-arm even friendly countries, making the international order more unstable.
A better working relationship between India and China would facilitate collaboration between the two when it is in their mutual interest. It would help avoid the sporadic diplomatic crises that have hampered efforts to boost trade between the Asian economic superpowers. And it would reduce security concerns for India, which also has a tense relationship with another neighbor, Pakistan, following a four-day conflict in 2025.
China describes the boundary question as a historical legacy that should not be allowed to define the overall relationship. Its leaders have repeatedly said the issue should be placed in an “appropriate position” in bilateral ties. By contrast, India has argued that peace and tranquility along the border are essential for normal bilateral ties.
China may see an interest in settling the dispute as a way to help it focus on other, more pressing priorities: strategic competition with the US, tensions with other neighbors in the South China Sea, its territorial claim over Taiwan, and a slowing domestic economy.
As is typical of border negotiations, any final settlement of the India-China boundary would involve three steps: delimitation, agreeing where the border should run; delineation, drawing that agreed border on official maps; and demarcation, physically marking it on the ground with pillars, markers or other reference points.
In 2025, the two sides agreed to establish an expert group to explore an“early harvest” deal. That is a term for an agreement that delivers limited, achievable results rather than waiting for a comprehensive, final settlement.
The significance of that agreement was that it moved the two sides beyond managing the conflict over the border and explicitly introduced work on boundary delimitation. Yet the central challenge remains: India and China still do not share a common view of where the border lies. BLOOMBERG
