David Petraeus: George W. Bush, Political Courage, and the Surge in Iraq

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush launched what he called the War on Terror. It began with the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, which quickly toppled the Taliban and expelled al-Qaeda from its most crucial sanctuary. Then, in early 2003, American forces—with the support of foreign allies like the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland—attacked Iraq, toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime and installing an occupation force in hopes of quickly transforming the country into a free and democratic state.

Instead, the post-regime coalition authority made significant missteps, and a devastating insurgency erupted. And despite President Bush’s 2004 reelection, the war quickly lost popular support among the American public. In early 2007, Bush appointed General David Petraeus, who had already served in Iraq as a two- and three-star general, to lead allied forces in Iraq, which heralded a sea change in American strategy known as “the surge.” As part of our coverage looking back on 9/11 and the world it created, General Petraeus tells the inside story of one of the most consequential moments in the War on Terror. The general’s essay today is both a crucial history and a profile in political courage. It demands reflection as we take stock of the last 25 years. —The Editors

By the end of 2006, the war in Iraq was failing. There is no useful purpose in softening that judgment with the passage of time.

The bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra by terrorists that February had accelerated sectarian violence and pulled Iraq into an increasingly vicious Sunni-Shia civil war. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni insurgent groups controlled substantial areas, Shi’ite militias operated with growing impunity in other parts of the country, and the Iraqi security forces were no longer capable of arresting the downward spiral. The strategy of transitioning security responsibilities to Iraqi forces, consolidating American troops on large bases, and progressively reducing the U.S. presence had clearly been invalidated by the escalating violence.

The numbers conveyed the horror imperfectly but unmistakably. In December 2006, an average of 53 Iraqi civilians were killed by violence every 24 hours in Baghdad alone. Washington, meanwhile, was approaching its own breaking point. Public support for the war had fallen dramatically, President George W. Bush’s Republican Party had just lost control of both houses of Congress, and the bipartisan Iraq Study Group—of which future defense secretary Robert Gates was a member—had recommended a course that anticipated a substantially reduced American combat role.

Many senior military leaders were deeply skeptical of sending substantial additional forces, advocating instead for an accelerated transition to Iraqi forces, the deployment of additional trainers and advisers, or other more modest measures with an eye to withdrawing U.S. forces.

Virtually every political incentive pointed toward reducing America’s commitment. President Bush chose instead to increase it, a decision that remains, in my view, one of the most courageous presidential decisions of the 21st century.