By The Jerusalem Post (World News) | Created at 2024-12-16 15:35:07 | Updated at 2024-12-16 18:34:36
3 hours ago
Hope for magical solutions and ignoring hard realities is what brought Israel to the October 7 disaster, he said.
By YONAH JEREMY BOB DECEMBER 16, 2024 17:27
IDF soldiers from the Nahal Brigade operate in Rafah, Gaza Strip, November 30, 2024.
(photo credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
The IDF and other security forces will need to have certain kinds of a physical presence in Gaza for at least a decade, even as Israel should carefully avoid any new settlements there, former top Shin Bet official Arik Barbing has told The Jerusalem Post in a recent exclusive interview.
Barbing is clearly against a “civilian occupation” of Gaza, but at the same time does not believe any third party can succeed at replacing Hamas without the security presence of the IDF at key points in the Strip for a very extended period.
Further, the timeframe for how long he expects the IDF will need to be in parts of Gaza is extended by the fact that the hostages’ issue is still unresolved and that he does not expect there will be a quick and comprehensive resolution of that issue.
Rather, he believes that any deal with Hamas, regardless of what the text of the deal says, will leave a certain number of hostages in Hamas’s possession and that some kind of extended complex standoff and competition over political control of Gaza is inevitable.
“Without resolving the hostages’ issue, it will be hard to move on,” for the country, said the former top Shin Bet official who at times was the agency’s top official for all of the West Bank and Jerusalem and at times was the top official for the cyber division.
Regarding the stakes for the hostages’ survival, Barbing said, “It’s a very sensitive and complex issue. Time is running out for the hostages’ hopes of survival. It is a day to day struggle. They should not be sent to their death.”
Also, even if they survive, regarding whether they will be able to rehabilitate themselves, he asked, “How will a person act when they have not seen the sun, had sanitation, had proper food, and have been constantly treated inhumanely for so long? What is the psychological impact? These are difficult dilemmas.”
'Hamas will never give back all of the hostages'
Although much of the diplomacy has revolved around the idea of a full IDF withdrawal and end to the war in exchange for a return of all of the Israeli hostages, he stated, “Hamas will never give back all of the hostages. They will preserve some ambiguity about who is left.”
“There are also questions about where are the dead bodies of those hostages who were killed? Hamas lost some of the bodies. Some Islamic Jihad is holding. Some criminal Gazan elements are holding, who are loyal to and associated with Hamas,” he continued.
Next, he said that it is an impossible and dangerous situation for the hostages and that he believes Hamas will play games and only give hostages back in rounds of deposits.
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He said that it might still be possible to rescue some more hostages, but that it would be very difficult.
When pressed that there had been no successful rescue operations of guarded hostages underground, he said that he thought many hostages end up spending temporary periods above ground even if they also spend a majority of their time underground, but agreed that most could not be rescued by an operation.
The operation to bring back the body of hostage Itai Svirsky was very sensitive and more of an exception, he noted, adding that the Shin Bet can sometimes pull off such operations, but only if it can find precise related intelligence.
That means all that is really left for most of the hostages is to make deals with the Gazan terror groups, he said.
The hope then would be to get the vast majority of the outstanding hostages back since “we probably cannot get 100% back – there will be some Ron Arad-type cases where we will never get the bodies back.”
“If negotiations work, then each time we could potentially get a mix of live and dead hostages.”
Despite all of his concern for the hostages, Barbing opposes a full withdrawal at this time. “We cannot leave Gaza now because Hamas will not keep the deal for the rest of the hostages anyway and then it will be harder for the IDF to go back.”
Regarding a full withdrawal, “there is no one yet to replace Hamas. We need to be very strong against Hamas. If we leave a vacuum, Hamas will come back fast.”
Who or what mix of groups does he think can replace Hamas to run Gaza?
While he does see a role for Fatah connected figures, especially potentially a strongman like Mohammed Dahlan, he does not think the Palestinian Authority on its own could come close to competing successfully with Hamas.
This is because he said the current PA is extremely weak in the eyes of most Palestinians.
He added that even in the West Bank, where they are formally supposed to be in control, they are very weak in the refugee camps, where only the IDF and Shin Bet have entered (though on December 14, after this interview, the PA did once enter the Jenin refugee camp in response to the groups bombing some of the PA police in Jenin.)
In fact, most of the refugee camps, he said, are run by informal local gangs and militias not affiliated with Fatah or Hamas.
“They are autonomous in the refugee camps,” said the former top Shin Bet official, adding that even the IDF often goes in now only with some air cover, bulldozers, and heavy armored vehicles, “the air force takes out targets and then the Israeli ground forces can go in.”
“Within internal Palestinian ongoing debates, the PA is viewed as extremely weak. If they went head to head with Hamas, the expectation would be that Hamas would tear them to pieces,” as happened in Gaza in 2007.
He recognized the Philadelphi Corridor as a special problem, saying, “Israel is still in Gaza. The Philadelphi Corridor is close to Rafah. The PA and Egypt are extremely weak at controlling the corridor unless they have a broader and enhanced Arab force in support including the UAE and Egypt and others.”
He said that the IDF needs to be in some key spots in Gaza, even if it is not deployed throughout Gaza. “There needs to be a perimeter, even up to two to four kilometers if necessary, that will be demilitarized. There may also need to be a transition period of around two years,” as certain authorities are gradually returned to the Palestinians as well as to whatever international parties may remain involved in supporting them against Hamas.
However, as long as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cannot decide and move forward on a new party to run Gaza, Hamas will have a greater ability to remain in control, warned Barbing.
Supplanting Hamas in Gaza
Returning to what qualities would be necessary for a new Palestinian group to supplant Hamas in Gaza politically, he stated, that if the new Palestinian managers of Gaza are viewed as corrupt and as collaborating with Israel, they will not retain enough legitimacy to rule.
“They cannot solve the issue on their own. But it could be done with an Arab alliance run by a strongman. Israel would not need to love him, but would need to be able to deal with him, but his image must also gain deference from Hamas. Someone like Dahlan.”
Pressed that PA President Mahmoud Abbas hates Dahlan and exiled him from PA areas, he acknowledged “Abu Mazes hates him, but if Trump says this guy is my favorite, that could pave the way for him and give him legitimacy.”
He said Trump might also be able to pressure Netanyahu into moving forward with agreeing to new managers for Gaza.
Also, he said there needs to be time to build a new Palestinian security force which can displace Hamas – adding, “there is no Bat Ehad officer [the IDF’s officer training camp] ready to run like in the IDF.”
Moreover, he explained that it will take time to learn with which Gazan forces Dahlan could coax to his side. “Who can switch from Hamas to Dahlan? If you just go to Hamulot [extended family tribal gangs], they [Hamas] shoot them. If you just give some small weapons to Hamulot, they [Hamas] still kill them or give them more weapons.” He said any Palestinians working to displace Hamas would need to be made much stronger so that they can retain control from Hamas.
Even if Dahlan and some hybrid of Arab allies and Western helpers, including groups like the CIA, are able to displace Hamas from governing Gaza, Barbing warned that the IDF will need to maintain, “a high level of activity to prevent terror, similar to what it does in the West Bank. If we had left Hamas alone in the West Bank without regular IDF raids, they would be firing rockets from Nablus into Tel Aviv.”
“If you have no boots on the ground for many years, it will be dangerous and there will be no control,” of terror threats, though he acknowledged that explaining this to Israel’s global allies would be a major challenge.
Part of the reason that he said the IDF will need to be involved at least in periodic raids to suppress terror for a longer period of time is because of the extent of the brainwashing that has taken place in Gaza. “At the time of the Hamas coup [against the PA] in 2007, Nukhba operatives were only seven years old. They never saw Jews until October 7. They were brainwashed in Dawa schools that they need to kill Jews.” He said that this problem will not just go away overnight.
The key will be splitting up security and civilian functions. “Leave security to Israel, and you [the new Gaza rulers] deal with civilian issues. Don’t make them [the new Palestinian managers] into being viewed as collaborators. And still there is no mathematical equation, no magic and no rabbit to pull out of a hat” to suddenly solve the complex issues.
It will take a decade at least, he said.
Hope for magical solutions and ignoring hard realities is what brought Israel to the October 7 disaster, he said.
“The MABAM - war between wars - we were told was like magic, but the achievements were only tactical and they did not change the balance of forces. Bibi was afraid we would kill someone important [from the enemy side] like [Hamas leader Yahya] Sinwar and that would lead into a war,” and all of this hesitance messaged our weakness to the other side, which then paradoxically “led us to war.”
He added, “All of the brigade, division commanders, and prime ministers were afraid of what comes next - this is why they never initiated a major operation other than in the 2008-9 Gaza conflict. Every fight was only after rocket fire by the enemy, and it was always limited to an operation and not a ‘war’.”
