By The Epoch Times | Created at 2026-09-30 23:41:59 | Updated at 2026-10-01 00:39:19
1 hour ago
House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Chairman John Moolenaar (R-Mich.) is urging heightened scrutiny of South Korea’s growing engagement with Beijing, warning that economic, technological, and diplomatic developments could pose risks to U.S. interests in one of Washington’s key treaty alliances in Asia.
In a Sept. 28 letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Moolenaar cited nine months of high-level engagement between Seoul and Beijing, South Korean semiconductor investment in China, and “discriminatory treatment” of U.S. companies compared with Chinese competitors.
“The U.S.-ROK alliance remains indispensable,” Moolenaar wrote, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea. But he said the potential for friction to develop into “a structural shift in Seoul’s alignment”—a longer-term change in how Seoul positions itself between Washington and Beijing—warranted close monitoring and, if necessary, action.
Moolenaar asked the State Department to brief the committee by Oct. 31 on developments in South Korea–China relations and the Trump administration’s response. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer were copied on the letter.
China Ties and Semiconductor Supply Chains
Moolenaar pointed to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s November 2025 visit to South Korea and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s state visit to China in January. During Lee’s visit, the two governments signed 14 memoranda of understanding following his meeting with Xi.
Moolenaar also called Samsung and SK Hynix manufacturing operations in China “serious points of CCP leverage” over allied global supply chains. Samsung operates a NAND flash-memory chip facility in Xi’an, while SK Hynix has operations in Wuxi and Dalian.
The facilities are owned by South Korean companies but rely in part on U.S.-controlled semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technology, putting their operations within the reach of U.S. export controls.
The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security removed Samsung China Semiconductor and SK hynix Semiconductor (China) from its Validated End-User program, effective Dec. 31, 2025. The program had allowed their Chinese semiconductor facilities to receive certain U.S.-controlled items under a general authorization rather than seeking individual licenses for each shipment.
Treatment of US Companies
Moolenaar alleged that South Korean authorities have enforced laws more aggressively against U.S. companies than against Chinese competitors.
He focused on Coupang, a major South Korean e-commerce platform whose parent company is incorporated in the United States. Moolenaar characterized a data breach involving the company as a “low-sensitivity” incident and alleged that 11 South Korean agencies nevertheless mounted a wide-ranging enforcement campaign, including more than 400 facility raids, more than 4,400 document requests and $409 million in penalties.
Coupang said in a Feb. 10 statement that a former employee accessed data from more than 33 million customer accounts but retained data from about 3,000. The company said no payment information, passwords, or government-issued identification numbers were accessed and that it had found no evidence the retained data was exploited.
Coupang did not respond by publication time to questions from The Epoch Times about Moolenaar’s disparate enforcement allegation and whether it could confirm the enforcement figures cited in his letter.
Moolenaar contrasted the enforcement against Coupang with South Korea’s handling of China-linked platforms AliExpress and Temu, citing Korean findings involving security breaches and unsafe products. He argued that Chinese platforms capture Korean consumer data and market share and benefit from what he described as China’s unfair trade and forced-labor practices.
Taiwan and Intelligence Sharing
The letter also raised concerns about Seoul’s position toward a potential conflict over Taiwan.
Moolenaar said Seoul had “effectively ruled out” supporting a regional response if Chinese aggression triggered a Taiwan contingency. He cited a March 22, 2024, campaign rally at which Lee, then South Korea’s opposition leader, questioned why events in the Taiwan Strait should matter to South Korea.
South Korean opposition leader Lee Jae Myung leaves a hospital in Seoul, South Korea, on Jan. 10, 2024. Lee Jin-man/AP Photo
Moolenaar also cited reports alleging that South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young disclosed U.S. classified information when he publicly identified Kusong as another location where North Korea was operating a uranium-enrichment facility, in addition to the previously acknowledged sites at Yongbyon and Kangson. He said the episode reportedly led U.S. intelligence agencies to impose new safeguards, including restrictions on some North Korea-related intelligence sharing with Seoul.
South Korea’s Unification Ministry denied that Chung disclosed classified intelligence, saying his reference to Kusong was based on publicly available information rather than classified intelligence supplied by another agency.
In May, prosecutors assigned a complaint accusing Chung of disclosing official secrets to the Seoul Southern District Prosecutors Office. The Unification Ministry said the assignment was procedural and should not be interpreted as the formal launch of an investigation.
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry also addressed reports about restrictions on U.S. intelligence sharing in an April 21 briefing, saying there were “no problems with coordination between the two countries on North Korea policy.”
Moolenaar said his interest was in strengthening the U.S.–South Korea alliance, but that “allied divergence on important national interests is not a concern to take lightly.”
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry and its embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment by publication time.
