By The Straits Times | Created at 2026-09-30 01:46:43 | Updated at 2026-09-30 02:21:27
46 minutes ago
SEOUL - Two North Korean soldiers captured while fighting for Russia in Ukraine have become a source of diplomatic friction between Kyiv and Seoul, exposing a divide between two countries, despite their shared concerns over Pyongyang’s involvement in the war.
While both countries recognise the security implications of North Korea’s involvement in the war, observers say their differing strategic calculations and diplomatic priorities have put them at odds over how to handle the prisoners.
Seoul has accused Kyiv of breaching a confidentiality agreement after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in an address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Sept 23 that the two prisoners of war (POWs) had been sent to South Korea.
President Lee Jae Myung called the disclosure “deeply regrettable”, describing the repatriation as an “extremely sensitive matter” with implications for diplomacy, national security and the Korean Peninsula. Seoul has since demanded an official explanation and apology from Ukraine, while Kyiv has denied that any such agreement existed.
Dr Bek Bum-Hym, a visiting research fellow at Seoul National University’s Asia Centre, told The Straits Times that Kyiv was likely seeking to leverage on the transfer of the POWs to highlight that the military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow was not just “an issue confined to Eastern Europe, but one that concerns the responsibility of all UN member states”.
And with South Korea’s unique position with regard to North Korea, the former diplomat surmised that Ukraine was thus seeking to secure greater military cooperation from South Korea.
Ukraine had previously said that South Korea could not remain “a distant observer” when North Korea is actively participating in a war in Europe, as helping Kyiv would also help Seoul protect its own long-term security interests.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Kyiv has repeatedly sought military assistance from Seoul, such as anti-aircraft systems.
But Seoul has maintained a longstanding policy of not directly providing lethal weapons to countries at war, limiting its support for Kyiv to humanitarian and non-lethal assistance.
South Korea has provided various forms of assistance to Ukraine since 2022, with the latest pledge being US$100 million (S$128 million) announced by Lee at a summit with Zelensky on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara in July.
The assistance was intended for a “comprehensive support package”, including areas such as reconstruction efforts, but drew the line at lethal weapons.
At that meeting, the two leaders agreed that the issue of the POWs would be handled “in accordance with international law and humanitarian principles”, while respecting the prisoners’ wishes, according to the Blue House spokesperson at the time.
No further details were made public until Zelensky’s surprise announcement at the UNGA.
The two POWs were reportedly transferred to South Korea in mid-September, just days before Zelensky’s announcement.
South Korea’s Constitution states that the entire Korean Peninsula is its territory and hence North Koreans are legally recognised as its citizens, rather than foreign nationals.
Doo Jin-ho, an analyst at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, suggests that Seoul and Kyiv may have discussed conditions for the repatriation of the two POWs, with Ukraine’s disclosure aimed at pressuring Seoul to provide the defensive weapons it seeks.
Doo told ST: “My assessment is that, with Western military assistance weakening, Zelensky probably wants to bolster Ukraine’s war-fighting capabilities while maximising some form of negotiating leverage vis-a-vis South Korea.”
On Sept 28, Zelensky said in a post on X that Pyongyang was preparing to deploy another 10,000 troops to join the 8,000 North Korean soldiers he said were currently fighting on Russian territory.
But Kyiv’s pressure tactic appears to have backfired, says Olena Guseinova, a visiting professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies’ Graduate School of International and Area Studies in Seoul.
While such pressure may have worked better with Western countries, Guseinova said the security environment in Northeast Asia is far more complex, and that the rift highlighted the difficulty Ukraine faces in navigating the region’s dynamics.
Seoul traditionally prefers to handle such sensitive security arrangements with discretion, says Guseinova, because “every decision concerning North Korea is made against the background of nuclear deterrence, the possibility of military escalation, relations with both Moscow and Beijing, and the management of inter-Korean tensions”.
The repatriation of the POWs also comes at a sensitive time, as Seoul seeks to revive dialogue with Pyongyang, with Lee having pledged to play the role of “pacemaker” in helping the US resume dialogue with North Korea. He made this latest reaffirmation during his address at UNGA on Sept 22 and again during a subsequent meeting on the sidelines with US President Donald Trump.
Denuclearisation talks have been stalled since 2019, after negotiations between Trump during his first term in the White House and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un broke down at their second summit in Hanoi.
Trump’s renewed push in his second presidential term to engage Kim has fuelled speculation of a possible summit later this year, potentially when Trump travels to Shenzhen for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November.
Kyiv’s disclosure could therefore encroach on the diplomatic space Seoul has been seeking to create, as it hopes renewed US-North Korea dialogue could eventually pave the way for inter-Korean talks, Guseinova added.
While the spat is likely to cool Seoul-Kyiv relations for a while, the analysts said that there is still a need for both sides to recognise each’s differing strategic interests and work together where common interests overlap.
Doo said that Kyiv would still need Seoul’s assistance in reconstruction efforts when the war ends, while Seoul stands to benefit from the Ukrainian forces’ experience in combat against North Korean troops.
These longer-term interests are important to prevent the dispute over the POWs from spilling over into Seoul and Kyiv’s broader strategic relationship.
Bek, who is also a policy adviser to South Korea’s National Security Council, similarly argued that Seoul and Kyiv could better manage their differences by decoupling the POW dispute from the broader issue of North Korea’s involvement in the Ukraine war.
“The handling and transfer of POWs should be addressed with international law and the individuals’ free will as the central considerations, while North Korea-Russia military cooperation should be discussed through separate diplomatic and security channels,” he said.
