Meet the 10 world leaders to watch in 2025

By The Straits Times | Created at 2025-01-03 21:42:39 | Updated at 2025-01-05 20:11:40 1 day ago

Donald Trump says “tariff” is the most beautiful word in the English language. But he is not letting on how complicated the process really is.

To enact the across-the-board 20 per cent tariff he has in mind, he will likely need to declare a national security emergency on trade.

A tariff on China is another matter. Trump can draw authority from investigations into China’s trade “misbehaviour” and make a snap announcement that might have taken a year to produce in his first term.

He will find support from the Republican-dominated Congress and an array of hawkish think-tanks, which have offered their own road maps for rescinding China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status and erecting a new tariff structure to kill off any dependence on China.

If there is to be an economic divorce, the prenups are ready.

The argument that his administration will marshal could go something like this: For over two decades, China has played the World Trade Organisation (WTO) like a fiddle. It has not kept its promises to be open, fair and reciprocal.

In this telling, Chinese President Xi Jinping has perfected a mercantilist trade policy with tax cuts, hidden subsidies and a cheap renminbi designed to dominate economically. And a wronged America is dealing with de-industrialisation and dependence on supply chains steered by a hostile adversary.

That is the premise behind a Bill to end China’s PNTR, introduced in November by Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state. It arms Trump with what he needs – leverage in trade talks with China.

If the Bill is passed by the incoming Congress in January, which looks likely, China will no longer merit the non-discriminatory treatment accorded to the other 165 WTO members. It will dissolve the unconditional most-favoured-nation status for Chinese imports, leaving Trump free to apply whatever tariff rates he likes.

The Trump effect

A reckoning in US-China ties – the most consequential relationship in the world – is inevitable. Yet, this example also shows the outsize effects leaders can have on the foreign policies pursued by their countries.

Who is in charge matters, as policy choices become less cut and dried in a complex world. A record year of elections has also sapped incumbents or ushered in new leaders who may strike a different path in international affairs. Nowhere is this starker than in the US.

A Joe Biden administration relied on the playbook of alliances and unilateral trade restrictions designed to safeguard economic interests and national security. Trump much prefers a confrontational approach – through antagonism, brinkmanship and bluster – and to place the ball in the other side’s court.

The waves Trump will create may dissipate – or heighten – depending on how world leaders react. Their collective action will shape the outlook for 2025, including the prospects for Singapore and its immediate region.

Watching all this across the Pacific will be the same adversary Trump faced in 2017, husbanding an economy that is weaker by all accounts. Can President Xi, shaken by a property meltdown and ebbing foreign investment, call his bluff?

Will he mirror Trump on tariffs, keep Americans out of China’s large market, which has become the testing ground for technologies of tomorrow? Or will the nation, known to test newly inaugurated American presidents with a belligerent gesture, turn the page by surprising him with an offering of peace?

Another complication – more players. How will the chief executives of top-rung companies from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, who are investing massively in the US market for semiconductors, batteries, electric vehicles and more, react? Will they hit pause or up the ante?

Will the nearly 6,000 American companies that are invested in Asean skip the region with the world’s highest growth rates for decades to come, or double down like it’s casino night at Marina Bay Sands?

While Trump plays tariff tag, the game has moved online. Asean is negotiating a Digital Economy Framework Agreement to cash in on the new frontier worth trillions of dollars. Will the billionaire businessman who prides himself on his art of the deal let such a big one slip by?

Xi Jinping’s most challenging year?

Across the Pacific Ocean, the mood is subdued. There is every possibility that 2025 could turn out to be one of the most challenging years of President Xi’s 13-year rule.

The economy is in its worst state in more than a decade, facing persistent deflation that threatens to rival the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.

Millions are jobless, especially young people who have graduated into a poor job market with few openings but many layoffs.

On once-bustling streets, shops stay stubbornly shuttered; those open send staff to stand by the door, cajoling passers-by to come in and spend some money.

The air of anxiety and pessimism is thick across Chinese cities. Mr Xi must confront serious problems, many of which are own goals, sprung from a state interventionist economic policy that he favours.

He must help Chinese families put food on the table, give them hope and confidence; he needs to give them reason to continue believing in the Chinese Dream.

How big of a saboteur Trump will be to Mr Xi’s massive undertaking is hard to tell now. But he has stacked his would-be Cabinet with some of the most vocal China hawks, and he has threatened tariffs of 60 per cent.

Trump 1.0 made many nationalists out of the Chinese, although plenty also quietly blame President Xi for his assertive foreign policy and a U-turn on Deng Xiaoping’s preference to lie low and bide China’s time.

China is better prepared for Trump 2.0, and can anticipate the re-elected US president’s game plan. But the Chinese economy is also frailer than it was eight years ago, when the trade war first erupted.

Mr Xi’s courtship of emerging nations to find new sources of growth and expand its influence will intensify, even as he attempts a juggling act to boost economic recovery, restore business confidence, maintain domestic stability and tackle fresh challenges posed by a second Trump presidency.

Trump’s possible retreat from multilateralism and alliances will give Mr Xi the opportunity to make a bigger play for global leadership and gain new markets for Chinese goods.

From his signature Belt and Road Initiative to his outsize presence in the Brics grouping, the Chinese leader has already fashioned himself into something of a godfather of the Global South.

There could be more goodies on the way – loans, scholarships, zero tariffs, investments, market access – if Mr Xi were to take bolder steps to challenge US dominance and redefine global governance.

Meanwhile, Beijing’s fervent defence of its “core interests” will not diminish despite its domestic preoccupations. Its assertive actions in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea will continue, especially if it believes there are agitators at play.

What roles will minilaterals Aukus and Quad – meant to counter a domineering China in the region – play under a transactional Trump is also far from certain.

A test for Japan, a reversal of fortunes on Korean peninsula

In the shadow of an assertive China and a combative US, Asia stirs. In a region where the gravest threat is viewed as coming from China – and the other East Asian giant, South Korea, is temporarily in turmoil – Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba asserts that the lynchpin for East Asia’s security is the US-Japan alliance.

There is little doubt that Japan has shared interests with the US – a free and open Indo-Pacific and the preservation of regional stability. With the Biden administration, Japan forged a latticework of trilateral security partnerships that it would like to see maintained through a Trump presidency. But Trump’s transactional, America-first approach to diplomacy and his impatience with multilateral forums might skew US foreign policy towards bilateralism.

Mr Ishiba has an ambitious vision for a muscular defence posture anchored by a formidable Japanese military capable of countering regional threats and a network of like-minded nations.

He takes office after a long line of predecessors shored up security cooperation and shifted the country away from pacifism, a norm enshrined in Japan’s Constitution since the end of World War II.

“The US derives great strategic benefits from its military facilities and areas in Japan,” he said in a landmark speech in November shortly after taking office.

The time is right, he says, to broach an update on their longstanding “asymmetrical bilateral treaty”, in which the US must defend Japan while the latter provides the use of its bases.

Mr Ishiba is keen to restructure an existing security treaty for greater equality and burden-sharing. He may well pursue this, having suggested previously the idea of stationing Japanese self-defence forces in Guam, a strategically important Pacific island. Less likely is the revision of an agreement regarding the stationing of US forces on Japanese soil.

But he could well find the forceful rhetoric hard to live up to. A series of blunders, including in calling a snap election shortly after taking power in October, which lost his party the parliamentary majority, has weakened his hand, and his approval ratings indicate his electorate has little confidence in him.

In so many ways, he seems the antithesis of the strong, charismatic leader liked by Trump. With his poor command of English, Mr Ishiba could find it a struggle to replicate the diplomatic mastery of his late political rival Shinzo Abe – who was golf buddy, confidant and on first-name terms with Trump.

At the time, Mr Ishiba was critical of what he saw as pandering by Mr Abe. But with his own inability to gain more than a five-minute congratulatory phone message with Trump – unlike Mr Abe’s widow Akie, who was invited by the Trumps to a private dinner on Dec 15 and is said to have softened the ground for a leaders’ meeting – it is now up to the Premier to master the art of the deal in persuading Trump that they share the same interests, all while navigating domestic political minefields.

Mr Ishiba will likely pledge even more Japanese investments in the US economy, while reminding Trump of its contributions. Since 2019, Japan has been the largest foreign investor in the US, where Japanese companies employ about one million Americans.

Mr Ishiba’s challenges for shoring up regional security are not helped by developments on the Korean peninsula. There, the implosion of the conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol, a critical figure who had improved ties with Japan and supported a US-Japan-South Korea trilateral grouping, has left the South in political turmoil.

Despite the worries over Trump’s return, it is domestic distractions that plague both US allies in North-east Asia. With the ruling People Power Party determined to hold on to power following Mr Yoon’s impeachment for his dangerous dalliance with martial law, South Korea’s leadership vacuum could result in lost opportunities in foreign affairs.

And with Acting President Han Duck-soo also impeached, attempts to soothe markets and reassure diplomatic partners seem in vain. The biggest aviation disaster on South Korean soil after a Jeju Air crash on Dec 29 could plunge the country into more agony.

If Mr Yoon’s impeachment is upheld by the court and a snap presidential election is held, relations with Japan may sour. The Democratic Party, which is likely to win, has repeatedly characterised Mr Yoon’s olive branch policy towards Japan as “humiliating diplomacy”.

In stark contrast, the stars are looking aligned for Mr Yoon’s neighbour, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The hermit kingdom is looking less isolated, particularly after Mr Kim warmed to his “closest comrade”, Russian President Vladimir Putin, even inking a defence treaty in June 2024.

The wily Mr Kim has also lent muscle to Russia’s war in Ukraine, dispatching more than 10,000 elite troops, in a calculated move expected to reap him much-needed foreign currency to prop up his economy as well as access to coveted military and nuclear technology.

All this might just earn the attention of Trump, who boasted of keeping the 27 “love letters” the two had exchanged from 2018 to 2019.

But more than six years have passed since they last corresponded, and Mr Kim now has more levers at his disposal. Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile technologies have improved significantly, likely with Russia’s help. Mr Kim was all too happy to demonstrate this with the launch of a new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile and the unveiling of a uranium enrichment facility in 2024.

Mr Yoon’s epic fail will also lend Mr Kim – who views South Korea as a “hostile state” with which the North is at war – more tailwind.

All this puts Mr Kim on a strong footing in 2025 to make demands. He wants to be taken seriously, for his regime to survive, and for North Korea to be recognised. He is setting a high bar for any third Trump-Kim summit – which will need more than love letters to kick-start, given how swimmingly things are going for Mr Kim.

This, coupled with Trump’s impending return to power and a US turn towards unilateralism, could reignite a push for South Korea to go nuclear to protect itself. Seven out of every 10 South Koreans already support their country developing its own nuclear weapons.

India and Australia: Two middle powers, two different paths

A Trump return also brings into sharper focus the dilemma of managing relations with the US and China. In New Delhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has an answer: “Vishwamitra”, a Sanskrit word that translates into “everybody’s friend”.

Mr Modi famously told Russian President Putin that “it’s not time for war” while the world had more pressing challenges, and convinced the US that India had to buy discounted oil from Russia to power its economy and keep global oil prices stable.

His open line to Mr Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu allows him to claim the role of global peacenik. He is also on back-slapping terms with Trump, who, while criticising India for its high tariffs, has been complimentary towards Mr Modi.

Mr Modi, aware of the larger goal of growing the economy and needing Chinese investments in his legacy-building third term, has also shrewdly chosen to thaw relations with China. In October, he reached an agreement with President Xi, in their first bilateral meeting in five years, on patrols along a disputed border in the Himalayans – the site of deadly clashes – opening the door to slowly normalise other facets of the relationship.

Mr Modi knows India derives its diplomatic influence from being everywhere all at once – with one foot in the China-dominated Brics and another in the Quad – while asserting itself as the “voice of the Global South”.

Hence, India’s longest-serving PM since Jawaharlal Nehru will attempt to repeat his success through 2025 by projecting a friendly image and asserting moral authority in touting India’s status as the world’s most populous democracy, even as critics accuse him of shrinking space for dissent within India and deepening religious polarisation.

In a world with rising US-China tensions, India offers a viable economic alternative to China. Many fund managers and foreign investors are bullish on what they see as “India’s decade”, after Mr Modi vowed to make India a developed country by 2047, its centenary year.

With a moderate and growing trade surplus with the US, Mr Modi knows some give-and-take will be needed. He is optimistic that Trump will value steady US-India ties, given their common concerns over China.

But there are troubled waters ahead. Disquiet – globally and domestically – has grown over the purported assassinations of Sikh separatists in North America, allegations refuted by India, which maintains that the Khalistan movement has engaged in terrorism.

Relations with Bangladesh will remain tense over the safety of its Hindu minority and India’s granting of asylum to deposed leader Sheikh Hasina.

Though Mr Modi enjoys great popularity at home, he needs to push through more labour reforms, improve the ease of doing business, rein in unemployment, and ensure that the upsurge in Hindu nationalism does not lead to communal tensions that challenge the country’s stability.

Trump’s return and the likely scramble by countries to create some measure of stability for themselves once he takes office might feel like deja vu to some.

In Trump’s first term from 2016 to 2020, Australia, along with Japan, had led efforts to keep him engaged and help persuade him to elevate the status of the Quad, a security grouping made up of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will find himself shouldering a similar burden and playing a familiar role. After leading his Labor Party to victory at the polls in May 2022, Mr Albanese jumped on a plane barely two days later for a meeting of the Quad with Mr Biden, then Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Mr Modi.

That hectic start to his leadership illustrates the dual challenge he faces in 2025.

On the one hand, Mr Albanese will be counted on to exercise regional leadership in holding up regional alliances and groupings such as the Quad, amid rising tensions in the region and a return of a US president known to be strong-willed and unpredictable.

This is a role Mr Albanese himself has embraced, in touting his credentials working with global leaders and ordinary Australians.

On the other hand, Mr Albanese is coming under pressure to focus on the domestic economy in the last stretch of a politically charged season, as polls must be held by May. His party currently trails the opposition Liberal-National coalition and he must placate voter frustrations over rising living costs. Travelling abroad would take him away from efforts to shore up his political position.

He will be on the alert for signs of potential disengagement by an incoming Trump administration, which could determine how active a role he plays regionally – a job he, unfortunately, has precious little time for in the first five months of the year.

South-east Asia will adjust

In this contested world, how will South-east Asia fare?

Quite well, if you take Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s words at face value. Much of the world still regards the region as possessing the greatest growth potential, as it rides the wave of growth from industrialisation, powered by companies searching for China+1 locations.

Trump’s tariffs may sting, but South-east Asia can still strike some sweet deals with the growth-focused Trump administration. With some luck, there might even be a digital free trade agreement with Asean. Just don’t expect him to show up at every Asean-related summit.

With Trump’s return looming large, Asean leaders have pushed back on protectionism and concentrated on making headway into regional integration and trade. These export-oriented economies – home to nearly 700 million people, and making up altogether the world’s fifth-largest economy – have some of the world’s highest trade-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios and much to lose if Trump enacts across-the-board tariffs.

Asean has not stood still. A Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that came into force in 2022 has boosted trade with Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. Some have also signed up to the amended Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement to deepen economic integration, an arrangement Trump pulled the US out of on his first day in office in 2017.

Two big Asean initiatives, years in the works, are expected to be finalised under Datuk Seri Anwar’s watch. First is an upgrade to the Asean-China Free Trade Area, which will boost intra-regional economic exchange and investments. Second is the Digital Economy Framework Agreement, which is projected to double the size of Asean’s digital economy in 2030 by lowering barriers and developing common standards for cross border e-commerce, digital payments and the use of artificial intelligence.

Mr Anwar will certainly claim victory over Asean’s deliverables by positioning them as his efforts to create a conducive regional environment for foreign investments and advance Malaysia’s economic development.

Yet, he wants more – a shot at global statesmanship. This is a leader who sees Malaysia’s Asean chairmanship for 2025 as nothing less than a chance to reshape the world and the direction of the grouping.

Decrying the “old unipolar world”, the outspoken 77-year-old has called for an overhaul of the global financial system, which “carries the DNA of the Bretton Woods institutions serving the Global North at the expense of the Global South”.

Cynical observers may call it opportunism, but Mr Anwar says it is time the Global South (and East) came to the fore in changing existing structures that “marginalise developing nations”.

“As we confront these challenges, Asean stands as an example of how South-South partnership can advance a more equitable, multilateral global order,” he said on Dec 2 at the Common Action Forum in Kuala Lumpur.

The key word here is “can”, as these lofty statements belie the fundamental tension between Malaysia’s foreign policy activism and Asean’s consensus-based approach to handling regional issues.

Two elephants in the room cast doubt on Mr Anwar’s desire to make Asean great again – the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar since 2021 and escalating tensions in the South China Sea.

Expectations of Myanmar are low, with Asean’s five-point consensus having never been met. The junta’s plan for elections could create fresh momentum. An agreement just to allow humanitarian aid and access to political detainees would be seen as a victory.

Similarly, tying up the preamble and some paragraphs of a code of conduct on the South China Sea between Beijing and South-east Asia’s claimants would be counted as significant progress.

A crisis in the South China Sea, on the other hand, would test Mr Anwar’s leadership of Asean, not to mention the bloc’s cohesion and America’s credibility, particularly if it involves US allies like the Philippines.

Down south, regional leadership may be contested by Indonesia’s “first foreign policy president”, Mr Prabowo Subianto, who won a strong mandate in 2024 when he garnered 58 per cent of the votes in a three-way presidential contest.

He may have been inaugurated only in October, but he has wasted no time in making his mark.

Less than a month after being sworn in, Mr Prabowo embarked on a whirlwind diplomatic tour – visiting China and the US in the same week, and attending major multilateral summits like Apec – quickly signalling his keenness in placing Indonesia at the heart of international diplomacy.

His motivations may be economic rather than geopolitical or personal. Central to the vision for his presidency is a bold objective of achieving 8 per cent growth in GDP, up from the current 5 per cent, a stated aim which critics are deeply sceptical about.

Achieving this target hinges on attracting substantial infrastructure investments designed to enhance connectivity and productivity across the archipelago, and enhance Indonesia’s position as an attractive destination for foreign direct investments.

Internationally, Mr Prabowo will push for a more assertive Indonesia in multilateral groupings. An announcement of Indonesia’s Brics partnership status within days of his assuming the top job, coupled with a declaration that South-east Asia’s most populous country was ready for full membership, suggests Mr Prabowo is unafraid of breaking with positions taken by Mr Joko Widodo’s administration.

But more likely is a scenario in which Mr Anwar finds an ally in Mr Prabowo, who is expected to lend strong support for Malaysia’s Asean deliverables. These facilitate cross-border investments, supply chain connectivity and sustainable development, and are aligned with his administration’s emphasis on “growth-oriented development”.

Mr Prabowo is somewhat of an unorthodox leader – sending Cabinet members to military boot camp and calling Trump to say he will go anywhere in the world to meet him.

The President’s novel foreign policy approach, including improving relations with China and Russia, has sparked debate over whether his bold moves serve the country’s broader strategic interests.

Political observers in the region’s largest country will closely monitor how Mr Prabowo navigates the delicate balance between pursuing an ambitious global agenda and managing domestic criticism of his international decisions.

In this, perhaps Mr Prabowo’s global activism illustrates one truth: Leaders need strong support at home, so they can steer their countries through challenging times.

The gambles awaiting Russia and Israel’s moves

One other geopolitical uncertainty haunts South-east Asia in 2025: How the two hot wars will pan out. Prolonged conflict could squeeze prices of food, energy and critical commodities, countering efforts to bring down inflation and depressing growth prospects.

Developments in the European theatre will be determined by how Russia acts. 2025 could present one of the biggest gambles in the career of Russian President Putin, whose actions will weigh heavily on Europe.

At first, Russia’s strategic prospects look better than at any time since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Ukrainians are slowly retreating: A year ago, around 14 per cent of their territory was under Russian control; it is now at 20 per cent. The Europeans remain pledged to help Ukraine but are increasingly exhausted by the costs this commitment entails. Trump is determined to avoid American entanglement in an endless war. So Mr Putin may be tempted to push on, hoping to achieve the total victory over Ukraine that has eluded him for almost three years.

Yet, doing so also carries enormous risks for Russia. Trump wants to stop the war in Ukraine without being accused of presiding over a US capitulation similar to that suffered by the Americans in Afghanistan. He will insist on concessions from Russia in return for a ceasefire in Ukraine. If Russia refuses to compromise, Trump could well decide to continue arming the Ukrainians.

Although Mr Putin claims that Russia could continue fighting for many years to come, the Russian economy is beginning to feel the strain of its huge defence expenditure, with its central bank head raising the spectre of a future financial bailout by the International Monetary Fund. That Russia now relies on the use of North Korean soldiers as cannon fodder in the war does not inspire much confidence in Russia’s resilience.

Persistent rumours suggest that a Putin-Trump summit is planned as early as February 2025, and the Russian leader will have to think long and hard about his options. He may choose to accept a ceasefire on Trump’s terms in the hope that the West will forget about Ukraine sooner rather than later, and Russia will get a chance to resume its war. Or he may roll the dice by defying Trump and continuing the war.

One thing remains clear: Mr Putin will do everything he can to overturn the current strategic map of Europe. As one top Nato official puts it, there is a “real prospect” that “unconventional” attacks by Russia – including attempts to sabotage Western communication and transport infrastructure – may cause “substantial” casualties during 2025 and require a Nato military response. So, even if Mr Putin blinks first and a Ukrainian ceasefire materialises, the broader confrontation between Russia and the West will continue.

Hubris is also the most significant danger facing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who holds the key to developments in the Middle East.

A year ago, fighting for political survival, he stood accused of failing to detect preparations for the Oct 7, 2023 incursion by Hamas, the Palestinian militant organisation based in Gaza, which resulted in the killing of the largest number of Israeli civilians in the history of the Jewish state. The Israeli military became embroiled in a vicious Gaza war with no end in sight.

In 12 months, while the Gaza war is far from over, Hamas is no longer a fighting force. Hezbollah, the Iranian-funded militia based in Lebanon, has been torn apart by the Israelis, its top leaders assassinated and most of its arsenal destroyed. Two successive Israeli air strikes dismantled Iran’s air defences. At the same time, Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad has been toppled, destabilising another key Iranian ally and sworn enemy of Israel.

Unsurprisingly, Mr Netanyahu’s domestic popularity is now soaring. And with Trump – Mr Netanyahu’s soulmate – soon back in the White House, talk in Tel Aviv now is no longer of just defeating Israel’s immediate opponents but remaking the entire Middle East as Israel becomes a regional power.

Mr Netanyahu is undoubtedly at the peak of his powers. With Iran now at its most vulnerable in decades and most Arab countries consumed by their internal troubles, the Israeli leader retains the strategic initiative.

But his ascendancy will not go unchallenged for long. The plight of the Palestinians remains unaddressed. Hatred of Israel across the Middle East has seldom been higher. The Gaza war has cost Israel a large amount of goodwill around the world. And as friendly as Trump may be, the incoming US president is unlikely to underwrite a military offensive to destroy Iran’s nuclear installation, as Mr Netanyahu now hopes.

Much will depend on how he leverages – or squanders – Israel’s newfound position.

Join ST's Telegram channel and get the latest breaking news delivered to you.

Read Entire Article