The Only Way to Save Europe

The European Union today faces a set of external challenges that threaten its very existence. In December 2025, Pentagon officials told European diplomats that the continent must assume leadership of NATO by 2027, suggesting that the transatlantic alliance may be coming to an end. Meanwhile, Washington’s decision to go to war with Iran, made without serious consultation with its European allies, has produced a global energy crisis and raised further doubts about U.S. reliability. And growing Russian military aggression and Chinese commercial and technological pressure pose serious economic and security problems for Europe.

Europe simultaneously faces an acute danger from within. Economic insecurity and immigration are fueling a populist nationalism that could debilitate, if not dismantle, the project of European integration. Far-right parties are gaining ground across the continent and are seeking to return power from Brussels to national capitals. Populist forces are undermining the EU’s collective will, which is making it even more difficult for Europeans to assume responsibility for their own security.

Europeans have only one option for responding effectively to these dual threats: they must complete the project of European integration. The way forward is to connect the reform proposals of Mario Draghi, the former Italian prime minister and former president of the European Central Bank, with German leadership. Draghi argues for accelerating integration by crafting a common EU policy on artificial intelligence, defense, and energy. Germany is the only country with the political strength to push the bloc in such a direction, and its leaders understand the urgency of the moment: at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz acknowledged the unraveling of the international order and highlighted the importance of increasing EU unity and competitiveness in response.

A German-led reform effort could give the EU the supranational character it needs to move toward strategic autonomy and act as a single player on the global stage. Deepening integration would also generate the economic rebound needed to counter the rising tide of illiberal populism. Draghi argues that Europe needs to make a qualitative leap in integration to the point where the continent can “act more and more as if [it] were one state.” Germany must seize the moment and take the lead in helping European countries come together to make that leap.

A WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

The efforts of China, Russia, and the United States to subvert the international security order are creating a level of global uncertainty and turmoil that is marginalizing the European Union and exposing it to unprecedented risks. U.S. President Donald Trump is the primary source of this upheaval. His threats to seize Greenland shocked not just Denmark but also all of Europe, and his tariffs have disrupted global trade. Trump’s decision to attack Iran has led to a region-wide conflagration and a spike in energy prices. And Washington’s support for Europe’s far right is confounding governments working to defend the center against the ideological extremes. European leaders and citizens increasingly feel that Trump sees allies as burdens, or even adversaries.

Trump’s approach to the war in Ukraine is perhaps the most potent threat to transatlantic trust and solidarity. European countries have concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin attacked Ukraine because he wants to remake the post–Cold War security order in a way that strengthens Russia and weakens the EU. Russia’s military and cyber-sabotage campaigns have reinforced that perception. Russian aircraft, missiles, and drones have penetrated EU airspace and disrupted operations at major airports, including those in Munich and Copenhagen. Trump’s friendly overtures to Moscow and dismissive attitude toward Kyiv have generated disappointment and estrangement in Europe.

Russia is also drawing closer to China, which suggests to many in Europe that Moscow and Beijing increasingly represent a single strategic challenge. In 2024, Chinese troops trained for special operations exercises in Belarus, bringing China’s threat closer to the continent. And Beijing has indirectly supported Putin’s war in Ukraine. In the eyes of many in Europe, Trump is aligning with Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in seeking to dismantle the liberal international order—a sharp departure from his predecessor, U.S. President Joe Biden, who teamed up with Europe to defend that order.

Collusion among Putin, Trump, and Xi could have three possible outcomes, all of which are unwelcome in Brussels. The world could slide toward another great-power war; the three leaders could come to an agreement similar to that of the Yalta conference of 1945, which would lead to the creation of new spheres of influence; or the international system could corrode, leaving behind a Hobbesian world in which only the law of the jungle reigns. Each of these scenarios poses a serious threat to Europe. A great-power conflict would force the EU to take sides, potentially pitting Europe against one or more external powers. A division of the world into new spheres of influence could leave Europe victimized because the continent could be split apart as countries are drawn into separate orbits. And ongoing global chaos would leave the continent unstable and risk its chances at prosperity.

THE THREAT WITHIN

Europe also faces a severe internal threat from populism. France, long a steady anchor of the EU, has gone through five prime ministers in the last two years as populist forces on both the right and left have gained strength. Sébastien Lecornu, appointed prime minister in September 2025, resigned after about a month in office; after President Emmanuel Macron reappointed him four days later, Lecornu cobbled together a government based on a tenuous compromise with the center-right Republicans, which was the only remaining option for the leadership to salvage a workable government. But a collapse of this government is likely because Macron is too unpopular to ensure that it survives, which would lead to new elections. Polls place the far-right National Rally, which is skeptical of the EU and NATO and sympathetic to Putin, as the clear favorite.

Elsewhere, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has steadily been gaining ground and is now tied with or even ahead of the center-right Christian Democratic Union at the top of the polls. For the first time since the end of World War II, the far right could claim the German chancellorship. (The next election is in 2029.) The AfD’s hard opposition to immigration and the EU and its support for Russia has led many European observers to fear the return of an aggressive and racist brand of German nationalism. Should the National Rally come to power in France and the AfD in Germany, the EU may well be finished.

In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has provided stability with her conservative governing coalition. But when Italians go to the polls in 2027, Meloni’s government will face challenges from both inside and outside her coalition. Matteo Salvini of the right-wing populist party the League, which opposes immigration and is supportive of Putin, will challenge her relative support for the EU and Ukraine to gain votes from the extreme right. The opposition alliance of the center-left Democratic Party and the populist Five Star Movement will also take on Meloni. A potential alliance between the anti-EU far right, represented by the League, and the populist left in the Five Star Movement poses a potent threat to the EU. In the United Kingdom, Nigel Farage’s Reform UK keeps gaining strength and could well take over Downing Street as the Labour government falters. Reform UK could usher in an agenda focused on maximizing British sovereignty, which could undo Labour’s efforts to reestablish agreements with the EU on issues such as defense and migration.

One of the main drivers of the populist wave in Europe is backlash against immigration, which presents a particular problem for the project of integration. EU member states need immigrants to counter demographic decline and boost economic growth, but integrating newcomers has become so politically fraught that it threatens any reform proposal. Rifts over immigration policy are currently too profound to resolve, so integration efforts must focus on pursuing economic reforms and improving social conditions in the hope that greater prosperity will create the political conditions conducive to tackling immigration at a later stage.

ITALIAN IDEAS, GERMAN POWER

Draghi, who led the European Central Bank from 2011 to 2019, believes that Europe risks irrelevance and subjugation unless it makes huge strides toward integration. In a 2024 report for the European Commission and multiple speeches since, he has put forward an ambitious program of reforms aimed at creating a Europe that innovates, leads, and succeeds in becoming more like a single country. Draghi’s plan contains four key proposals: economic reforms to enhance competitiveness and growth; investments in AI to stimulate innovation and allow the EU to keep pace with the United States and China; energy policy reform to improve energy security and reduce prices; and changes to security policy and arms procurement to create a common defense.

Draghi also calls for streamlining the EU’s policymaking process. Implementing his economic proposals requires enough collective political will to encourage member states to go beyond their own narrow short-term self-interest. Currently, his proposals cannot gain approval because they require unanimous consent and the EU’s political leadership is too weak to implement major reforms. Draghi proposes that all decisions, including those on defense, should be made by majority vote, ending the EU’s reliance on unanimity.

Draghi’s proposals are the basis for a successful response to populism because they push Europe to strengthen its institutions, which is precisely what populists oppose. He focuses on three areas that are crucial in the current moment: a single energy market to protect consumers from being gouged by suppliers; a single defense system to push back against the growing threat from Russia; and the development of AI to create new jobs and opportunities. Improving Europe’s institutions in these areas can counter critics who believe that Brussels is useless or even harmful to EU citizens. Successful reforms can demonstrate to populists on both left and right that Europe is not the problem but the solution.

But Draghi is not in power. In Italy, Meloni leads a conservative coalition that opposes the transfer of authority from member states to the EU. Italy also lacks the influence in Europe necessary to promote far-reaching reform in Brussels. France has historically been one of the leaders of Europe, and Macron is a strong proponent of strategic autonomy. But the president and his coalition are singularly weak right now, and France’s political landscape is deeply divided as the far right surges in popularity.

Only Germany, Europe’s strongest country, has the clout to pursue such reforms. Merz leads a centrist coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. His strength lies in his sense of purpose: he understands that the only effective antidote to populism is credible economic reforms that increase growth and competitiveness. A fiscal conservative with deep experience in the private sector, Merz speaks the language of markets while defending Germany’s brand of social democracy. Merz also understands power politics. He is staunchly pro-NATO and has figured out how to handle Trump by challenging him on Greenland and Iran, which has allowed Berlin to engage pragmatically with Washington. In an EU that is politically and ideologically divided, Merz is the only leader capable of translating Draghi’s reform agenda into a concrete political project.

Merz, like every other EU leader, faces domestic challenges and is struggling to maintain his popularity. But he has demonstrated a unique willingness to lead the EU. In the face of increasing Russian threats to NATO’s eastern front, Merz visited Lithuania in May 2025 to mark the deployment of a German brigade to the region and assure the Baltic states that their security was integral to European security. When Trump talked about taking over Greenland, Merz was among the first to promise to send troops to defend it; in January, Germany dispatched a small reconnaissance unit to Greenland as part of a joint European mission to bolster Arctic security. It is no accident that just days after Trump clashed with European leaders in Davos in January, Merz flew to Rome to sign a pact with Meloni to ensure that the EU can be, as the Italian prime minister said, “the protagonist of its own destiny.”

Soon after his trip to Rome, Merz attended an informal EU summit in Belgium focused on boosting the continent’s competitiveness and met with Meloni, again, to discuss EU reforms. Draghi attended the summit, too, and gave a speech in which he reiterated that Europe would risk becoming subordinated, divided, and deindustrialized if it did not turn into a “genuine federation.” Merz can start by urging that the EU scrap its unanimity requirement in decision-making, which would immediately accelerate Europe’s ability to act as one and bring Draghi’s proposals on AI, defense, and energy more within reach.

ALL TOGETHER NOW

The war in Iran has confirmed the urgency of putting Draghi’s proposals into action. The energy crisis produced by the conflict has made it clear that the EU needs to unify its energy market. Integrating national energy markets into a single system would lower costs and reduce the continent’s chronic energy fragmentation. Draghi calls for joint purchasing of natural gas to give Europe more bargaining power; massive investment in cross-border electricity grids to allow free flows of energy across member states; and decoupling electricity and natural gas prices to ensure that the low cost of renewables and nuclear energy is passed on to consumers and industry. To finance all this, Draghi supports issuing common European debt in the form of eurobonds. The need for energy security could foster the political momentum needed to pursue reforms aimed at stimulating competitiveness and innovation.

The war also underscores the importance of a common European defense. In March, Hezbollah launched Iranian-made drones at Cyprus, an EU member, revealing the vulnerability of Europe’s southern front. The conflict has also exposed Europe’s severe shortcomings: member states’ militaries have struggled to send ships to help defend their Gulf partners against Iranian retaliation. Yet the war has also shown how ad hoc cooperation among EU countries can be a model for pursuing a common defense. A coalition of member states sent warships and antiaircraft defenses to protect Cyprus, and air defenses to partner countries in the Middle East threatened by Iran.

So far, these efforts only include a small contingent of member states—primarily France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, working in concert with the United Kingdom—that are willing to take on a greater role in defense. Of these, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are displaying similar initiative in the reassurance force that they say they are willing to send to protect Kyiv from new Russian aggression after a cease-fire is reached.

This coalition-based approach to defense provides a valuable model for the future. It shows that several of Europe’s most powerful members are committed to Article 42.7 of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, which mirrors NATO’s Article 5 commitment to collective defense for members. Although no longer part of the EU, the United Kingdom’s readiness to form an “E3” alongside France and Germany and to participate in Europe’s “coalitions of the willing” sends an encouraging signal to Putin that European deterrence exists. And thanks to Berlin’s readiness to ramp up defense spending, Germany will soon also be the continent’s best-armed country.

The next step for the EU is to agree to coordinate defense production. Today, each European country develops and procures its own weapons systems, resulting in massive duplication without additional military value. Draghi has repeatedly denounced the fragmentation of European defense as one of the continent’s most costly inefficiencies. As Draghi noted in his 2024 proposals for the European Commission, EU members have supplied ten different types of howitzers to Ukraine, making battlefield operations needlessly chaotic. Germany can start by promoting an EU-wide effort to jointly procure weapons, share the results of military research and development, and consolidate industrial production. Without integrated air, land, and sea forces, Europe will continue to pay a premium for weak defenses.

If the fusion of Draghi’s reform agenda and Merz’s bold leadership proved successful, Europe would not fall victim to geopolitical collusion among the United States, Russia, and China or to illiberal populism within its own borders. Instead, it would demonstrate that it can be a protagonist, and not a casualty, of the challenge to define a new international security order. It would ensure that it is able to sit at the table with other great powers in shaping the twenty-first century. Marrying Italian ideas with German strength can make Europe a capable political actor able to keep up with the accelerating course of history.

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