Trump’s Second Term and the Future of the Quad

With Donald Trump securing victory in the presidential election, and his party winning a majority in the Senate as well, his second term in the White House is set to bring new dynamics to U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. 

The Quad alliance – comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia –  began to take shape during Trump’s first term, with ministerial meetings in 2019 and 2020. But the grouping truly gained steam under President Joe Biden, who saw it as a crucial means to counterbalance China’s growing influence. During Biden’s administration, efforts to strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia intensified, including holding annual Quad leaders’ summits every year since 2021. 

The latest Quad summit was hosted in Biden’s hometown of Wilmington, Delaware, just two months before the election. A senior administration official framed the summit as a critical step to reinforce the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness and curb China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. “The act of bringing together these four leading maritime democracies … really is exactly the type of alliance activity we need in this moment,” the unnamed official told CNN. Biden’s administration saw the Quad as essential in uniting “four leading maritime democracies” to address regional challenges.

As the election approached, other Quad members voiced their positions. Just a day before the U.S. election, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar affirmed the future of the Quad, with Jaishankar stating that India-U.S. relations would continue to “grow” regardless of the election outcome, citing shared security concerns (read: China). However, Trump’s “America First” policy previously led to the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, casting some uncertainty over his approach to regional alliances more broadly. 

Biden’s administration has significantly strengthened the Quad through heightened military spending and expanded security commitments. Japan, under former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, also increased its defense budget and deepened its security collaboration with the U.S., bolstering the alliance’s foundation. Australia has taken similar steps, most notably with its acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS pact, adding significant maritime strength to its capabilities. India, meanwhile, has maintained a steady defense budget, signaling a more cautious stance amid the Indo-Pacific arms buildup.

In Trump’s second term, Japan and the U.S. will likely remain core players in the Quad, given their growing alignment on defense priorities. Japan’s strengthened commitment, along with mutual security interests through NATO and the Indo-Pacific, positions the Japan-U.S. partnership as a keystone of the alliance’s stability. As Quad members prepare for an uncertain future in China-U.S. relations, this deepening Japan-U.S. bond may be pivotal in maintaining regional security and countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Looking ahead, China-U.S. relations will likely continue to hinge on the Taiwan issue. With tensions high, both nations have strong incentives to avoid open conflict; for the United States, the challenge is to support Taiwan’s defense without triggering war, while China faces significant economic risks from aggressive military action. Biden previously stated in May 2024 that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in case of an invasion, reaffirming Washington’s commitment to Taiwan while still observing its One China policy. During the presidential debates, Trump and Harris did not directly address Taiwan, though it was broadly understood that a Harris administration would have continued Biden’s policies on Taiwan and the Quad.