War in Sudan: al-Burhane, Chemical Weapons, Political Islam, and Accusations Against the United Arab Emirates

Behind the war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces lies a regional confrontation involving Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and several transnational armed networks. Yet the international debate focuses primarily on the accusations against the United Arab Emirates. A more comprehensive analysis must also examine the chemical weapons attributed to the military, the foreign support for General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane, and the military resurgence of Islamists from the former regime of Omar al-Bashir.

Sudan, a Country Sacrificed in a War That Has Become International

What is unfolding in Sudan is no longer simply a war between two generals. It is a national collapse, a proxy war between foreign powers, and an international communications battle in which some interventions are denounced on a daily basis while others remain, curiously, relegated to the background. Since April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), commanded by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane, have been fighting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemetti. This war has displaced some 13 to 14 million people. In 2026, approximately 33.7 million Sudanese were in need of humanitarian assistance, and several regions in Darfur and Kordofan experienced famine conditions. Documented statistics report tens of thousands of deaths, but some estimates cited by the Washington Post put the number of victims as high as 150,000. The actual death toll could be even higher, as no one is accurately counting those who die from starvation, disease, the collapse of hospitals, or the inability to access medication.

Amid this catastrophe, one question remains insufficiently addressed: why does the international debate focus almost exclusively on accusations against the United Arab Emirates, when al-Burhane’s camp also has a vast network of external support? Why does the alleged origin of a weapon used by the FSR immediately spark a backlash against Abu Dhabi, while Iranian drones, Turkish military contracts, Egyptian support, Saudi alignment, and the resurgence of Islamist networks are rarely considered together in a single analysis?

This is not to deny the atrocities attributed to the FSR. Ethnic massacres, sexual violence, looting, forced displacement, and attacks on civilians—particularly in Darfur—are well documented and must be prosecuted. But condemning the crimes of one side cannot justify ignoring those of the other, much less portraying the Sudanese army as a neutral and inherently legitimate institution.

Al-Burhane does not lead a politically neutral army

Portraying the SAF as an ordinary republican army, simply engaged in defending the state, amounts to erasing a large part of Sudan’s recent history. For thirty years, Omar al-Bashir’s regime transformed the military, the intelligence services, the civil service, the banks, and part of the economy into pillars of an authoritarian system steeped in political Islam. Under this regime, the wars waged against peripheral populations, domestic repression, and the campaigns carried out in Darfur resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of people. Al-Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. His regime had welcomed Osama bin Laden in the 1990s and turned Sudan into a hub for various transnational Islamist networks.

Al-Burhan is not an exact replica of al-Bashir and presents himself as a military officer without ideological affiliation. But the institution he commands has never been entirely rid of the structures of the former regime. The war has even offered them a historic opportunity to rebuild. A Reuters investigation documented the organized return of senior figures from al-Bashir’s National Congress Party and the Sudanese Islamist movement to work alongside the army. Islamist leaders claim credit for their contribution to the SAF’s victories, while their networks have helped recruit thousands of fighters and train numerous volunteers. Several figures linked to the former regime have also regained influence in the territories administered by the Port Sudan authorities.

The crucial question, therefore, is not merely whether al-Burhane personally belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a matter of identifying the forces on which his military apparatus depends and those that might claim their share of power in the event of victory. An army that relies on ideological brigades and the networks of a former Islamist regime does not become politically neutral simply because its commander wears the official state uniform.

The coup that destroyed the democratic transition

Al-Burhane did not come to power to save a civilian transition threatened by the FSR. In October 2021, he led—along with Hemetti—the coup that halted the transition that had begun after al-Bashir’s fall. The two men were partners at the time. Together, they helped neutralize civilians, arrest political leaders, and restore the military’s dominance over the state.

Their alliance fell apart when it came to determining who would be in command, at what pace the FSR would be integrated into the army, and which of the two generals would ultimately control the country, its institutions, its mineral resources, and its economic networks. The current war, therefore, does not pit a coup leader against a historic defender of democracy. It pits the two main armed beneficiaries of the failure of the Sudanese transition against each other.

This reality does not erase any of the crimes attributed to the FSR. However, it precludes politically exonerating the SAF command solely on the grounds that it controls the recognized institutions in Port Sudan. International recognition of an administration does not absolve its leaders of responsibility nor does it alter the nature of the armed groups fighting under its banner.

Chemical Weapons: The Accusation the World Would Rather Forget

One of the most serious allegations concerns the Sudanese military’s use of chemical weapons. In January 2025, the Washington Post, confirming a report initially published by the New York Times, revealed that U.S. intelligence agencies believed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had used chemical weapons on at least two occasions. This information emerged just as Washington was imposing personal sanctions on al-Burhane, on the grounds that neither he nor Hemetti were fit to lead a future peaceful Sudan. The Washington Post reported on these U.S. assessments.

In May 2025, the United States formally concluded that the Sudanese government had used chemical weapons during 2024 and announced new sanctions. In September 2026, a dossier consisting of photographs, videos, communications, and documents was presented as evidence that the SAF had developed chemical capabilities, conducted tests, and built up a clandestine stockpile before attempting to conceal it. These new details were reported by The National.

An independent international investigation remains essential to establish the exact nature of the agents used, the locations of use, the number of victims, and the chain of command. But the gravity of the U.S. conclusion should have placed this case at the center of international coverage. Let’s imagine for a moment that comparable intelligence had accused the FSR, or a presumed partner of the UAE, of having developed and then used chemical substances: how many governments would have immediately called for a total embargo, maximum sanctions, and a special United Nations investigation? This difference in treatment represents one of the major anomalies in the Sudanese case.

The Al-Baraa ben Malik Brigade and the Militarization of Political Islam

Among the forces fighting alongside the SAF is the Al-Baraa ben Malik Brigade, which emerged from the Sudanese Islamist movement and has become a major military player in the conflict. In September 2025, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on the brigade due to its involvement in the war, its destabilizing role, and its alleged ties to Iran. The official U.S. statement describes the brigade as an Islamist actor linked to Tehran.

In March 2026, the United States designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a global terrorist entity and announced its classification as a foreign terrorist organization. The Al-Baraa ben Malik Brigade has been identified by Washington as its armed wing. This designation appears in the official OFAC database. It should be noted that this is a U.S. legal classification, not a universal designation adopted by all states or by the United Nations. Nevertheless, it remains politically significant.

According to U.S. authorities, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood is said to have provided up to 20,000 fighters to the war effort, some of whom are said to have received training or other forms of support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. These claims must be verified with the same rigor as any accusations made by a government. They do, however, show that the Islamist presence in al-Burhane’s camp can no longer be portrayed as a fabrication by the FSR or the UAE.

The danger extends beyond the military sphere. Islamist networks can use the war as a tool for political rehabilitation. By presenting themselves as the state’s defenders against the FSR, they are gradually erasing their responsibility for the crimes and authoritarianism of the former regime, rebuilding their structures, and preparing their return to government institutions. Providing fighters today may enable them to demand ministries, positions in the security services, and renewed control over the economy tomorrow.

Foreign Supporters of al-Burhane’s Camp

The prevailing narrative often reduces the international dimension of the war to a single phrase: “The Emirates support the FSR.” Yet al-Burhane’s camp benefits from a much broader network of foreign support. Egypt provides it with significant political and strategic support and, according to several analyses, military assistance. The Egyptian government views the SAF as the institution best positioned to preserve a centralized Sudanese state, protect its southern border, defend its position on the Nile issue, and contain paramilitary forces that could destabilize the region.

Iran has supplied the SAF with drones that have helped shift the balance of power. This cooperation coincided with the restoration of diplomatic relations between Khartoum and Tehran in 2023. It is part of a broader Iranian strategy aimed at establishing military and logistical outposts around the Red Sea. For Tehran, Sudan represents a valuable maritime outlet and an opportunity to rebuild the influence it already held under the al-Bashir regime. Reports of ties between certain Sudanese Islamist fighters and the Revolutionary Guards raise further questions about the extent of this cooperation.

Turkey also plays a key role. A detailed investigation by the Washington Post uncovered a contract worth at least $120 million with Baykar, a company co-owned by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s son-in-law. The contract specifically covered TB2 drones, hundreds of warheads, control stations, and technical assistance to Sudan. The newspaper verified some of the messages, commercial documents, flight data, and images of attacks. Representatives from Baykar reportedly witnessed the operational use of the drones on site. The Washington Post investigation details these deliveries to the Sudanese military.

The documents examined also reveal the economic quid pro quos under consideration: access to copper, gold, and silver mines; fishing rights; and the opportunity for Turkish companies to participate in the development of a strategic port on the Red Sea. This dimension is fundamental. Foreign powers do not support one side solely for ideological or humanitarian reasons. They negotiate over mineral resources, port infrastructure, military positions, and trade corridors. Sudanese blood thus becomes the invisible currency of a geopolitical market.

Russia also features in this competition, through its gold mining interests, its former paramilitary networks, and its planned naval base in Port Sudan. It has maintained ties with several Sudanese actors, either successively or simultaneously, illustrating the fluidity of alliances and the autonomy of certain economic networks from official diplomatic positions.

Saudi Arabia: Official Mediator, an Increasingly Less Neutral Power

At the start of the war, Saudi Arabia could still present itself as a relatively balanced mediator. Together with the United States, it hosted the Jeddah negotiations. Riyadh historically maintained relations with both generals, since al-Burhane’s men, like Hemetti’s, had participated in the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen.

As the conflict dragged on, however, Saudi interests shifted closer to the SAF camp. Assessments by ACLED, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, and the British government now classify Saudi Arabia among the states aligned with the military, alongside Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and other varying partners. A British government summary lists these various forms of external support.

This alignment is not surprising. Riyadh has considerable interests in Red Sea security, port infrastructure, trade routes, and agriculture. The kingdom favors a centralized Sudanese state over a permanently fragmented territory. It also seeks to limit the expansion of Emirati influence along the African coast and the region’s major logistics corridors.

Public evidence regarding direct Saudi military aid remains less concrete than that pertaining to the Turkish contract or the Iranian drones. It would therefore be an overstatement to present every allegation of funding or delivery as definitively proven. It is no longer credible, however, to view Saudi Arabia as an arbiter entirely outside the balance of power. Its rapprochement with al-Burhane’s camp, its diplomatic influence, and its strategic rivalry with Abu Dhabi must be factored into any serious analysis.

Can we speak of a Saudi strategy aimed at containing the Emirates? The competition is evident in Sudan, Yemen, the Red Sea, ports, finance, aviation, and the attraction of international companies. The existence of a centralized mechanism funding every media campaign against Abu Dhabi would, however, require additional documentary evidence. A sound analysis must distinguish between a demonstrable convergence of interests and a conspiracy whose precise organization has yet to be established.

Mercenaries, Militias, and Transnational Networks

The Sudanese conflict also attracts foreign fighters and intermediaries. Colombian nationals have been recruited to fight or provide technical expertise to the FSR, particularly in the use of drones. Routes passing through Libya have been documented, involving the transfer of fighters, fuel, and equipment through territories controlled by forces associated with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army. A United Nations report described Libya as an important logistical and operational base for some of these movements. The Associated Press reported on experts’ findings regarding these networks.

These allegations are serious and must be examined without leniency, even when they point to companies or individuals based in the Emirates. However, the presence of a person, a company, or an intermediary on Emirati territory does not automatically prove the involvement of the Abu Dhabi government. A distinction must be made between private or clandestine activities, the operations of intermediaries, and decisions formally attributable to a state.

As for the SAF, the integration of Islamist brigades, community militias, and former security networks from the al-Bashir era poses a comparable problem. A force allied with a recognized army does not become respectable simply by virtue of that alliance. The official status of the camp to which it belongs does not alter its ideology, its methods, or the risks it poses to civilian populations.

War now functions as an international marketplace where former military personnel, security firms, arms brokers, drone operators, gold traffickers, and local armed groups all operate. Governments may officially support a peace process while, at the same time, companies, citizens, or regional partners contribute to prolonging the fighting. It is precisely for this reason that a serious investigation must examine the entire network of financial and military channels rather than singling out a single external party as responsible from the outset.

Why the Emirates Fight Political Islam

The Emirates’ foreign policy cannot be understood without its resolute opposition to political Islam. Abu Dhabi views the Muslim Brotherhood and its networks not merely as conservative parties, but as transnational structures capable of successively using associations, the media, elections, and institutions to take over the state and gradually erode pluralism. This doctrine is contested by some scholars and governments, but it possesses clear historical and strategic coherence.

Since the Arab uprisings of 2011, the UAE has supported governments, political movements, and at times military actors opposed to Islamist forces, from Egypt to Libya, from Yemen to the Horn of Africa. Their critics describe this policy as interventionist. Their defenders see it as a strategy designed to prevent the formation of an ideological arc that would exploit religion, polarize societies, and pave the way for new authoritarian regimes.

In Sudan, the return of al-Bashir’s structures within the SAF gives concrete substance to this concern. From the Emirati perspective, preventing the re-establishment of a regime dominated by Islamists does not merely mean defending a national interest. It also means preventing Sudan—located between the Sahel, Egypt, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa—from once again becoming a platform for transnational ideological and military networks.

This perspective, however, cannot excuse any atrocities. The ethnic massacres, sexual violence, looting, and obstruction of aid attributed to the FSR must be condemned and prosecuted. Fighting political Islam does not give anyone a license to kill civilians. But this rule must apply equally to the SAF, the Islamist brigades fighting alongside them, and the foreign governments that supply them with weapons, technology, or political protection.

Allegations Against the UAE: What Is Known and What Is Not

The SAF-aligned government accuses the UAE of providing weapons, logistical support, and financial aid to the FSR, particularly through Chad and other regional channels. Abu Dhabi categorically denies any military support to either side. Amnesty International has identified Chinese equipment in Sudan that it believes was re-exported by the UAE, while various investigators have deemed certain supply chains to be credible. These allegations warrant independent investigations, but they do not, on their own, constitute a judicial ruling establishing the UAE’s state responsibility.

In May 2025, the International Court of Justice dismissed the case brought by Sudan against the UAE under the Genocide Convention. It did so on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, due to a legal reservation made by the UAE, and not after ruling on the merits of the allegations. The proceedings and the decision are available on the International Court of Justice’s website. This decision is therefore neither a condemnation of Abu Dhabi nor a general ruling on all of the allegations.

To date, no international court has established on the merits that the UAE is legally responsible for the atrocities committed in Sudan. It is therefore necessary to speak of alleged support, accusations, evidence, or disputed channels, rather than definitively proven guilt.

The real anomaly lies in the asymmetry of attention. Accusations against the UAE are often presented as if they alone encapsulated the international dimension of the war. Turkish contracts, Iranian drones, Egypt’s strategic role, Saudi alignment, Russian interests, chemical weapons, and the return of Islamists are treated as secondary factors. This is not about calling for silence regarding Abu Dhabi, but about demanding the same level of scrutiny for all the powers involved.

Emirati humanitarian aid that some narratives seek to erase

The UAE is among the leading providers of aid to the Sudanese people. According to data released by Abu Dhabi, more than $4.24 billion has been allocated to Sudan between 2015 and 2025, including nearly $784 million since the war broke out in April 2023. This assistance includes food shipments, medicine, evacuations, field hospitals, and contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Health Organization, the Red Crescent, and other humanitarian partners.

In February 2026, the UAE announced an additional $500 million contribution to the United Nations humanitarian response for Sudan. Reuters reported on this commitment. This aid has a tangible impact: it helps feed, treat, and protect populations that would otherwise be abandoned.

We cannot ask Arab states to take on greater humanitarian responsibilities and then automatically portray each of their interventions as a propaganda operation. Aid from the UAE must be monitored, evaluated, and made traceable, just like that of all donors. However, it cannot be dismissed simply because it contradicts a political narrative hostile to Abu Dhabi.

Humanitarian action does not automatically respond to military accusations, just as a contested accusation does not negate the actual effects of the assistance provided to civilians. The two dimensions must be examined separately, with the same standard of evidence.

From Yemen to Sudan: A Rivalry Between Two Gulf Visions

Sudan is not an isolated case. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began the war as part of the same coalition, but their priorities gradually diverged. Riyadh prioritized the formal preservation of a unified Yemeni state under the authority of a central government, while Abu Dhabi supported southern forces and local partners opposed to Islamist groups.

This divergence reflects two different visions of the regional order. Saudi Arabia favors state structures compatible with its border security and political preeminence. The Emirates rely more on local partners, port infrastructure, security networks, and economic alliances. These approaches may be criticized or defended, but they explain why two countries long portrayed as inseparable now find themselves competing in Yemen, Sudan, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa.

The UAE’s rise on the international stage constitutes a significant shift in and of itself. A relatively small country has built global airlines, strategic ports, sovereign wealth funds, logistics infrastructure, and a diplomatic network that allows it to operate far beyond its borders. This success inspires admiration, but also resistance among those who believe that this influence challenges traditional regional hierarchies.

Putting an End to Selective Outrage

The problem is not that the United Arab Emirates is being investigated. Any credible allegation of arms transfers must be investigated. The problem arises when this standard disappears as soon as the discussion turns to chemical weapons attributed to the SAF, Iranian drones, the $120 million Turkish contract, Egyptian support, Saudi alignment, Russian networks, or the military resurgence of al-Bashir’s Islamist structures.

The real question is not whether the Emirates should be held above criticism. No state should be. The question is why accusations against Abu Dhabi are so often presented as a verdict, while the facts concerning the supporters of the opposing side are reduced to mere footnotes.

An honest assessment of the conflict must simultaneously acknowledge several realities. The FSR bears responsibility for considerable atrocities, and no strategy to combat political Islam can absolve it of this. Al-Burhan’s army is neither neutral nor isolated: it enjoys significant international support, has facilitated the return of figures from the former Islamist regime, and faces extremely serious allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons. The UAE pursues its own interests, as do all the powers involved in the region, but it also champions a coherent stance against political Islam and provides humanitarian aid on a scale that cannot honestly be denied.

The Sudanese people will be saved neither by the propaganda of the SAF nor that of the FSR, nor by a campaign that pins the blame for a war fueled by a multitude of states, militias, companies, and clandestine networks on a single country. A solution will only become possible when every external power is held accountable for its actions according to the same standards, when all supply chains are scrutinized with the same rigor, and when the resurgence of ideologies that have already destroyed Sudan ceases to be ignored.

It is precisely this equal treatment that is lacking today.

(*) Lahcen Isaac Hammouch is a Belgian-Moroccan journalist and writer. The author of several books and op-eds, he analyzes social issues, governance questions, and the transformations of the contemporary world.