China’s Military Open New Logistics and Training Facility in Laos

This week, the Chinese military opened a new logistics and training facility at an airport in Laos, further expanding its regional security presence and marking the first overseas presence of the Chinese air force.

In a statement, China’s Ministry of Defense said that the China-Laos Military Joint Support and Training Center was inaugurated on Tuesday, in a ceremony that was attended by Lao Defense Minister Khamlieng Outhakaysone and a delegation from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The facility, which is based at Ban Keun Airport, around 50 kilometers north of the capital Vientiane, also includes a China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy.

“The center, jointly maintained and operated by both sides, is aimed at helping Laos strengthen the training of its air force pilots,” the Ministry said, but offered no details about what personnel or equipment would be based at the airport.

“The construction and use of the center reflect mutual respect and equal consultation between China and Laos, comply with both countries’ domestic laws, relevant international law and common practice,” it said. “It is not directed against any third party and contributes to enhancing practical military cooperation as well as promoting regional peace and stability.”

Satellite imagery of the Ban Keun facility shows it also includes the construction of an extensive airfield. According to Reuters, work began on the new airfield in late 2025 and work was ongoing as of early September. “In place of green fields,” it reported, “a large paved runway and a parallel taxiway and apron were visible, along with a number of new buildings.”

The airport was built on the site of an airfield known as Lima Site 44, one of a network of airstrips that were used by the U.S. military and Central Intelligence Agency during the Vietnam War, when the U.S. secretly supported an insurgency by anti-communist Hmong rebels. However, satellite images show that the new airfield expands far beyond the narrow, red-earthed strip established during the Vietnam War.

The new center adds to the handful of overseas facilities now operated by the PLA, since the opening of its first official overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. It also complements a similar training and logistics facility that has been established at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. The Cambodian facility was officially inaugurated by Prime Minister Hun Manet in April 2025, after three years of Chinese-funded refurbishments that include a 300-meter-long deep-water pier, a 5,000-ton dry dock, and a 1,000-ton slipway.

China’s involvement at Ream has attracted the suspicion of Western, and particularly American, security officials, who fear that the base may evolve into a full-blown Chinese base. Cambodia has sought to allay these fears by inviting foreign navies, including those of Japan, Vietnam, and the U.S., to visit the base.

Collin Koh, a scholar at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said in a post on X that unlike Ream, the base in Laos is “more ostensibly similar to the one in Djibouti.” He added, “It may not be wrong to conclude this is the first full-fledged PLA overseas base in Southeast Asia.”

The development at Ban Keun is perhaps unsurprising given the rapid expansion of China’s influence in Laos over the past 15 years. During that time, the north of the country has become economically fused to southern China, as new highways and an impressive China-built railway have improved overland connections. The Chinese investment presence is clearly visible in most parts of the country, and there is a large Chinese expatriate community in Vientiane and the provincial towns of northern Laos.

Defense relations have proceeded more slowly, perhaps due to the sensitivities of Vietnam, Laos’ traditional defense patron, which has had close ties with Laos dating back to the communist struggle of the 1960s and 1970s. In ⁠June, however, Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith visited Beijing for meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, during which the two leaders agreed to enhance defense cooperation.

Xi also suggested that China and Laos should establish a “3+3” strategic dialogue mechanism involving their foreign, defense, and public security ministers, “as an opportunity to strengthen law enforcement and security cooperation and crack down on cross-border crimes.” (A similar mechanism was established with Cambodia earlier this year.) Last month, Beijing and Vientiane also concluded “Peace Train 2026,” a 16-day joint military exercise aimed at “humanitarian assistance and military medical services.”

One Chinese security analyst told the state-run Global Times that the base at Ban Keun was a means of providing the Lao People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which operates a small and obsolescent fleet of Chinese and Russian craft, with a “systematic training system for pilots, maintenance crew and flight personnel” that will reduce its reliance on overseas training. More broadly, the analyst said, the facility will deepen “practical exchanges” between the two militaries, “upgrading from simple equipment assistance to long-term integrated cooperation in talent training, joint exercises and equipment support.”

Perhaps most tellingly, the analyst drew an explicit parallel between Ban Keun and the facility at Ream Naval Base, noting that together they “cover inland airspace in the Indochina Peninsula and the maritime direction in the Gulf of Thailand.”

In both cases, the Chinese military has emphasized that the facilities have been established on the basis of “mutual respect” and are not directed at any

Nonetheless, the Ban Keun facility has the potential to alter the strategic map of mainland Southeast Asia, pulling Laos and Cambodia further out of the Vietnamese sphere of influence.

Nguyen Khac Giang, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, told Bloomberg that in light of the recent expansion of China’s military presence in Cambodia and the South China Sea, Vietnam in particular could have “serious grounds for concern” if the Ban Keun facility becomes a foothold for a more permanent PLA presence in Laos.

“These developments could give Beijing greater leverage over strategic access routes around Vietnam, raising concerns about its ability to monitor, and potentially constrain, Vietnam’s room for maneuver in time of crisis,” Giang told the newspaper. “Much depends on how the facility is used.”

Vietnam has not yet officially commented on the opening of the new facilities in Laos.